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INCONCEIVABLE? DEDUCTING THE COSTS OF
FERTILITY TREATMENT
Katherine T. Prattt
This Article considers whether infertile taxpayers can deduct their fertil-
ity treatment costs as medical expenses under Internal Revenue Code § 213
and whether they should be able to deduct them. Internal Revenue Code
§ 213 defines medical expenses as "amounts paid-for the diagnosis, cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of affecting
any structure orfunction of the body." This definition is interpreted by refer-
ence to a baseline of normal biological functioning, which includes reproduc-
tive functioning. Most people conceive and bear children without having to
incur expenses for fertility treatment. Expenses incurred to approximate the
baseline of normal reproductive health are deductible, even if the taxpayer
winds up better off, with a child, after the fertility treatment. The medical
profession recognizes that infertility is a disease or condition. Infertility is a
loss, just as a broken leg is a loss. Fertility treatment costs are thus medical
expenses under § 213. In addition, given the existence of the medical ex-
pense deduction, taxpayers should be able to deduct the cost of fertility treat-
ments, including IVF, egg donor, and surrogate procedures, under either an
"ability-to-pay" or consequentialist normative approach. Reproduction is ex-
tremely important to most people. In addition, allowing taxpayers to deduct
the costs of fertility treatment will encourage infertile taxpayers to elect the
most effective treatment option and reduce the rate of risky multifetal
pregnancies. This Article concludes that fertility treatment costs are deducti-
ble as medical expenses under current law and should be deductible as medi-
cal expenses.
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Something to live for came to the place,
Something to die for maybe,
Something to give even sorrow a grace,
And yet it was only a baby.1
INTRODUCTION
Each year, more than a million Americans receive medical treat-
ment for infertility.2 This Article addresses one of the financial as-
pects of fertility treatment, specifically the taxation of fertility
treatment costs. Most medical insurance policies do not cover fertility
treatment.3 As a result, infertile patients bear the costs of fertility
treatment themselves. Infertile patients may, however, be able to
recoup some of these expenses by deducting their fertility treatment
1 Harriett Prescott Spofford, Only, in THE HOME BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 122 (Burton
Stevenson ed., 1949); see also DEBRA BRIDWELL, THE ACHE FOR A CHILD 22 (1994) (quoting
Spofford's poem, Only). Poetry is included in this Article to convey the intensity of the
emotions surrounding infertility and childbearing. "Poetry is the art of letting the primor-
dial word resound through the common word." THE RAG AND BONE SHOP OF THE HEART:
POEMS FOR MEN 182 (Robert Bly et al. eds., 1992) (quoting Gerhart Hauptmann).
2 See RESOLVE, NAT'L INFERTILITY ASS'N, RESOLVING INFERTILIT. UNDERSTANDING
THE OPTIONS AND CHOOSING SOLUTIONS WHEN YOU WANT TO HAVE A BABY 3 (1999) [here-
inafter RESOLVING INFERTILITY]. The American Society of Reproductive Medicine (ASRM)
indicates that infertility affects about ten percent of the reproductive-age population in the
United States (about 6.1 million people). See Am. Soc'y for Reprod. Med., Frequently Asked
Questions About Infertility, at http://www.asrm.org/Patients/faqs.html (last visited Mar. 5,
2004) [hereinafter ASRM, Infertility Q&AI.
3 See Thomas D. Flanigan, Note, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and Insurance Under
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 38 BRANDEIS L.J. 777, 777 (2000) (noting that
ninety-three percent of health insurance plans exclude coverage for fertility treatments);
see also RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 296 (quoting insurance policy language that
inferentially excludes fertility treatment from coverage). On the other hand, some specific
diseases that can cause infertility, such as endometriosis, require treatment even if the
patient is not trying to have a child, so insurance policies often cover this type of treatment.
A small number of states have enacted statutes that require insurance coverage of high-
tech fertility treatments, such as in vitro fertilization. The website of RESOLVE, a non-
profit organization that addresses infertility issues, describes the scope of mandated insur-
ance coverage in such states. See RESOLVE, Insurance Coverage, State laws, at http://www.
resolve.org/main/national/advocacy/insurance (last visited Mar. 5, 2004).
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costs as medical expenses or having their fertility treatment expenses
reimbursed through a medical flexible spending account. 4
Although many fertility patients assume that all of their fertility
treatment costs are medical expenses, for tax purposes, 5 the classifica-
tion of some fertility treatment costs as medical expenses is controver-
sial. 6 No reported cases address this issue. 7 The Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) has issued conflicting rulings on the deductibility of fer-
tility treatment costs. In 1957, the IRS ruled that the costs of artificial
insemination were not deductible medical expenses.8 More recently,
however, the IRS ruled that egg donor expenses were deductible med-
ical expenses.9
Tax commentators disagree about the deductibility of fertility
treatment costs. During an exchange among tax professors on a law
professor listserv, Professor Joseph Dodge argued that fertility treat-
ment costs are not medical expenses because fertility treatment is a
"lifestyle choice," not health care: "[R]eproduction is a bodily func-
tion, but it is one the exercise of which is purely optional-a lifestyle
choice." 10 Although a similar argument could be made about sexual
4 I.R.C. §§ 105, 213 (2000). The § 213 medical expense deduction and the § 105(b)
medical flexible spending account reimbursement exclusion provide for the tax treatment
of certain "medical care," as defined in § 213(d)(1). This Article considers whether fertil-
ity treatment costs are deductible under § 213, or excludable under §105, as medical ex-
penses, and whether they should be deductible or excludable. Section 213(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code provides: "There shall be allowed as a deduction the expenses paid
during the taxable year, not compensated for by insurance or otherwise, for medical care
of the taxpayer, his spouse, or a dependent ... to the extent that such expenses exceed 7.5
percent of adjusted gross income." Id. § 213(a). Section 105(b) provides that an em-
ployee-taxpayer's gross income does not include employer reimbursements for "expenses
incurred by him for the medical care.., of the taxpayer, his spouse, and his dependents."
Id. § 105(b). References to § 213 deductibility in this Article apply equally to § 105
reimbursability.
5 See, e.g., Kristin Davis, The Agonizing Price of Infertility, KIPLINGER'S PERS. FIN. MAG.,
May 1996, at 50, 53 (describing the tax reporting positions patients have taken with respect
to fertility treatment costs).
6 See, e.g., James Edward Maule, Federal Tax Consequences of Surrogate Motherhood, 60
TAXES 656, 661-64 (1982); see also id. at 663 ("In light of the treatment accorded other
devices and procedures designed to mitigate the effects of a disease or bodily malfunction,
a medical expense deduction should be allowed for the cost of resorting to a surrogate
motherhood arrangement."). But see Mark Reid & Daphne Main, Tax Issues Surrounding
Assisted Reproduction Expenses, TAXES, May 2000, at 28-29 (concluding that infertile taxpay-
ers cannot take a medical expense deduction for surrogacy costs).
7 The IRS challenged a taxpayer's deduction of surrogacy costs in a case it litigated,
but the case settled and there was no reported decision. See Sedgwick v. Commissioner,
No. 10133-94, 94 PTT 13-53 (T.C. filed June 7, 1994) (LEXSTAT) (noting that the IRS
determined that surrogacy expenses are not medical expenses).
8 See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 5707244900A (July 24, 1957) (denying a medical expense deduc-
tion for the costs of artificial insemination).
9 See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200318017 (Jan. 9, 2003) (ruling that egg donor expenses and
related costs are medical care expenses within § 213).
10 Posting of Professor Joseph Dodge, Florida State University College of Law,
jdodge@law.fsu.edu, to Taxprof@Listserv.uc.edu (Apr. 20, 2000) (copy on file with au-
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functioning, Professor Dodge argued that the cost of Viagra is distin-
guishable from the cost of fertility treatment and the cost of Viagra
may qualify for the medical expense deduction."1 Professor Calvin
Johnson took the position that the costs of both fertility treatment and
Viagra should not be deductible as medical expenses because repro-
ductive and sexual dysfunction do not involve the sort of catastrophic
losses thatjustify a medical expense deduction. 12 ProfessorJim Maule
argued that fertility treatment costs should be deductible as medical
expenses if the costs of Viagra are deductible as medical expenses. 13
This Article considers whether the costs of fertility treatment are
deductible under current federal tax law and whether they should be
deductible. In dealing with these questions, this Article discusses simi-
larities between the costs of treatment for reproductive and sexual dys-
function, and the costs of medical care that permits reproductive
choice.
thor). Taxprof is a closed Internet discussion group for tax law professors at AALS-accred-
ited law schools.
11 See id.
Viagra does pose an interesting issue, namely whether outlays to overcome
the effects of aging should be viewed as repairs.... The "repair" idea...
presupposes a baseline or norm. Outlays to "improve" one's body probably
shouldn't count as medical expenses, at least in principle.... In the case of
Viagra, "ED" apparently does not effect geezers exclusively. So it might be a
"repair" for some, an "improvement" for some, and in the gray zone for
many.
Id.
12 E-mail from Professor Calvin H. Johnson, University of Texas at Austin, School of
Law, chjohnson@mail.law.utexas.edu, to Professor Katherine T. Pratt, Loyola Law School
(Oct. 3, 2003) (on file with author) (reproducing Posting of Professor Calvin H. Johnson,
to Taxprof@Listserv.uc.edu (Apr. 20, 2000)).
The only legitimate reason for allowing a tax deduction is that the taxpayer
has lost the money and is poorer. The intellectual case for giving deduc-
tions to subsidize good people or good things is essentially trivial. Giving
out real money is a far better idea, primarily because everyone knows it is
real money when they talk about it, and they distribute the money more
sanely. The only rationale for a medical deduction is that medical expenses
are not consumption but inherent losses. You are no better off spending
$10,000 for a broken leg because the combination of break and expense
leave you not improved. They took cosmetic surgery out of [§] 213 because
it did not fit the core idea.
It is difficult to see how a childless couple has a loss by acquiring a child by
high tech means that wipes out the benefit of the expense. Children are
not losses or deductions .... Children are God's gift to parents and they
leave you way ahead, even after counting every dime of the cost. High tech-
nology reproduction hits me as obviously distinct from expenses to cure
disease or breaks. Children are neither a broken leg nor a disease.
Id.
13 Posting of Professor James Edward Maule, Villanova University School of Law,
maule@law.villanova.edu, to Taxprof@Listserv.uc.edu (Apr. 20, 2000). Professor Maule
took the position that fertility treatment for uterine dysfunction is the analogue of Viagra
treatment for erectile dysfunction because both fertility treatment and Viagra mitigate the
effects of reproductive disease. Thus, he argued that surrogacy costs should be deductible
if the costs of Viagra are deductible. Id.
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Part I examines the experience of infertility, including the emo-
tional distress caused by infertility, the medical treatment of infertility,
and the financial burdens of fertility treatment. Part II considers the
tax treatment of fertility treatment costs under current law, first for
medical care that does not involve donors or surrogates, then for the
additional costs of procedures involving donors and surrogates. Part
III explores whether fertility treatment costs should be treated as med-
ical expenses or as nonmedical expenses, given the existence of a
medical expense deduction. In order to resolve this normative ques-
tion, this Article considers: (1) whether fertility treatment costs should
be deductible in order to take into account taxpayers' ability to pay;' 4
and (2) whether various types of fertility treatment costs should be
deductible under a consequentialist normative approach. 15 The Arti-
cle concludes that fertility treatment expenses, like the costs of medi-
cal care that facilitates reproductive choice and the costs of treating
sexual dysfunction, should be treated as medical expenses because of
the vital importance of reproductive and sexual functioning to most
people.
I
THE EXPERIENCE OF INFERTILITY
A. The Extreme Emotional Distress Caused by Infertility
Most people want to have children at some point in their lives. 16
This does not mean that every person should want to have children.
In addition, people who want to have children want to be able to de-
cide when to have their children. Reproductive choice is highly per-
sonal. The point here is that the desire to have children is pervasive,
although not universal.
The vast majority of couples can conceive and bear children with-
out fertility treatment, so fertility treatment merely returns infertile
taxpayers to where they would have been absent the medical infertil-
ity. Professor Calvin Johnson argues that the medical expense deduc-
tion applies to losses incurred to try to return the taxpayer to a
baseline of health; bearing a child makes the taxpayer better off, so
fertility treatment does not fit the rationale for the medical expense
deduction.1 7 In his view, "[c]hildren are neither a broken leg nor a
14 See discussion infra Part III.B.
15 See discussion infra Part III.C.
16 See LewisJ. Lord et al., Desperately Seeking Baby: Ten Million Americans Are Struggling to
Have Children, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 5, 1987, at 58, 59 (noting that "[o]nly [two]
percent of married women actually prefer to be childless").
17 See E-mail from Professor Calvin H. Johnson, University of Texas at Austin, School
of Law, chjohnson@mail.law.utexas.edu, to Professor Katherine T. Pratt, Loyola Law
School (Oct. 3, 2003) (on file with author) (reproducing Posting of Professor Calvin H.
Johnson, to Taxprof@Listserv.uc.edu (Apr. 20, 2000)).
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disease.118 It is not the child that is the loss, however; the infertility is
the loss. The goal of the medical treatment is to restore the infertile
taxpayers to the normal state of being able to bear a child if they want
one.
Infertility is a loss, just as a broken leg is a loss, and the following
discussion explores the effects of that loss. People usually assume that
they will not have any trouble having children when they want to have
them. The reality of infertility comes as a shock. As one infertile pa-
tient observed, "[f] inding out that you are infertile can feel like sud-
denly discovering a limb is paralyzed."19
Long-term treatment of infertility exacts a heavy toll, both emo-
tionally and financially.20 Infertility often has a devastating emotional
18 Id.
19 See BRIDWELL, supra note 1, at 93.
What if for instance, a woman on her way out the door in the morning,
reached out to pick up a glass of orange juice and found her arm wouldn't
move. Imagine her shock. She thinks, That's strange, maybe I just need to
think about what I'm doing. She concentrates and tries again. Nothing hap-
pens. She's confused because she's never had any reason to doubt that her
arm would work. The cold fear of something dreadfully wrong settles on
her. She sees a doctor and goes through years of test and treatments. All
the doctor can tell her is that she might never regain the use of her arm,
but there is always the chance that it might spontaneously heal sometime in
the future if she keeps trying to use it.
Each time she thinks of using her arm, a small persistent hope rises in
her-maybe this time it will work. But each time it fails her hopes are
crushed. Meanwhile, she looks no different to the outside world. People
are confused when she stops coming to the volleyball games or won't shake
hands.
When she finally ventures to tell some friends about her disability, she hears
a lack of understanding: "well at least you have your other arm," or "at least
it's not life-threatening." . .... She will have to go through a myriad of
feelings on her own as she sorts through and realigns herself to her new
reality without the use of her arm. Before she adjusts, the shock and fear
will probably turn into questioning, anger, feelings of vulnerability, and
deep sadness....
With an infertile person, the part of his or her body that would make a baby
or hold a baby until it can be born is that part that is disabled. To varying
degrees, we go through this same type of grief and reassessment process as
we adjust to the reality that part of our body is not working and what that
means to our self-image and life plans.
Id. at 93-94.
20 See SusAN LEWIs COOPER & ELLEN SARASOHN GLAZER, CHOOSING ASSISTED REPRODUC-
TION: SOCIAL, EMOTIONAL, & ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 17 (1998).
[1] nfertility involves multiple losses. From the first moment that an individ-
ual or couple realizes that they are having difficulty conceiving or carrying a
child, they are confronted with loss. [They suffer the] loss of self-esteem,
loss of body integrity, loss of privacy, loss of sexual pleasure, loss of time,
loss of money, [and] loss of comfort in friendships and family
relationships. ...
Id. The authors also note that infertility and its treatment can imperil the infertile pa-
tient's marriage, relationships with others, and career. Id.
Another author compares the stresses of being infertile to the stresses of having a
chronic illness. See BRIDWELL, supra note 1, at 129. These include the stresses associated
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:1121
effect, especially on women.2 1 In numerous psychological studies, re-
searchers have found that infertile women frequently suffer from se-
vere depression. 22 In a famous study, researchers discovered that
infertile women's scores on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) (a
test used to measure the severity of depression) were comparable to
the scores of patients with terminal diseases like cancer. 23
Infertility causes grief in men as well, but men sometimes feel
constrained in their expression of grief.24 One grieving man stated:
I'll always love the ones we lost. Every time we had a miscarriage, I
thought it would be easier if somebody would just take [my] arm or
leg so I could have a child....
with "dealing with the schedule of doctor's appointments and medication, operations and
uncomfortable medical procedures, the side effects of drugs, the emotional energy spent
in working through fears and grief, and needing to adjust to a different reality than [the
intended parents] had planned." Id.
21 COOPER & GLAZER, supra note 20, at 18-19.
The observation that women and men experience infertility in different
ways is something that has long been known by infertile couples and their
caregivers. This phenomenon has been studied by several researchers. Wo-
men have been found to experience significantly more psychological dis-
tress than do their partners, especially in the areas of depression, anxiety,
cognitive disturbance and hostility. Researchers suggest that these findings
can best be explained by differences in expectations about motherhood
and fatherhood.
... For many [women], the threatened loss of pregnancy and childbirth
represents an immense loss. They report having looked forward for many
years to growing a baby inside them-to feeling its movement within their
womb and experiencing its birth during labor and delivery. Some find the
thought that they might never have this experience unfathomable: it fills
them with profound sadness. Thus, for some women pregnancy feels like
an essential life event, one that cannot be missed.
Id. Most of the psychological literature on the experience of infertility focuses on women's
experiences of infertility.
22 See, e.g., Alice D. Domar et al., The Prevalence and Predictability of Depression in Infertile
Women, 58 FERTILITV & STERILITY 1158, 1161-62 (1992) (noting that the researchers were
not surprised to find that the "infertile women had higher depression scores than control
women"); Anna Hjelmstedt et al., Gender Differences in Psychological Reactions to Infertility
Among Couples Seeking 1NF- and ICSI-Treatment, 78 AcTA OBSTETRICIA ET GYNECOLOGICA
SCANDINAVICA 42, 44-46 (1999) (noting the different psychological impact infertility has on
women and men); Michelle P. Lukse & Nicholas A. Vacc, Grief Depression, and Coping in
Women Undergoing Infertility Treatment, 93 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 245, 249 (1999) (find-
ing that infertile women "experienced measurable levels of grief and depression").
23 See Domar, supra note 22, at 1161-62 (reporting BDI scores for women suffering
from infertility). One patient describes the depth of her despair: "What surprised me
about the grief was the way it kept blindsiding me when I least expected it. A day... would
start with no great emotional load, but a word or a song would set me off, and ... I
couldn't control my sobbing-not crying-uncontrollable sobbing." BRIDWELL, supra note
1, at 95.
24 See BRIDWELL, supra note 1, at 146 (societal roles permit women to express their
grief openly, but pressure men to appear strong even when they experience grief).
1128
2004] DEDUCTING THE COSTS OF FERTILITY TREATMENT 1129
... The sadness hit so deep [I] couldn't sleep. It was blacker than
black. When you're that low, there's not much anybody can do or
say. 2
5
Many infertile patients report that infertility has been "the most
upsetting experience of their lives."' 26 Infertile patients repeatedly ex-
perience a cycle of hope for a child and loss of their hoped for child. 2 7
The hoped-for child exists on an emotional level even if the child is
never physically conceived. 28 The feelings of loss experienced by in-
fertile patients are real and recurrent, even though most people find
them difficult to comprehend. 29 The failure of others to understand
the anguish of infertile patients adds to patients' feelings of
isolation.30
Infertility deprives would-be parents of an "experience that is cen-
tral to ... identity and meaning in life." 3 1 As Lori Andrews and Lisa
Douglass have noted, "It]he lengths to which [infertile patients] will
go to conceive a child attest to the intensity of the pain of infertility.
32
25 Id. (alterations in original).
26 Ellen W. Freeman et al., Psychological Evaluation and Support in a Program of In Vitro
Fertilization and Embryo Transfer, 43 FERTILITY & STERILITY 48, 50 (1985) (noting that fifty
percent of women and fifteen percent of men being treated for infertility described the
experience with this language).
27 BRIDWELL, supra note 1, at 94-95 ("Those unable to conceive a child do not experi-
ence a clean grief because the loss happens over an extended period of time as a monthly
cycle of hope and grief.").
28 The following poem captures the experience of a hoped-for child:
How can I say good-bye,
When we've not yet said hello?
My "Imagined Child"-will you ever come to be?
From early years the future was guaranteed-now
I wonder, "Will this dream be realized?"
Carefree and assured, we started our lives together;
Tentative and unsure, will we forever fear the future?
The pathway to you is uncertain,
The questions unanswerable.
As the journey continues, filled with evaluation of
uncharted territory, my vision of you remains constant.
My peace is found in knowing that while I may not
hold you in my arms, I will always hold you in my heart.
D. Rausch, Uncharted Territory, reprinted in JOHN C. JARRETr II & DEIDRA T. RAUSCH, THE
FERTILITY GUIDE: A COUPLES HANDBOOK FOR WHEN You WANT TO HAVE A BABY (MORE THAN
ANYTHING ELSE) iii (1998).
29 BRIDWELL, supra note 1, at 128-29.
-0 See JOAN LIEBMANN-SMITH, ET. AL., THE UNOFFICIAL GUIDE TO OVERCOMING INFERTIL-
ITY 273-77 (discussing the embarrassment and stigma many infertile patients feel in decid-
ing whether to tell others of their infertility); RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 220
("[Sjelf-imposed secrecy that tends to surround infertility is a major contributor to stress
[and] [c]oming out in the open about your infertility can mean opening yourself to com-
ments and criticisms from those who do not understand what you are experiencing.").
31 SeeJOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUC-
TIVE TECHNOLOGIES 24 (1994).
32 Lori B. Andrews & Lisa Douglass, Alternative Reproduction, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 623,
629 (1991).
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The following poem captures the elemental despair infertile patients
experience:
Oh, many's the time in the evening
When the light has fled o'er the sea,
That I dream alone in the gloaming
Of the joys that are not for me;
And oft in my sorrowful bosom
Swells up the mother-love flame,
And I clasp with my arms that are trembling
My child that never came....
The hours swim on the midnight,
The moon looks over the hill,
And the u-lu-lu of the night owl
Sinks mournfully and shrill;
The solitude aches with rapture,
And my heart with the mother-love flame
As I sing alone in the gloaming
To the child that never came. 33
B. The Medical Treatment of Infertility
Infertility is "a disease or condition affecting the reproductive sys-
tem that interferes with the ability of a man or woman to achieve a
pregnancy or of a woman to carry a pregnancy to live birth."34 There
are many causes of infertility. Male factors and female factors each
account for about a third of infertility cases. 35 Infertility is attributable
to a combination of male and female factors in about ten percent of
infertility cases. 36 In about twenty percent of infertility cases, the in-
fertility is "unexplained," i.e., it cannot be diagnosed. 3 7
Male factors include: (1) disorders related to impaired sperm
production, maturation, or transfer, including varicocele (testicular
varicose veins);38 (2) blocked or absent vas deferens (the tube that
connects the testes and the urethra); and (3) absent or retrograde
ejaculation. 39 These problems can be caused by a variety of factors,
including: hormonal imbalances; genetic disorders; environmental
33 Ella Rhoads Higginson, The Childless Mother's Lullaby, in A BOOK OF LULLABIES 383
(Elva S. Smith ed., 1925).
34 RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 5. According to the American Society of
Reproductive Medicine, infertility is "a disease of the reproductive system that impairs one
of the body's most basic functions." ASRM, Infertility Q&A, supra note 2.
35 See ASRM, Infertility Q&A, supra note 2.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Ten to fifteen percent of men may have varicocele and forty to fifty percent of men
treated for infertility have varicocele. See RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 165.
39 See BRIAN KEARNEY, HIGH-TECH CONCEPTION: A COMPREHENSIVE HANDBOOK FOR
CONSUMERS 14-15 (1998).
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factors; anatomical defects; sexually transmitted diseases; spinal cord
injuries; and bladder, prostate gland, or testicular cancer or surgery.40
Female factors include ovulation disorders, blocked fallopian
tubes, cervical disorders, endometriosis, and uterine disorders. 41
These female factors can be caused by a variety of conditions, such as:
hormonal imbalances; autoimmune reactions; genetic disorders; ana-
tomical defects (including those caused by in utero exposure to DES
taken by the patient's mother42 ); pelvic inflammatory disease, vene-
real disease, and other types of infection; scar tissue; fibroid tumors;
and cancer.43
Fertility rates decline for women in their thirties and dramatically
decline for women in their forties.44 The progressive decline in a
woman's fertility is due to a combination of several factors, including
increased rates of ovarian dysfunction, 45 uterine dysfunction, 46 and
chromosomal abnormalities in their eggs.47 While women can still
conceive and bear children during perimenopause (the series of grad-
ual hormonal changes that precede menopause), they are less fertile
at this point in their lives. 48
40 Id. at 14-15; see also Herman Kattlove & RogerJ. Winn, Ongoing Care of Patients After
Primary Treatment for Their Cancer, CA (AM. CANCER SOC'Y), May 1, 2003, at 172 (noting that
infertility is a complication of testicular cancer treatment).
41 Id. at 11-14.
42 During the mid-1900s, some pregnant women took a prescription drug called di-
ethylstilbestrol (DES). See RESOLVING INFERTILrT, supra note 2, at 136. Women who, as
fetuses, were exposed to DES can develop various types of reproductive disorders that
cause infertility, including cervical disorders, uterine disorders, tubal disorders, irregular
menstrual cycles, and endometriosis. See id. at 137-38. In utero exposure to DES also
increases a woman's risk of miscarriage and premature delivery. See id. at 138.
43 See KEARNEY, supra note 39, at 11-14; Resolving Infertility, supra note 2, at 89-101,
121-45; see also Anita Hamilton, Eggs on Ice; A Woman's Fertility Often Peaks Before She's Ready
to Have Babies. Does Banking Her Eggs Make Sense?, TIME, July 1, 2002, at 54 (noting that
cancer treatment causes infertility).
44 SeeJARREr & RAUSCH, supra note 28, at 37-38.
45 See KEARNEv, supra note 39, at 11 (noting that certain ovulation disorders are more
common in older women); RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 149 (same).
46 See RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 149 (noting that rates of certain uterine
disorders increase as a woman ages).
47 See KEARNEY, supra note 39, at 293 (noting that embryos of older women have a
higher risk of chromosomal abnormalities); RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 149
(same).
48 See RESOLVING INFERTIITY, supra note 2, at 14. A higher percentage of older wo-
men are having children, despite the fact that a woman's fertility declines with age. Id at
11, 14. Since 1981, the birthrate for 40 to 44-year-old women has increased seventy-four
percent. Id. at 14. About sixty-nine percent of the in vitro fertilization (IVF) cycles in 2001
were performed on women between the ages of 30 and 39. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION, ET AL., 2001 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES 21 (2003),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/ARTO/PDF/ART200l.pdf [hereinaf-
ter 2001 CDC REPORT]. Although some female factors are related to age, other female
factors are not related to age and can occur in younger women. See COOPER & GLAZER,
supra note 20, at 196-97 (describing various causes of premature ovarian failure in young
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Medical treatment of infertility is progressive. The physician be-
gins fertility treatment by taking the patient couple's 49 medical history
and by conducting physical and pelvic examinations.50 If, based on
this preliminary information, the source of the infertility cannot be
determined, the doctor selects from a number of other tests and
procedures. 51
Doctors frequently ask infertile female patients to generate ovula-
tion records (based on their temperature and on ovulation indicator
tests) 52 and order blood tests to determine whether the woman's hor-
mones are within normal ranges at various times during her cycle. 5
Transvaginal ultrasound often is used to monitor the woman's ovu-
latory cycle. 54 Doctors also frequently order an X-ray of the fallopian
tubes and uterus to check for blockage of the patient's fallopian tubes
and abnormalities in the uterus. 55 If the doctor suspects that the in-
fertility is caused by certain problems, such as endometriosis or fibroid
tumors, the doctor may perform a laparoscopy, which is a diagnostic,
outpatient surgical procedure. The doctor may also perform a
postcoital test to determine whether the woman's cervical mucus is
normal or abnormal and whether any of the man's sperm are alive
and moving. 56
The workup for male patients begins with the man submitting a
semen sample to determine whether each of the following is normal
or abnormal: (1) the total volume of semen; (2) the sperm count; (3)
sperm motility and velocity; (4) morphology (maturity, shape, and size
of the sperm or the sperm head); (5) liquefaction and viscosity of the
women); see also supra notes 44-47 (describing fertility problems that are more likely to
occur in older women).
49 Infertile patients may be in a traditional or nontraditional relationship. Most infer-
tile patients are heterosexual married men and women. Some patients are unmarried
couples, either heterosexual or same-sex, and some patients are individuals who plan to be
single parents. For consistency and unless otherwise noted, this Article will use nomencla-
ture that fits the typical case. Professor Lisa Ikemoto criticizes the common assumption
that the fertility patient is heterosexual and married, and considers the implications of this
assumption for nontraditional patients, including single parents and gay and lesbian
couples. Lisa C. Ikemoto, The In/Fertile, the Too Fertile, and the Dysfertile, 47 HASTINGS L.J.
1007, 1027-33, 1053-57(1996).
50 See RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 66-69.
51 Id. at 68-69.
52 See id. at 70-72.
53 See id. at 90-91. The hormones commonly tested include FSH, LH, estrogen (in
the form of estradiol), prolactin, progesterone, thyroid-stimulating hormone (TSH), and
adrogens (including the male hormones testosterone and dehydroepiandrosterone sul-
fate). Id.
54 See id. at 74.
55 See id. at 75-77. This diagnostic X-ray is called a hysterosalpingogram (HSG). Id. at
75.
56 See id. at 75.
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semen; (6) white blood cell count; and (7) seminal fructose levels. 57
Semen is also tested for: (1) infections, such as chlamydia; (2) sperm
antibodies; and (3) the ability of the sperm to penetrate an egg.58
Male patients also submit blood samples so that the laboratory can
determine whether the man's hormone levels are normal or abnor-
mal.59 In more severe cases, doctors may perform a testicular biopsy
to evaluate sperm production.60
This infertility workup usually enables the doctor to identify and
treat specific causes of infertility. For example, endometriosis may be
treated with surgery, hormonal treatment, or a combination of the
two.6 ' Clomiphene citrate, a moderately priced pill, which is taken
orally, is often prescribed for certain types of ovulation and uterine
disorders. 62 Doctors may also treat these ovulation and uterine disor-
ders, as well as other types of disorders, with various injectable pre-
scription drugs that stimulate the ovaries. 63 A doctor stimulating a
woman's ovaries monitors the cycle with blood tests and transvaginal
ultrasounds in order to determine the number of developing follicles
and the correct medication dosage, and to detect any side effects of
the medications. 64 Doctors also treat certain male factors with surgery
or hormonal medication. For example, varicocele, a common male
factor, can be surgically repaired. 65 Doctors also use intrauterine in-
semination (IUI) for some female factors and some male factors.6 6
The vast majority of infertile patients receive conventional drug
and surgical treatment. 67 If these treatments are not successful, how-
57 Id. at 81-85.
58 Id. at 85-86.
59 See id. at 86-87.
60 See id. at 86.
61 Id. at 125.
62 Id. at 103-04. Clomiphene citrate is sold under the brand name Clomid or Ser-
ophene. Clomiphene citrate is typically administered for five consecutive days during a
woman's cycle. Id. The daily dose is one to four 50-milligram pills and the cost is around
$10 per pill. Id.
63 Id. at 105-10.
64 The most serious immediate side effect of ovarian stimulation is Ovarian Hyper-
stimulation Syndrome (OHSS), which occurs in one to five percent of medicated cycles.
Id at 114. Ovarian Hyperstimulation Syndrome is a condition in which the ovarian stimu-
lation causes an abnormal amount of fluid to accumulate in the abdominal cavity. Id. The
"fluid accumulation can cause pressure on surrounding organs, including the lungs and
heart. Breathing difficulties, dehydration, and severe nausea can result; occasionally, hos-
pitalization may be required." Id.
65 Id. at 166-67. Surgical repair of varicocele dramatically improves sperm counts,
sperm motility, and fertility. See id. at 168.
66 Id. at 145-46, 171. In an IUI, the man's sperm is processed to concentrate the
highest quality sperm, and then the physician transfers the sperm into the woman's uterus
at the time of ovulation, using a catheter through the cervix. Id. at 145-46.
67 The ASRM estimates that eighty-five to ninety percent of infertile patients are
treated with conventional drug and surgical treatments. See ASRM, Infertility Q&A, supra
note 2.
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ever, patients sometimes resort to assisted reproductive technologies
(also known as high-tech fertility treatments), including in vitro fertili-
zation (1VF) and procedures that involve third parties, such as sperm
donors, egg donors, and surrogates. In IVF procedures, the doctor
stimulates the ovaries of the intended mother and extracts her eggs
when they are mature. 68 The eggs are then fertilized with the in-
tended father's sperm in a test tube and several days later the result-
ing embryos are implanted in the intended mother's uterus. 69
If the cause of the infertility is a sperm disorder (such as low
sperm count, poor sperm motility, or abnormal sperm morphology), a
relatively new technique called Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection
(ICSI) may be used in conjunction with IVF. In an ICSI procedure,
an embryologist injects a single sperm into each egg.70 ICSI dramati-
cally improves fertilization rates, 7' and doctors have hailed it as a revo-
lutionary treatment for sperm disorders. 72
Some couples can only have a child with the help of a sperm do-
nor, egg donor, or surrogate. Couples requiring sperm donation typi-
cally use the sperm of an anonymous donor from a sperm bank.73
The cost of sperm donation is minimal because it is easy for the donor
to provide the sperm sample.7 4
If the intended mother cannot produce healthy eggs, the couple
can arrange for an egg donor to provide them with eggs. An egg do-
nor procedure is similar to an IVF procedure, except that the doctor
stimulates the egg donor's ovaries instead of the intended mother's
ovaries, and then extracts the donor's eggs when they are mature.
The eggs are fertilized with the sperm of the intended father or a
donor, and the resulting embryos are then implanted in the intended
68 See RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 176-80.
69 See id. at 180-82.
70 See KEARNEv, supra note 39, at 115, 117-18. The first successful ICSI procedure
occurred in 1992. It is now a common procedure. Id. at 115-16.
71 See id. at 118-20 (reporting that ninety percent of eggs injected using ICSI survive
intact and seventy percent of those injected eggs reach normal fertilization).
72 See id. at 115; RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 186. One fertility specialist,
Dr. Sherman J. Silber, opined: "The development of ICSI has completely revised the way
we look at male-factor infertility. There may soon be virtually no form of male infertility
[other than complete absence of the testes] that is not amenable to treatment." KEARNEv,
supra note 39, at 115.
73 See COOPER & GLAZER, supra note 20, at 175 (noting that couples rarely use a known
sperm donor).
74 The cost of sperm donation is incidental compared to the cost of egg donation or
surrogacy. BRIDWELL, supra note 1, at 198, 209 (comparing average sperm donation cost of
$30 and average egg donor cost in 1993 of around $1,500). Thus, this Article will limit
discussion of third-party costs to egg donor and surrogacy fees.
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mother's uterus. 75 Couples enlisting the assistance of an egg donor
may know the donor or may find the donor through an agency.76
If the intended mother can produce eggs but cannot gestate the
child, the intended parents can arrange for a surrogate to gestate the
child. After the intended mother's ovaries are stimulated, the eggs
are extracted and fertilized and the resulting embryos are implanted
in the uterus of a surrogate who carries and bears the child.77 If the
intended mother cannot produce healthy eggs or carry the child, the
intended parents can either arrange for a donor to give them eggs,
which are fertilized and then implanted into the uterus of a surrogate
who carries and bears the child, or for a surrogate to both provide the
eggs and gestate the child.78
C. The Cost of Medical Treatment for Infertility
The cost of fertility treatment ranges from moderately priced
treatments to very expensive treatments. The cost of clomiphene cit-
rate for one month of treatment is usually between $40 and $200. 79
An IUI procedure usually costs a "few hundred dollars."80 Surgery to
open blocked fallopian tubes costs $10,000 to $15,000.81 The costs of
injectable ovarian stimulation drugs for one cycle of treatment can
total up to $5,000.82 Surgery to repair varicocele typically costs $5,000
to $8,000.83
Assisted reproductive technologies are among the very expensive
types of treatment.8 4 The average price for a single IVF procedure is
75 See RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 273.
76 Intended parents often use known egg donors, but rarely use known sperm donors.
COOPER & GLAZER, supra note 20, at 211. About twenty percent of egg donors are known
by the intended parents. See REsOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 277.
77 See RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 280.
78 See COOPER & GLAZER, supra note 20, at 251. Surrogates are typically paid a fee,
which varies and can range from $10,000 to $25,000, with additional amounts paid for
carrying multiple fetuses. See, e.g., Liz Doup, The New Extended Family, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL,
Apr. 6, 2003, at IE (noting that the typical surrogate fee is about $18,000); Brian M.
Schleter, The Business of Babies, THE CAPITAL (Annapolis, MD), Aug. 6, 2001, at Al (report-
ing that surrogate fee can be up to $25,000); Janet Zimmerman, Path to Parenthood: An
Inland Woman Steps in as a Surrogate to Help Other Couples Have Children, PREss ErTRPRsE
(CA), June 23, 2002, at El (noting that surrogates are paid about $20,000).
79 Patients take one to four pills a day for five days and the cost for one pill is around
$10. See RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 103-04.
80 See Davis, supra note 5, at 51.
81 See Vickie Chachere, 'Test Tube' Babies Began 20 Years Ago, TAMPA TRIB., July 25,
1998, at 1.
82 See LIEBMANN-SMITH ET AL., supra note 30, at 320.
83 See Chachere, supra note 81.
84 Assisted reproductive technology expenses include: (1) the costs of various pre-
scription drugs, including the drugs used to stimulate the ovaries of the intended mother
or egg donor; (2) the costs of medical supervision of the stimulation, including the costs of
ultrasound monitoring of the developing eggs; and (3) the hospital, lab, and doctor fees
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around $10,000, and infertile patients often undergo numerous pro-
cedures.85 ICSI adds about $2,500 to the cost of a single IVF cycle.8 6
In egg donor and surrogate procedures, the intended parents incur
additional expenses, the largest of which is the fee paid to the egg
donor or surrogate.8 7 An egg donor's fee is typically in the $3,000 to
$5,000 range, but a small number of egg donors receive a higher
fee. 88 The fee for surrogates also varies, but is usually in the $10,000
to $25,000 range. 9
Insurance does not usually cover fertility treatments per se,90 but
may cover the treatment of certain disorders that can cause infertil-
ity.9 1 Fertility patients therefore must pay for most of their fertility
treatment.
Patients spend vast sums of money to increase their chances of
conceiving and bearing a child, even though two in five are not able
to do so. 92 This willingness to pay large amounts for fertility treat-
ment creates intense financial pressure for infertile patients. Patients
for the egg extraction and implantation. See LIEBMANN-SMITH ET AL., supra note 30, at
319-20 (discussing these expenses).
85 See RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 303; see also Davis, supra note 5, at 51
(reporting that "[ilt isn't unusual for [infertile] couples to spend $30,000 or more in their
quest for a child").
86 See Chachere, supra note 81.
87 These expenses include the fees paid to: (1) the agency that represents the donor
or surrogate; (2) legal counsel to represent the donor or surrogate; (3) a psychologist to
evaluate and counsel the donor or surrogate; and (4) the donor or surrogate. See LIEB-
MANN-SMITH ET AL., supra note 30, at 320; see also Doup, supra note 78, at IE (noting that
expenses for a surrogacy procedure included the surrogate's fee, the fee paid to the agency
representing the surrogate, and the surrogate's legal and medical fees).
88 Donors have been offered fees as high as $100,000. See, e.g., Marilee Enge, Ad Seeks
Donor Eggs for $100,000, Possible New High, CHL. TRIB., Feb. 10, 2000, § 1, at 3 (describing a
full-page advertisement in a college newspaper offering egg donors $100,000); Kenneth R.
Weiss, Eggs Buy a College Education, L.A. TIMES, May 27, 2001, at Al (displaying photographs
of advertisements offering up to $100,000 to potential donors). Very few donors are paid
such high fees. Id. at A30-31.
89 See, e.g., Erica Noonan, Breathing Life into Hopes for a Family: Rare Lung Disease Won't
Derail Goal, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 13, 2003, at NW1 (noting that costs of surrogacy proce-
dure to overcome infertility can exceed $40,000); Schleter, supra note 78, at Al (noting
that surrogate fee is usually between $10,000 and $25,000); Zimmerman, supra note 78, at
El (noting that surrogates are paid about $20,000).
90 Peter J. Neumann, Should Health Insurance Cover IVF? Issues and Options, 22 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 1215, 1217-18 (1997) (noting that health insurance rarely covers
IVF).
91 See LIEBMANN-SMITH ET AL., supra note 30, at 331.
92 See Neumann, supra note 90, at 1223. Neumann cites studies in which survey re-
spondents indicated that they would pay large sums to increase their chances of having a
child. Id. For example, Neumann cites a U.K. study in which survey respondents indicated
that they "were willing to pay 29 percent of their after-tax income for a 50 percent chance
of having a child, and willing to risk a 20 percent chance of death in order to have a child."
Id. at 1224 (citation omitted).
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often defer as many nonmedical expenses as possible in order to fi-
nance their fertility treatment.93
In addition, patients may rely heavily on less expensive treat-
ments, such as IUI after ovulation induction with clomiphene, even
though these treatments are not effective for certain types of infertility
problems.94 Patients also sometimes proceed with whatever type of
care is covered by their insurance, even if, compared to IVF, that care
is more invasive and less effective in dealing with their particular infer-
tility problem.95 For example, where insurance covers tubal surgeries,
but not IVF, a woman with blocked fallopian tubes may have several
tubal surgeries to attempt to repair her tubes, instead of bypassing the
tubes with IVF.
II
THE TAX TREATMENT OF FERTILITY TREATMENT COSTS
UNDER CURRENT LAW
Taxpayers may be able to recoup some of their fertility treatment
costs under the tax code. The following sections consider whether
some or all fertility treatment costs are deductible as medical expenses
under current law.
A. The Tax Treatment of Medical Expenses
Internal Revenue Code (IRC) § 262 provides that taxpayers gen-
erally may not deduct personal expenses. 96 Section 213 provides,
however, that taxpayers can deduct their expenses for medical care
(i.e., medical care of the taxpayer, his or her spouse, or a dependent)
to the extent that those expenses exceed 7.5 percent of the taxpayer's
adjusted gross income (AGI) .97 For example, assume that a taxpayer
93 See RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 305.
94 See id. at 304 ("The least expensive alternatives may turn out to be the least effec-
tive.... [I]f they do not [work], the costs can quickly add up to equal or exceed what you
would have paid for more expensive, although more effective, treatment."); Davis, supra
note 5, at 54 ("[Multiple] cycles of IUI with blocked fallopian tubes . . . [are] a waste.").
95 See RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 304-05.
96 See I.R.C. § 262(a) (2000) ("Except as otherwise expressly provided ... no deduc-
tion shall be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses.").
97 See I.R.C. § 213(a). Taxpayers with large medical expenses may be subject to the
Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT). Taxpayers compute their tax liability both under the
regular income tax and the AMT, and then pay whichever tax liability is higher. See I.R.C.
§ 55(a). The base of the AMT, "alternative minimum taxable income" (AMTI), is broader
than the base under the regular income tax. See I.R.C. §§ 55(b) (2), 56-58. The AMT tax
rate for individuals is twenty-six percent on the first $175,000 of the "taxable excess" and
twenty-eight percent on the "taxable excess" exceeding $175,000. See I.R.C.
§§ 55(b) (1) (A) (i)-(ii). The "taxable excess" is AMTI less an exemption amount ($45,000
for married couples filingjointly and $33,750 for single filers, with the exemption amount
being phased out at higher AMTIs). See I.R.C. § 55(b) (1) (A) (ii), (b) (2), (d) (1), & (d) (3)
(amended 2001). For purposes of the regular income tax, medical expenses can be de-
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in the thirty-five percent tax rate bracket has $100,000 of AGI and
$17,500 of medical expenses. The taxpayer can deduct $10,000 of the
medical expenses because the $17,500 of medical expenses exceed
$7,500 (7.5 percent of the $100,000 of AGI) by $10,000. This deduc-
tion reduces the taxpayer's taxable income by $10,000, which saves
the taxpayer $3,500 in taxes.
Medical expenses for which the taxpayer has been reimbursed do
not qualify for the § 213 deduction.98 Taxpayers who participate in
employer-sponsored medical flexible spending accounts are reim-
bursed for their medical expenses, which are expenses attributable to
"medical care," as defined in § 213. 99 The reimbursements from med-
ical flexible spending accounts are funded by pre-tax deductions from
the participants' income, so participation in the medical flexible
spending account allows the participants to pay medical expenses out
of pre-tax dollars 00 For example, assume that a taxpayer in the
thirty-five percent tax rate bracket participates in her employer's med-
ical flexible spending account. The taxpayer's annual contributions to
the account are capped at $5,000. The employer periodically with-
holds funds from the taxpayer's paycheck in order to fund the $5,000
amount in the taxpayer's flexible spending account. After the tax-
payer pays $5,000 of medical expenses, she is reimbursed that amount
out of the account. The $5,000 of pay withheld and contributed to the
flexible spending account is not taxed, which saves the taxpayer
$1,750 (35 percent of the $5,000 of pay excluded from income).
ducted only to the extent they exceed 7.5% of the taxpayer's Adjusted Gross Income
(AGI). See I.R.C. § 213(a). For purposes of the AMT, however, medical expenses can be
deducted only to the extent they exceed ten percent of the taxpayer's AGI. See I.R.C.
§ 56(b)(1)(B) (2000). See I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(B).
Klaassen v. Commissioner, No. 98-9035, 1999 WL 197172, at *1 (10th Cir. 1999), illus-
trates the effect of subjecting taxpayers with medical expenses to the AMT. In Klaassen,
taxpayers with AGI of $83,056.42 and a medical expense deduction of $4,767 were subject
to the AMT. See id. The taxpayers, a husband and wife, had ten dependents and claimed
twelve personal exemptions on their tax return. See id. They also had total medical ex-
penses of $10,996. Of that amount, they deducted $4,767 ($10,996 medical expenses less
$6,229, which is 7.5% of $83,056 of AGI). Under the regular income tax, they owed
$5,111. Id. Under the AMT, they owed an additional $1,085, in part because their medical
expense deduction, for purposes of the AMT, was only $2,690 ($10,996 medical expenses
less $8,306, which is ten percent of $83,056 of AGI). Id.
98 See I.R.C. § 213(a).
99 I.R.C. §§ 105(b), 125. The 7.5% floor of § 213 does not apply to these
reimbursements.
100 See Maureen B. Cavanaugh, On the Road to Incoherence: Congress, Economics, and Taxes,
49 UCLA L. REv. 685, 706 (2002) (noting that flexible spending accounts permit taxpayers
to pay medical expenses with pretax earnings).
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B. The Characterization of Fertility Treatment Expenses as
Medical Expenses
The characterization of some fertility treatment expenses as § 213
medical expenses is unsettled. There are no reported cases that
squarely address this issue. IRS administrative pronouncements have
reached conclusions that are seemingly inconsistent, but the most re-
cent of these pronouncements indicate that, at least for the time be-
ing, fertility treatment expenses other than surrogacy expenses are
deductible as medical expenses. In 1957, the IRS ruled that the costs
of IUI are not medical expenses. 10 1 In 2002, however, the IRS stated,
in a publication for taxpayers, that the costs of fertility treatment, in-
cluding IVF, are medical expenses. 10 2 Even more recently, the IRS
issued a private letter ruling in which it concluded that the fee paid to
an egg donor, and the related costs of arranging for the egg donation,
are medical expenses under § 213.103
On the other hand, the IRS, with the approval of its national of-
fice, has taken the position in litigation that the costs of surrogacy are
not medical expenses.10 4 In addition, although the recent administra-
tive pronouncements indicate the current IRS position on fertility
treatment costs other than surrogacy costs, the IRS is not bound to
follow the position it has taken in private letter rulings0 5 or in tax-
payer publications. 10 6
1. The Definition of Medical Expenses
Section 213 provides that medical expenses include costs in-
curred for "the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention
of disease, or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of
101 See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 5707244900A (July 24, 1957) (ruling that a taxpayer could not
deduct as a medical expense the amount paid for artificial insemination).
102 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OF TREASURY, No. 502, MEDICAL AND DENTAL
ExPENSEs 6 (2002), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p502.pdf (last visited Mar.
7, 2004) [hereinafter IRS PUBLICATION 502] (advising taxpayers that they may deduct the
cost of fertility enhancements "such as in vitro fertilization (including temporary storage of
eggs or sperm)").
103 See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200318017 (Jan. 9, 2003) (ruling that egg donor expenses and
related costs are § 213 medical expenses).
104 See Sedgwick v. Commissioner, No. 10133-94, 94 PTT" 13-53 (T.C. June 7, 1994)
(LEXSTAT).
105 Private letter rulings may not be used or cited as precedent. See I.R.C.
§ 6110(k) (3). The IRS sometimes considers such rulings internally, however, to determine
its position on an issue. See MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
3.03[3] [c], at 3-30, 3-32 (2d ed. 1991).
106 See, e.g., Adler v. Commissioner, 330 F.2d 91, 93 (9th Cir. 1964) (language in a
taxpayer publication does not estop the government from making a contrary argument at a
later date); SALTZMAN, supra note 105, 3.04[8] (stating that taxpayer publications "per-
form a useful and laudable function," but "they may not be relied on by taxpayers in plan-
ning future transactions").
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the body."' 0 7 The first prong of this two-part definition is potentially
underinclusive; if read literally and narrowly, it might fail to character-
ize as medical expenses the costs of medically treating injuries, condi-
tions, and defects. The Department of the Treasury (Treasury
Department) has resolved some of this underinclusiveness problem by
broadly interpreting the term "disease" to cover conditions (including
those caused by personal injury), impairments, and disorders. 10 8
The potential underinclusiveness of the first prong of the defini-
tion is, to some extent, offset by the broader language in the second,
or "structure or function," prong of the definition. This second prong
correctly characterizes as medical expenses the costs of medical treat-
ment of a patient's injuries, conditions, impairments, or disorders.
The problem with the "structure or function" prong of the medical
expense definition is that it is overinclusive. For example, read liter-
ally, the second prong would characterize even the costs of cosmetic
surgery as medical expenses. 10 9 Consistent with this interpretation of
§ 213, the IRS ruled that the costs of cosmetic surgery were medical
expenses under the "structure or function" prong of the definition. 011
Although the IRS was no doubt unhappy about allowing taxpayers to
deduct the costs of cosmetic surgery as medical expenses, such costs
were within the broad second prong of the statutory definition. In
1990, Congress addressed this problem by amending § 213 to specifi-
cally exclude "cosmetic surgery or other similar procedures" from the
definition of medical expenses."1
Medicine and drugs also affect the structure or function of the
body, so medicine and drug costs seem to be within the definition of
medical expenses. Congress, however, specifically provided in § 213
107 I.R.C. § 213(d)(1) (A). Treasury Regulation § 1.213-1(e) tracks this statutory lan-
guage. Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e) (2003).
108 See Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e) (1) (v) (a). The Regulation states:
[T]he cost of medical care includes the cost of attending a special school
for a mentally or physically handicapped individual, if his condition is such
that the resources of the institution for alleviating such mental or physical
handicap are a principal reason for his presence there.... Thus, the cost of
medical care includes the cost of attending a special school designed to
compensate for or overcome a physical handicap. ...
Id. (emphasis added).
109 Law professors who teach the basic income tax class sometimes provide students
with other extreme reductio ad absurdum examples of the overinclusiveness of the second
prong of the medical expense definition. One such example is the cost of a spa day, com-
plete with a manicure, pedicure, and haircut, each of which affects the "structure" of the
body, but seems to be a clear consumption expense.
110 See Rev. Rul. 76-332, 1976-2 C.B. 81, 82 (ruling that fees paid for a face-lift opera-
tion qualified as medical expenses under § 213); Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,515 (Dec. 11, 1975)
(concluding that the cost of cosmetic surgery is a medical expense under § 213 because
the surgery alters the structure of the body).
111 See I.R.C. § 213(d) (9) (A).
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that medicine and drug costs are medical expenses only if the drugs
are prescription drugs.
112
The Treasury Department has also excluded from the definition
of medical expenses any expenses incurred for the general well being
of the taxpayer. 113 Treasury Regulation § 1.213 provides that the
medical expense deduction is for "expenses incurred primarily for the
prevention or alleviation of a physical or mental defect or illness," and
that "an expenditure which is merely beneficial to the general health
of an individual, such as an expenditure for a vacation, is not [deduct-
ible]."11 4 For example, the cost of a gym membership is not a medical
expense, despite the fact that exercise will improve the taxpayer's
health. 115 The cost of a weight loss program for an obese taxpayer is a
medical expense, however, because doctors recognize that obesity is a
disease or condition. 116
Much of the case law under § 213 involves taxpayers trying to de-
duct as a medical expense the cost of an item, such as a pool or a
vacation, which is usually purchased for nonmedical personal rea-
sons. 1 17 The idea is that taxpayers should not be able to convert a
nondeductible personal consumption expense into a deductible med-
ical expense by arguing that their medical condition required them to
buy the recreational personal items. In distinguishing between non-
deductible personal expenses and deductible medical expenses,
courts look for a direct and proximate relation between the expense
and the medical care.1 18 In doing so, courts consider various factors.
For example, in Havey v. Commissioner, the court stated:
In determining allowability, many factors must be considered. Con-
sideration should be accorded the motive or purpose of the tax-
payer, but such factor is not alone determinative .... [A]lso[,] it is
important to inquire as to the origin of the expense. Was it in-
curred at the direction or suggestion of a physician; did the treat-
ment bear directly on the physical condition in question; did the
treatment bear such a direct or proximate therapeutic relation to
112 See id. § 213(b).
113 SeeTreas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e) (1) (ii) (2003).
114 Id.
115 See Rev. Rul. 79-151, 1979-1 C.B. 116 (ruling that the cost of a weight reduction
program to improve the taxpayer's health, but not prescribed for the specific purpose of
curing a disease, is not a § 213 medical expense).
116 See Rev. Rul. 2002-19, 2002-1 C.B. 778.
117 See, e.g., Evanoffv. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 1394, 1396 (1982) (denying a
medical expense deduction for the costs of installing an in-ground pool at the taxpayers'
home because there were community pools nearby).
118 See Havey v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 409 (1949). The taxpayer's doctor recom-
mended that she go to the seashore in the summer and to Arizona in the winter as treat-
ment for her heart disease. Despite this recommendation, the court held that the taxpayer
could not deduct the cost of vacations in New Jersey and Arizona because the medical
benefit of the vacations was incidental. Id, at 409-10, 413.
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the bodily condition as tojustify a reasonable belief the same would
be efficacious; was the treatment so proximate in time to the onset
or the recurrence of the disease or condition as to make one the
true occasion of the other, thus eliminating expense incurred for
general, as contrasted with some specific, physical improvement?" 19
Section 213 cases and rulings also indicate that fees paid to non-
medical providers are deductible as medical expenses only if the ser-
vices provided are necessary to treat the taxpayer's medical condition.
These cases and rulings involve expenses incurred for items that are
not recreational, but may nonetheless be characterized as either per-
sonal or medical. For example, in Gerstacker v. Commissioner a20 the
court held that the taxpayers could take a § 213 deduction for legal
fees paid to establish a guardianship for Mrs. Gerstacker, so that she
could be committed to a mental institution and receive the medical
care her doctors prescribed. 12 1 On the other hand, the court, in Le-
vine v. Commissioner,1 22 denied the taxpayers a medical expense deduc-
tion for fees paid to a lawyer who helped their mentally ill son with
activities such as filling prescriptions, paying bills, buying clothes, hir-
ing a housekeeper, and finding a job.123
Where the taxpayers' expenses are for treatment that is medical
in nature (including fees for doctors' services, hospital charges, fees
for diagnostic tests, surgical fees, or prescription drugs), it is very diffi-
cult for the IRS to argue that the expenses are not medical expenses.
The assumption is that most medical treatment originates out of medi-
cal necessity, rather than pure personal consumption motives. 124 The
problem with this assumption is that the "structure" part of the "struc-
ture or function" prong of the medical expense definition is overin-
clusive; it characterizes medical services that are undertaken for
nonmedical reasons as medical expenses. This is what prompted the
1990 cosmetic surgery amendment to § 213 mentioned above.' 25
It is interesting to note the specific language Congress used in the
1990 cosmetic surgery amendment. Section 213(d) (9) provides that:
"The term 'medical care' does not include cosmetic surgery or other
119 Id. at 412.
120 414 F.2d 448 (6th Cir. 1969).
121 See id. at 453. The IRS later ruled that it would follow the Sixth Circuit's decision in
Gerstacker, 414 F.2d 448. See Rev. Rul. 71-281, 1971-2 C.B. 166.
122 695 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1982).
123 See id. at 58, 61 (holding that such fees "lack 'the proximate relationship to the
illness ... required for deductibility,'" id. at 61 (quoting Gerstacker, 414 F.2d at 453)).
124 See Mark G. Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an "Ideal"
Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Far from Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REV. 831, 865 (1979).
Professor Kelman has challenged this assumption, pointing out the income elasticity and
price elasticity of medical care. See id. at 866-68.
125 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11342(a),
104 Stat. 1388-471 (1990).
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similar procedures, unless the surgery or procedure is necessary to
ameliorate a deformity arising from, or directly related to, a congeni-
tal abnormality, a personal injury resulting from an accident or
trauma, or disfiguring disease."1 26 Cosmetic surgery is defined as "any
procedure which is directed at improving the patient's appearance
and does not meaningfully promote the proper function of the
body."1 2 7
Congress thus narrowed the second part of the medical expense
definition by limiting it in a way that is consistent with the broader
interpretation of the first prong of the definition. In other words, the
real baseline for characterization of medical expenses is whether the
expense helps the patient resume or approximate normal biological
functioning. This baseline of normal biological functioning is implicit in
§ 213. For example, Treasury Regulation § 1.213-1 provides: "[T]he
cost of medical care includes the cost of attending a special school
designed to compensate for or overcome a physical handicap, in or-
der to qualify the individual for future normal education or for normal
living, such as a school for the teaching of braille or lip reading."128
The § 213 regulations, revenue rulings, and case law also indicate
that the cost of a substitute for a taxpayer's diseased or impaired body
part is a medical expense. In Revenue Ruling 68452, the taxpayer
received a kidney transplant and paid the travel, surgical, and hospital
expenses of a kidney donor. 129 The IRS ruled that the taxpayer could
deduct the expenses attributable to the donor, but paid by the tax-
payer, under § 213.130 The costs of the kidney donor were medical
expenses of the taxpayer-patient under either prong of the medical
expense definition: the transplant was a "treatment" for the taxpayer-
patient's kidney disease and it was for the purpose of affecting the
"structure or function" of the taxpayer-patient's body-even though
some of the medical care was given to a third-party donor. 131
The cost of a substitute for the taxpayer's diseased or impaired
body part can qualify as a medical expense under the first prong of
the definition, even though it would not qualify under the second
prong. This is particularly true for the cost of care that "mitigates" or
"ameliorates" the taxpayer's disease, condition, or impairment. For
126 I.R.C. § 213(d) (9) (A) (2000).
127 I.R.C. § 213(d)(9)(B). In 1996, the IRS ruled that the cost of laser vision correc-
tion surgery is a medical expense, despite the fact that it improves the taxpayer's appear-
ance, because it promotes the proper function of the taxpayer's eyes. See Priv. Ltr. Rul.
9625049 (Mar. 27, 1996).
128 Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e) (1) (v) (a) (2003) (emphasis added).
129 See Rev. Rul. 68-452, 1968-2 C.B. 111.
130 Id.
131 See id. at 112 (stating that the surgical and hospital care expenses of the donor were
"for the 'medical care' of the. [donee-taxpayer] and that the donor's transportation costs
were "primarily for and essential to medical care of [the donee-taxpayer]").
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example, the § 213 regulations specifically provide that taxpayers can
take a medical expense deduction for the cost of a seeing eye dog.13 2
In Revenue Ruling 64-173, the IRS ruled that the taxpayers could de-
duct the amounts paid to a blind student's guide at school.13 3 The tax
court has also held that taxpayers could deduct the amounts paid to a
person who took class notes for their deaf child. 34
Although these various substitutes for normal functioning do not
affect the structure or function of the taxpayer's body, the costs of
these substitutes still qualify as medical expenses because the items in
question mitigate a disease, condition, or impairment under the first
prong of the definition. In all of these examples, the payments are
made to nonmedical providers, but the expenses are incurred for
care. These examples are thus distinguishable from cases such as Ger-
stacker because in those cases the payments made to nonmedical prov-
iders were not for the care of the patient; instead, the expenses were
for services that were ancillary to the care of the patient.
2. Application to Fertility Treatment Expenses
a. Fertility Treatment Expenses in General
The costs of fertility treatments that do not involve a donor or a
surrogate are medical expenses under either prong of the
§ 213(d) (1) (A) definition. The purpose of non-third-party fertility
treatment is to enable the female patient to become pregnant and
give birth to a child. Thus, the treatment costs are incurred "for the
purpose of affecting any structure or function of the [taxpayer's]
body." 13 5 Fertility treatment costs also qualify as medical expenses
under the first prong of § 213(d) (1) (A) because the medical profes-
sion recognizes that infertility is a disease or condition, 3 6 and fertility
treatment costs are incurred for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, or
treatment of that disease or condition. 13 7 The costs of the initial phy-
sician and laboratory workup are incurred to diagnose the specific
cause of the infertility. 138 Some fertility treatments, such as the surgi-
cal repair of blocked fallopian tubes, endometriosis, or varicocele,
132 See Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(iii). It is irrelevant whether the blindness was
caused by disease or injury, or was congenital. Id.
133 See Rev. Rul. 64-173, 1964-1 C.B. 121.
134 SeeEstate ofBaer v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 170, 173 (1967) (holding that
"the amount paid to the 'notetaker' was for the primary purpose of alleviating [the] physi-
cal defect of deafness and, therefore, is deductible as a medical expense").
135 I.R.C. § 213(d)(1)(A) (2000).
136 The American Society of Reproductive Medicine, a nonprofit organization of scien-
tists, doctors, nurses, and other health professionals, characterizes infertility as a "disease of
the reproductive system." See ASRM, Infertility Q&A, supra note 2.
137 See discussion supra Parts I.B-C.
138 See supra Part I.C.
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cure or treat the disease or condition of infertility. t3 9 Other conven-
tional treatments and assisted reproductive technologies mitigate
rather than cure the disease or condition. 140
In spite of the fact that fertility treatment expenses seem to fit the
medical expense definition, it is possible to argue that fertility treat-
ment expenses are nonetheless nondeductible under § 213, because
the decision to bear children is a personal consumption decision, not a
medical decision. For purposes of defining the scope of the business
expense deduction, 41 the tax law has consistently treated child rear-
ing as a form of personal consumption. For example, in Smith v. Com-
missioner, the taxpayers, Mr. and Mrs. Smith, paid for child care so that
they could both work outside of the home. 14 2 They argued that their
child care costs should be deductible as a business expense. 143 The
court disallowed the business expense deduction, stating, "[w]e are
not prepared to say that the care of children, like similar aspects of
family and household life, is other than a personal concern.' '14 4
The IRS could analogize to these business expense deduction
cases and argue that fertility treatment costs are personal consump-
tion expenses, not deductible medical expenses. There are two differ-
ent ways in which the IRS could make this argument. First, the IRS
could argue that fertility treatment is within the cosmetic surgery ex-
ception, because fertility treatment is a lifestyle choice and is thus sim-
ilar to cosmetic surgery. Recall that § 213(d) (9) (A) provides that "the
term 'medical care' does not include cosmetic surgery or other similar
procedures, unless the surgery or procedure is necessary to ameliorate
a deformity arising from, or directly related to, a congenital abnormal-
ity, a personal injury resulting from an accident or trauma, or a disfig-
uring disease." 145 Section 213(d) (9) (B) defines cosmetic surgery as
139 See supra Part I.B.
140 See supra notes 61-78 and accompanying text.
141 Taxpayers are allowed to deduct their ordinary and necessary business expenses
under I.R.C. § 162 (2000).
142 See 40 B.T.A. 1038, 1038-39 (1939) ("The wife's services as custodian of the home
and protector of its children are ordinarily rendered without monetary compensation.
There results no taxable income from the performance of this service and the correlative
expenditure is personal and not susceptible of deduction.").
143 See id. at 1039.
144 Id. Professor Douglas Kahn summarizes the tax law's treatment of child care costs
in this way:
While the expense of caring for children may be a necessary cost of freeing
the parent from the home so that he can earn income, it also is an expense
arising out of personal, family obligations. The cost of child care is analo-
gous to commuting expenses which are not deductible even though a tax-
payer is not able to earn gross income unless he travels from his residence
to his place of work.
DOUGLAS A. KAHN, FEDERAL INCOME TAx: A STUDENr's GUIDE TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE §10.2000, at 434 (4th ed. 1999).
145 I.R.C. § 213(d) (9) (A) (2000) (emphasis added).
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"any procedure which is directed at improving the patient's appear-
ance and does not meaningfully promote the proper function of the
body. "
146
The scope of § 213(d) (9), however, is too narrow for this argu-
ment to succeed. "Similar" in the context of § 213(d) (9) means pro-
cedures other than cosmetic surgery that improve the patient's
appearance, but do not promote functioning, 147 such as liposuction
and hair transplants. The legislative history of the amendment to
§ 213 specifically states:
[U]nder the provision, procedures such as hair removal, electroly-
sis, hair transplants, [liposuction], and face lift operations generally
are not deductible. In contrast, expenses for procedures that are
medically necessary to promote the proper function of the body
and only incidentally affect the patient's appearance or expenses
for treatment of a disfiguring condition arising from a congenital
abnormality, personal injury or trauma, or disease (such as recon-
structive surgery following removal of a malignancy) continue to be
deductible under present-law rules. 1 48
The cosmetic surgery amendment was drafted to create an exception
for the cost of medical procedures that affect the structure and ap-
pearance of the body, but not the functioning of the body. In other
words, Congress drafted the amendment to limit the "structure or
function" prong of the medical expense definition, but not the first
prong of the definition. Under this approach, the cost of breast aug-
mentation, for example, cannot qualify as a medical expense because:
(1) the cost is not incurred because of a disease or a medical condi-
tion, and thus is not within the first prong of the definition; and (2)
the cost is not incurred for a procedure that affects the functioning of
the body, and thus is not within the second prong of the definition. 149
On the other hand, the costs of cosmetic surgery procedures that
either affect the functioning of the body or mitigate the affects of a
disease or medical condition are deductible as medical expenses. 150
Similarly, fertility treatment expenses, other than the costs of surro-
gacy, could be characterized as medical expenses both under the
"structure or function" prong and under the first prong because fertil-
146 Id. at § 213(d) (9) (B).
147 Id. at § 213(d) (9).
148 136 CONG. REc. S30,485 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1990).
149 See I.R.C. § 213(d) (1) (A), (d)(9)(A), (B).
150 See id. § 213(d) (9) (A) (stating that the cost of cosmetic surgery that is "necessary to
ameliorate a deformity arising from, or directly related to a congenital abnormality, a per-
sonal injury resulting from an accident or trauma, or disfiguring disease" is a medical
expense).
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ity treatment costs are incurred for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, or
treatment of the disease or medical condition of infertility. 15 1
Second, and more generally, the IRS could argue that giving
birth to a child is "merely beneficial to the general health of the [tax-
payer]," and therefore fertility treatment expenses are not deductible
as medical expenses. 1 52 This argument is consistent with Professor
Johnson's view that a person can lead a "normal" life without ever
having children, and thus the choice of whether to bear children is a
consumption decision, not a medical decision. 153 If this argument
were persuasive, however, it would apply with equal force to other
medical expenses that relate to reproductive choice, such as the costs
of contraceptives, abortions, vasectomies, and sterilization procedures.
The argument could also apply to the cost of medical care for sexual
conditions or dysfunction, such as the cost of Viagra, because a person
can also lead a "normal" life without being sexually active.
Some insurance companies have taken the position that the deci-
sion to bear or not bear children is a "lifestyle choice" and have de-
clined to cover fertility treatment and contraceptives for that
reason. 154 The majority of insurance plans cover abortion, vasectomy,
151 One could argue that fertility treatment is analogous to cosmetic surgery because
fertility treatment is not a life or death matter for the infertile patient. Cosmetic surgery is
the only type of medical expense specifically excluded from § 213, however. The congres-
sional failure to exclude fertility treatment along with cosmetic surgery in the 1990 amend-
ment may have been deliberate. As the old maxim of statutory construction goes, expressio
unius, exclusio alterius (meaning that one can infer from the specific inclusion of one item,
that the omission of other specific items was intentional). See, e.g., GAIL LEVIN RICHMOND,
FEDERAL TAX RESEARCH: GUIDE TO MATERIALS & TECHNIQUES 40 (5th ed. 1997) (citing
Becker v. United States, 451 U.S. 1306, 1309 (1981), vacated on other grounds, 452 U.S. 935
(1981)); seealsoBarnhartv. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003) ("[T]he canon ...
does not apply to every statutory listing or grouping; it has force only when the items
expressed are members of an 'associated group or series,' justifying the inference that
items not mentioned were excluded by deliberate choice, not inadvertence." (quoting
United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65 (2002)).
152 Treasury Regulation § 1.213-1 provides that "an expenditure which is merely bene-
ficial to the general health of an individual, such as an expenditure for a vacation, is not
[deductible]." Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii) (2003).
153 See E-mail from Professor Calvin H. Johnson, University of Texas at Austin, School
of Law, chjohnson@mail.law.utexas.edu, to Professor Katherine T. Pratt, Loyola Law
School (Oct. 3, 2003) (on file with author) (reproducing Posting of Professor Calvin H.
Johnson, to Taxprof@Listserv.uc.edu (Apr. 20, 2000)).
154 See Lisa A. Hayden, Gender Discrimination Within the Reproductive Health Care System:
Viagra v. Birth Control, 13J.L. & HEALTH 171, 183 (1998-99) (quoting an insurance industry
spokesperson who characterized contraceptives as a "lifestyle drug;" "[c] consequently, only
fifteen percent of indemnity insurance plans offer coverage of the five most common con-
traceptive methods"); Marie McCullough, Infertile Couples Get New Ammo, CHARLSTON GA-
ZETrE, July 9, 2000, at 5B. Few plans cover contraceptives and even fewer plans cover
fertility treatment, such as IVF. See Bob Rosenblatt, Viagra Spurs New Questions About HMO
Drug Coverage, L.A. TIMES, June 8, 1998, at 88 (comparing insurance coverage of Viagra,
contraceptives, and fertility treatment).
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and tubal ligation, however. 155 Insurance companies and employers
who purchase insurance for their employees take into account the
cost of treatments when they determine which treatments will be cov-
ered by their plans. Given their need to ration care, it is not surpris-
ing that many insurance companies have not wanted to cover
expensive treatments such as IVF, or widely used, inexpensive treat-
ments such as contraceptives. Many insurers cover the costs of Viagra,
however.156 According to an insurance industry spokesperson, insur-
ance companies treat Viagra differently than contraceptives because,
"there is a clear distinction between Viagra, which has been approved
as a cure for a medical dysfunction, and contraception, which [is] a
'lifestyle drug.' "157
If the IRS adopted this "lifestyle" approach, the cost of medical
care that furthers reproductive choice would not be deductible under
section 213 where the medical care does not repair or treat a disease
or a condition. In other words, the cost of contraceptives, vasecto-
mies, and tubal ligations would not be deductible. Viagra and 1VF,
however, both ameliorate a disease or condition; the costs of fertility
treatment for reproductive dysfunction would thus be deductible if
the costs of Viagra to treat sexual dysfunction were deductible.
(Viagra and IVF both simulate normal functioning by temporarily
bypassing, but not curing, the underlying medical problem.1 58 )
Consider whether the IRS could successfully argue the line of
cases in which taxpayers have tried to convert nondeductible personal
consumption expenses into deductible medical expenses. 159 The
155 See Rosenblatt, supra note 154, at S8.
156 See Paul Rauber, It's a Man's World: Is Male Potency More Important Than Preventing
Pregnancy, SIERRA, Sept.-Oct.1998, at 20 (criticizing the willingness of insurers to cover
Viagra but not contraceptives, and noting that only fifteen percent of non-HMO plans
cover the five most common forms of reversible contraceptives).
157 Debra Baker, Viagra Spawns Birth Control Issue, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1998, at 36, 36 (quot-
ing Richard Coorsh, spokesperson for the Health Insurance Association of America). Simi-
larly, Professor Dodge argued that fertility treatment costs are not deductible as medical
expenses because fertility treatment constitutes a lifestyle choice, not medical treatment.
See Dodge, supra note 10 ("I suppose reproduction is a bodily function, but it is one the
exercise of which is purely optional."). Professor Dodge also expressed the view that the
cost of Viagra could be deductible as a medical expense only in some cases. Professor
Dodge argues that expenditures incurred to "repair" a physical defect are deductible, but
expenditures incurred to "improve" physical performance beyond a baseline of normal
functioning are not deductible. See id. In his view, expenditures for treatment that merely
counteracts the effects of aging are not deductible, but he notes that erectile dysfunction
is, in some cases, not age related. Id.
158 Erectile dysfunction has a variety of causes including diabetes, prostate disorders,
and heart problems. See generally John Simons, Taking on Viagra, FORTUNE, June 9, 2003, at
102, 108 (discussing some of the common causes of erectile dysfunction). Viagra does not
cure these disorders; instead it creates a temporary erection by blocking a specific enzyme
in the penis. Id. at 110. For a summary of how IVF works to bypass the underlying medical
problem of infertility, see supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
159 See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
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types of expenses involved in these cases, such as the cost of a pool, a
vacation, golf, a gym membership, or a trip to a spa, are typically in-
curred for a consumption motive by people who are healthy. Al-
though the item in question may provide incidental health benefits,
the cost of the item is not a medical expense. In some cases, however,
the taxpayer can argue that the recreational expenses were incurred
primarily for medical reasons.
In many cases in which the taxpayer tries to deduct recreational
expenses as medical expenses, the taxpayer fails to establish the fac-
tors required to support a medical expense deduction.16 0 In contrast,
a court applying the factors from these cases to fertility treatment ex-
penses would likely conclude that: (1) the taxpayer's motive is to diag-
nose, treat, or ameliorate the medical disease or condition of
infertility; (2) the fertility treatment is undertaken at the direction or
suggestion of a physician; (3) the diagnosis, treatment, or ameliora-
tion bears a direct relationship to the infertility and justifies a reasona-
ble belief that the care will be efficacious; and (4) the care is
proximate in time to the onset or recurrence of the infertility.1 61
Said another way, healthy individuals purchase pools, vacations,
and golf primarily for fun, and only incidentally for health benefits.
Conversely, healthy individuals do not undergo IVF, egg donor, and
surrogacy procedures for fun. In this respect, fertility treatment
presents a clearer case for deduction than Viagra, because many men
who do not suffer from erectile dysfunction use Viagra "recreation-
ally." 16 2 If a doctor told an infertile patient to take a vacation in Ha-
waii to improve his or her chances of conceiving, the costs of such a
vacation could be characterized as personal and nondeductible under
this line of cases, but the costs of medical procedures to ameliorate
infertility cannot be characterized as personal and nondeductible
under this line of cases. 163
160 See Havey v. Commissioner, 12 T.C 409, 412 (1949); supra notes 115-17 and accom-
panying text.
161 Id.
162 See Christine Gorman, Viagra Turns 5, TIME, Jan. 20, 2003, at 146.
One trend that has started to worry public-health officials.., is the growing
recreational use of Viagra in some settings .... Viagra, often in combina-
tion with illegal drugs like ecstasy, enables patrons of sex clubs to have sex
with more partners, which increases their risk of contracting sexually trans-
mitted diseases (STDs) like syphilis and AIDS. "One out of three sexually
active gay men at our STD clinics has used Viagra in the past year," says Dr.
Jeffrey Klausner, director of STD Prevention and Control Services in San
Francisco. The same was true for I of 14 heterosexual men at the clinics.
Id.
163 During an e-mail exchange on the Taxprof list serve, Professor Joseph Dodge ar-
gued: "I suppose reproduction is a bodily function, but it [is] one the exercise of which is
purely optional-a lifestyle choice. Sexual activity is also a bodily function, but nobody
would seriously claim that sexual devices, toys, and fees for sexual services should be de-
ductible." E-mail submission from ProfessorJoseph Dodge, Florida State University College
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The IRS has taken seemingly inconsistent positions on the char-
acterization of the costs of various types of reproductive medical care
as deductible medical expenses. The § 213 regulations specifically
provide that "amounts paid for operations or treatments affecting any
portion of the body, including obstetrical expenses. . ., are deemed to be
for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the
body .... "164 Thus, medical obstetrical care of a woman who is already
pregnant is medical care under § 213.
The IRS has, over the years, changed its position on the deduct-
ibility of the costs of medical care that permits reproductive choice.
As noted earlier, the IRS ruled in 1957 that taxpayers could not deduct
the cost of an artificial insemination as a medical expense, since the
expense was "not incurred primarily for prevention or alleviation of a
physical or mental defect or illness.' 165 In other words, the IRS, in
1957, did not regard infertility as a defect or illness. The reasoning of
this ruling, however, may lead to a different conclusion today because
the medical profession now recognizes infertility as a disease or medi-
cal condition. In the early 1970s, following Roe v. Wade, 166 the IRS
issued a series of revenue rulings in which it ruled that the costs of
contraceptives, abortions, and vasectomies all qualify as § 213 medical
expenses. 167 Also, as noted earlier, the IRS recently revised the tax-
payer publication on medical expenses to include "fertility enhance-
ment" on the list of items that are deductible as medical expenses.' 68
The publication states that § 213 medical expenses include "the cost
of. . . procedures to overcome your inability to have children," specifi-
cally including IVF. 1 69
For purposes of characterizing costs as deductible medical ex-
penses, the appropriate baseline in § 213 is normal biological function-
of Law, to Taxprof@Listserv.uc.edu (Apr. 20, 2000) (copy on file with author). Expendi-
tures for sexual devices, toys, and sexual services are not deductible because such items are
the analogue of the trip to Hawaii, meaning that healthy individuals typically purchase
such items for fun, not for medical reasons. These expenditures are thus distinguishable
from expenditures for medical fertility treatment under § 213.
164 Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e) (1) (ii) (2003). The Treasury Department promulgated
this Regulation in 1957, before fertility treatment was common, so the term "obstetrical
expenses" does not necessarily include fertility treatment expenses. T.D. 6279, 1957-2 C.B.
190.
165 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 5707244900A (July 24, 1957).
166 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
167 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 73-200, 1973-1 C.B. 140 (ruling that the cost of birth control pills
is a medical expense under § 213); Rev. Rul. 73-201, 1973-1 C.B. 140 (ruling that the cost
of a legal vasectomy or abortion is a medical expense under § 213).
168 IRS PUBLICATION 502, supra note 102, at 6.
169 Id. The publication also states that "[s]urgery, including an operation to reverse
prior surgery that prevents you from having children," is medical care for purposes of
§ 213. Id.
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ing,t70 and the § 213(d) (1) (A) definition must be interpreted in light
of this benchmark. Recall that the costs of cosmetic surgery were
thought to qualify as medical expenses, prior to the amendment of
§ 213, under the "structure or function" prong of the definition.1 71
For purposes of § 213, however, medical care that affects a structure
of the body should only be treated as medical care if it helps to restore
or approximate normal biological functioning. For example, the cost
of a prosthetic leg is a medical expense because the prosthetic limb
affects both the structure and function of the body.
Although cosmetic surgery affects the structure of the body, it is
not generally medical care for purposes of § 213 because it does not
usually affect normal biological functioning. The change in the struc-
ture of the body merely affects appearance. Where cosmetic surgery is
necessary to restore or approximate normal functioning, it is medical
care. Medically necessary cosmetic surgery includes surgery to repair
congenital abnormalities, injuries, and disfigurements from disease.
Consistent with this language, a breast augmentation procedure is not
medical care, for purposes of § 213, but a breast reconstruction sur-
gery following surgical removal of breast cancer is medical care. 172
The standard is not whether the patient would die or appear disabled
without treatment; rather, it is whether the treatment is necessary to
restore or approximate normal biological functioning. 73
Reproduction is part of normal biological functioning. Both disa-
bility law and constitutional law recognize that reproduction is not
only a normal biological function, but is a major or fundamental life
activity. For example, the Supreme Court held, in Bragdon v. Abbott,
that reproduction is a "major life activity" for purposes of applying the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). 174 A person is dis-
170 For example, Treasury Regulation § 1.213-1 provides: "[T]he cost of medical care
includes the cost of attending a special school designed to compensate for or overcome a
physical handicap, in order to qualify the individual for future normal education or for
normal living, such as a school for the teaching of braille or lip reading." Treas. Reg.
§ 1.213-1(e) (1) (v) (a) (2003) (emphasis added).
171 See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
172 See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
173 Breast reconstruction surgery affects the structure of the body, but it also helps to
repair a disfigurement that is caused by disease. In addition, it helps the patient restore
some of the bodily integrity lost in the cancer surgery, and may permit the patient to
resume normal sexual functioning. In contrast, regular cosmetic surgeries do not similarly
affect the functioning of the body.
174 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998) ("We have little difficulty concluding that [reproduction
is a major life activity]."). The respondent in the case, who was HIV positive, needed a
cavity filled by the petitioner dentist. See id. at 624. After disclosing her HIV status, the
dentist informed her that he would fill the cavity only in the hospital, which meant that the
respondent would have to pay an extra hospital fee for the procedure. Id. The respondent
sued the dentist, alleging a violation of the ADA, which prohibits discrimination "on the
basis of disability in the . . . enjoyment of the . . . services . . . of any place of public
accommodation by any person who .. .operates [such] a place." Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C.
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abled under the ADA if he or she has "a physical or mental impair-
ment that substantially limits one or more [of his or her] major life
activities. '1 75 The ADA does not define the operative terms in this
definition, so courts have had to interpret the terms. 176
Under the ADA, courts have interpreted the term "major life ac-
tivity" by comparing the activity in question to an illustrative list of
"major life activities" in a Rehabilitation Act regulation. 177 The list
includes activities "such as caring for one's self, performing manual
tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
working." 178 Some courts have defined "major life activity" narrowly
to require that the activity in question meet three requirements: (1)
microfrequency, (2) macrofrequency, and (3) universality. 179 Other
§ 12182(a) (2000). The District Court granted summaryjudgment for the respondent. See
Abbot v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580 (D. Me. 1995). The First Circuit affirmed. See Abbot v.
Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir. 1997). The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of
Appeals that the respondent's HIV infection was a "disability" for purposes of
§12102(2) (A) of the ADA, which defines a disability as "a physical ... impairment that
substantially limits one or more of [an individual's] major life activities," but vacated and
remanded for a determination as to whether or not an exemption to the ADA applied in
this case. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 655.
175 42 U.S.C. §12102(2) (A) (2000).
176 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 631-32. Regulations promulgated by the Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS) defined "physical or mental impairment" as "any
physiological disorder or condition .. .affecting one or more of the following body sys-
tems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech or-
gans; cardiovascular; reproductive[;] digestive[;] genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic;
skin; and endocrine." 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (1997). Courts have defined the term
"physical or mental impairment" for purposes of the ADA by looking to the definition of
that term in other regulations, including the DHHS regulation quoted above. For further
discussion of this portion of the ADA test for disability, see Sarah Lynn Oquist, Note, Repro-
duction Constitutes a "Major Life Activity" Under the ADA: Implications of the Supreme Court's
Decision in Bragdon v. Abbott, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1357, 1382-83 (1999).
177 See, e.g., Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 631-32, 638 (stating that courts must construe the
ADA in a manner that is consistent with the Rehabilitation Act regulations).
178 28 C.F.R. § 41.31 (b) (2) (2003); 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1997).
179 See, e.g., Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 915 F. Supp. 102, 106-08 (S.D. Iowa
1995) (concluding that reproduction is not a "major life activity" because it is an activity
that is engaged in only infrequently); Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240,
243 (E.D. La. 1995) (concluding that reproduction is not a "major life activity" because it is
not an activity one engages in "throughout the day, every day").
Microfrequency characterizes an activity in which an individual engages in
numerous times throughout a day or continuously for a substantial portion
of the day. Macrofrequency characterizes an activity in which an individual
engages in almost every day, if not every day. Universality characterizes an
activity in which almost all individuals engage in, unless an individual has a
"disability." The ADA's list of major life activities includes "caring for one's
self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breath-
ing, learning, and working." All individuals-unless disabled-participate
in the listed major life activities throughout the day, every day.
Oquist, supra note 176, at 1413; see infra notes 271-73 and accompanying text.
Courts have interpreted the "substantial limitation" requirement of the major life ac-
tivity definition, to mean: "(i) [u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average
person in the general population can perform; or (ii) [s]ignificantly restricted as to the
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courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have interpreted
the term more broadly to include any activity of "comparative
importance."'180
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Bragdon v. Abbott states, "reproduc-
tion falls well within the phrase 'major life activity.' Reproduction and
the sexual dynamics surrounding it are central to the life process it-
self."18 1 Although the petitioner argued that, for purposes of the
ADA, "major life activity" means activities that have a "public, eco-
nomic, or daily character," 18 2 a majority of the Court disagreed, on
the theory that "reproduction could not be regarded as any less im-
portant than working and learning," activities which are listed as ma-
jor life activities in the Rehabilitation Act.' 8 3
condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major
life activity as compared to ... the average person in the general population [performing
that major life activity]." See, e.g., Whitfield v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 2d 434,
437 (D. Del. 1999). This definition is derived from Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC) regulations. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(i)-(ii).
180 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638 ("As the Court of Appeals held, '[t]he plain meaning of
the word "major" denotes comparative importance' and 'suggest[s] that the touchstone for
determining an activity's inclusion under the statutory rubric is its significance,'" (quoting
Abbot v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 939 (1st Cir. 1997)). For criticism of this broader defini-
tion of "major life activity," see, for example, Oquist, supra note 176, at 1412-15 (arguing
that the Supreme Court should have adopted the narrower three-part test used in Krauel,
915 F. Supp. 102).
181 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 639. Justice Kennedy noted:
[T]he ADA must be construed to be consistent with regulations issued to
implement the Rehabilitation Act .... Rather than enunciating a general
principle for determining what is and is not a major life activity, the Reha-
bilitation Act regulations instead provide a representative list.... [T] he list
is illustrative, not exhaustive.
These regulations are contrary to petitioner's attempt to limit the meaning
of the term "major" to public activities. The inclusion of activities such as
caring for one's self and performing manual tasks belies the suggestion that
a task must have a public or economic character in order to be a major life
activity for purposes of the ADA. On the contrary, the Rehabilitation Act
regulations support the inclusion of reproduction as a major life activity,
since reproduction could not be regarded as any less important than work-
ing and learning.
Id. at 638-39 (citations omitted).
Chief Justice Rehnquist took the position that, for purposes of the ADA, "major"
should be interpreted to mean "greater in quantity, number, or extent," rather than of
"comparative importance." Id. at 660 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
No one can deny that reproductive decisions are important in a person's
life. But so are decisions as to who to marry, where to live, and how to earn
one's living. Fundamental importance of this sort is not the common
thread linking the statute's listed activities. The common thread is rather
that the activities are repetitively performed and essential in the day-to-day
existence of a normally functioning individual. They are thus quite differ-
ent from the series of activities leading to the birth of a child.
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Constitutional law cases have also treated reproduction as funda-
mentally important. For example, in Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Supreme
Court struck down a forced sterilization statute. 184 Justice Douglas
noted: "We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the
basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental
to the very existence and survival of the race." 185
Case law thus establishes that reproduction is a normal biological
function, and the baseline for deductibility under §213 is normal bio-
logical functioning. In the context of reproductive functioning, "nor-
mal" functioning does not necessarily mean "natural" functioning.
Instead, normal in this context means a state of the body (pregnant or
not pregnant) that the patient can choose and achieve with medical
assistance. In other words, the § 213 definition of "medical care" in-
cludes medical intervention that facilitates reproductive choice. Re-
productive medical care sometimes facilitates pregnancy, by treating
or bypassing a diseased or impaired reproductive system and allowing
an infertile patient to achieve the "normal" state of pregnancy that a
fertile patient can achieve without any medical intervention. In other
cases, reproductive medical care prevents or ends pregnancy.
Since the early 1970s, the IRS has consistently taken the position
that the costs of medical treatment to prevent pregnancy are deducti-
ble under § 213.186 Similarly, the costs of medical treatment to facili-
tate pregnancy are also deductible. In fact, the argument for
deductibility of fertility treatment expenses is arguably stronger; un-
like medical means of birth control, fertility treatment diagnoses,
treats, or mitigates an existing disease or condition. 187 In other words,
fertility treatment is more like the example of Viagra being used to
treat sexual dysfunction.1 8
It is irrelevant that some people who choose not to have children
(or who choose not to be sexually active) can lead happy, "normal"
lives. A person who wants to have children (or to be sexually active)
and cannot, because of a biological limitation, is not leading a normal
Justice O'Connor concluded that reproduction is not a "major life activity" for pur-
poses of the ADA because it is not an activity in which all persons engage. Id. at 664-65
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
In my view, the act of giving birth to a child, while a very important part of
the lives of many women, is not generally the same as the representative
major life activities of all persons-"caring for one's self, performing man-
ual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and work-
ing"-listed in regulations relevant to the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990.
Id.
184 316 U.S. 535, 543 (1942).
185 Id. at 541.
186 See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
187 See supra notes 49-78 and accompanying text.
188 See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
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life. A person's body should permit the person to choose whether to
bear children: what a person does with that choice is irrelevant. If a
person's body does not permit the person to choose whether to bear
children and that person seeks medical care to overcome the disease
or condition of infertility, the cost of that medical care is deductible
under § 213.
With a § 213 benchmark of normal functioning, the tax law
might distinguish between fertility treatment costs of premenopausal
women and postmenopausal women.1 8 9 If a younger woman cannot
have children without an IVF procedure because her fallopian tubes
are blocked, the IVF procedure enables the woman to approximate
normal functioning. If a fifty-year-old woman cannot have children
without an IVF procedure (and perhaps an egg donor) because of her
age, it might appear that the fertility treatment enables the woman to
approximate supernormal functioning. On the other hand, the activ-
ity, child bearing, is part of normal functioning.
As noted above, normal reproductive functioning incorporates
reproductive choice. 190 Childbearing by a postmenopausal woman is
not natural-meaning that it requires medical intervention in all
cases-but that is true of all medical care designed to counter the
natural effects of aging, and it is true of all forms of medical care that
prevent or end pregnancy. Medical treatment of other disorders re-
lated to aging, such as osteoporosis, heart disease, and dementia, con-
stitute medical care despite the fact that these disorders are "natural"
in older people. In addition, prescription hormone replacement
therapy for postmenopausal women is treated as medical care. 191 Said
another way, "[ilt is certainly 'unnatural' for [postmenopausal] wo-
men to give birth, [but] virtually every medical intervention is 'unnat-
ural' to some degree." 19 2 The only difference between the medical
treatment of infertility of postmenopausal women and the medical
treatment of other disorders related to aging is that the other disor-
ders entail loss of day-to-day functioning, but nothing in § 213 makes
deductibility turn on such a distinction.
189 Fertility of women declines with age, but more and more older women are having
children. See RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 11, 14. The birthrate for forty to forty-
four-year-old women has increased seventy-four percent since 1981. See supra note 48 and
accompanying text.
190 This argument is consistent with the position of the IRS that contraceptives, abor-
tion, vasectomy, and sterilization expenses are all medical expenses. See supra note 167 and
accompanying text (discussing revenue rulings in which the IRS concluded that these ex-
penses are medical expenses).
191 See I.R.C. § 213(b), (d)(3) (2000).
192 KEARNEY, supra note 39, at 162.
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b. The Expenses of Donor and Surrogate Procedures
Fertility procedures involving donors and surrogates raise addi-
tional characterization issues. In a donor procedure, the issue is
whether the additional costs of using the donor (e.g., the donor's fee,
the broker's fee, the fee for the donor's attorney, the cost of insur-
ance, and the costs of medical care of the donor) are characterized as
medical expenses under § 213. In a surrogate procedure, there are
two issues: (1) are any of the costs of the procedure characterized as
medical expenses under § 213; and (2) if so, are the additional costs
of using the surrogate (e.g., the surrogate's fee, the fee for the surro-
gate's attorney, the cost of insurance for the surrogate, and the costs
of medical care for the surrogate) characterized as medical expenses?
The goal of a donor procedure is to enable the female taxpayer
to conceive and bear a child. The procedure changes the structure of
the taxpayer's body and is undertaken to ameliorate the taxpayer's
infertility. The costs of the donor procedure, 193 including the costs of
care for the taxpayer and the donor, and the related costs, are thus
medical expenses under either prong of the § 213 definition.' 94 The
IRS has, at least for now, conceded this issue and allowed a medical
expense deduction for the costs of an egg donor procedure. 95 Never-
theless, in the unusual case in which the taxpayer pays a super-model
egg donor or super-brainy egg donor an exorbitant donor fee, the IRS
could challenge the medical expense deduction for the donor's fee
on the theory that the extra amount paid to the donor for her beauty
or brains is analogous to cosmetic surgery expenses. 19 6
193 See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
194 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
195 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200318017 (Jan. 9, 2003) ("The unreimbursed expenses for the egg
donor fee, the agency fee, the donor's medical and psychological testing, the insurance for
post-procedure donor assistance, and the legal fees ... are medical care expenses that are
deductible under § 213.").
196 Patients who are trying to find a particular type of egg donor are typically looking
for a proxy for themselves. Most couples try to find an egg donor who physically and
psychologically resembles the intended mother or father. See COOPER & GLAZER, supra note
20, at 238.
Most recipient couples are very grateful to be able to receive donated ova
and they try to have few expectations or requirements of a donor. None-
theless, like parents through sperm donation, they hope that the donor will
bear some physical (and ideally psychological) resemblance to them. Al-
though many will tell the child the truth about his or her origins, they pre-
fer a child that "fits in," because similarities will make it less likely that
strangers will be asking bothersome and intrusive questions.
As with sperm donation, concerns about the donor extend beyond physical
appearances. Aware of the significance of genetics, couples hope that the
donor will resemble them in other ways as well. Although most seek per-
sonality and intellectual similarities, some couples focus on ethnic or relig-
ious connections.
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Surrogate procedures differ from nonsurrogate procedures be-
cause the goal in a surrogate procedure is to have the surrogate, not
the taxpayer, get pregnant and bear a child. If the female taxpayer
can produce eggs, some of the medical treatment affects the structure
or function of her body, but the costs of implanting the embryo in the
surrogate's uterus and the additional costs of a surrogate are not in-
curred for the purpose of affecting the structure or function of the
taxpayer's body. If the female taxpayer cannot produce eggs, either
an egg donor or the surrogate is stimulated to produce eggs, and the
resulting embryos are implanted in the surrogate's uterus. Under
these circumstances, none of the treatment affects the structure or
function of the female taxpayer's body.
197
It is irrelevant that some or all of the surrogacy expenses do not
qualify under the second prong of the medical expenses definition, if
the expenses qualify under the first prong of the definition. The char-
acterization of these expenses under the first prong of the § 213 defi-
nition turns on whether the medical profession regards infertility as a
disease or condition.
198
As discussed earlier, the § 213 regulations, revenue rulings, and
case law indicate that the cost of a substitute for a taxpayer's diseased
or defective body part is a medical expense. 199 The IRS ruled, for
example, that a taxpayer who needed a kidney transplant could de-
duct the kidney donor's surgical, hospital, and travel costs as § 213
medical expenses. 20 0 Whether payments for a "substitute" uterus or
for "substitute" eggs or sperm are analogous to the sanctioned substi-
tutes depends on whether reproduction is part of normal function-
ing.20 1 Because courts are likely to conclude that reproductive
Ironically, the husband and wife who placed one of the most notorious "top dollar"
egg donor advertisements, which specified that the donor be at least 5'10", were for a 5'11"
woman and her 6'5" husband. SeeWeiss, supra note 88. Darlene Pinkerton, the egg donor
broker who placed this advertisement, stated: "They want a tall child .... People are not
trying to create a super-athlete or super-intelligent being. They are trying to match them-
selves." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Families selecting a sperm donor also typi-
cally try to find a donor who physically resembles the intended father. See COOPER &
GLAZER, supra note 20, at 190. While some patients try to have a child with more desirable
traits than the patient has, those cases are the exception, not the rule. See Meghan Daum,
Baby Gift, HARPER'S BAZAAR, Apr. 1, 2000, at 222 (noting that, although more infertile
couples are having children with donated eggs, such couples rarely seek out exceptionally
beautiful or intelligent donors); Weiss, supra note 88.
197 Where the surrogate supplies the eggs and carries the child, the procedure is some-
times an artificial insemination procedure. COOPER & GLAZER, supra note 20, at 280. An
artificial insemination procedure is less costly than an IVF procedure. See supra note 80
and accompanying text.
198 See supra Part II.B.2.a.
199 See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
200 See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
201 See supra notes 170-73 and accompanying text.
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functioning is part of normal functioning, 20 2 they are also likely to
conclude that donor eggs and sperm, or a donor uterus, are sanc-
tioned substitutes as well.
[I]f one has the freedom to procreate, then by extension one
should also have the freedom to choose how procreation will occur.
This argument appears to have merit when one considers that infer-
tile couples have the same desires to have and to raise children of
their own as do fertile couples. Infertile couples should not be
forced to give up their fundamental right to procreate when availa-
ble medical technology and social agreements can allow them to
enjoy the same rights as couples who are fertile. 20 3
This "substitute for normal functioning" argument would support a
medical expense deduction for the additional costs of a donor proce-
dure,20 4 and a deduction for all of the costs of a surrogate
procedure. 205
The IRS could try to distinguish the kidney donor ruling on the
grounds that,20 6 in the case of a donor or surrogate procedure, some
of the extra treatment costs are paid to nonmedical parties, such as
the donor or surrogate and the lawyer and broker for the donor or
surrogate. 20 7 The payment to the egg donor or surrogate is payment
202 See supra notes 174-85 and accompanying text.
203 Laura A. Brill, When Will the Law Catch Up with Technology? Jaycee B. v. Superior
Court of Orange County: An Urgent Cry for Legislation on Gestational Surrogacy, 39 CATH. LAW.
241, 252-53 (1999) (footnotes and citations omitted).
204 More specifically, this "substitute for normal functioning" argument would support
a deduction for the typical additional costs of a donor procedure, but it would not support
the deduction of extra amounts expended to create a "designer baby." This would not be
an issue in most cases, however, because parents enlisting the assistance of an egg donor
are usually trying to match themselves. Weiss, supra note 88. This raises a difficult issue.
While the parents are trying to approximate theirnormal functioning, one could argue that
normal functioning produces a child, not a child with specific attributes, even if the infer-
tile mother has those attributes. In addition, it would be very difficult and awkward to
determine what is required as a "substitute for normal functioning" on a case-by-case basis.
Thus, a bright-line rule, in the form of a cap on the amount of the deductible donor fee, is
probably advisable from an administrative perspective.
205 These third-party costs are analogous to the extra costs paid for a kidney donor by
the donee (i.e., the donor's plane fare, surgical and medical expenses). See Rev. Rul. 68-
452, 1968-2 C.B. 111 (ruling that the costs of a kidney donor are deductible by the donee
as medical expenses). Although a kidney transplant is lifesaving medical care, and fertility
treatment is not lifesaving treatment, there is nothing in § 213 that distinguishes between
lifesaving treatment and treatment or mitigation of non-life-threatening diseases and
conditions.
206 See id. (describing the IRS's position with respect to a donee-taxpayer's deduction
of a donor's expenses).
207 The intended parents may have to pay fees to the donor or surrogate, the agency
that represents the donor or surrogate, and the lawyer who represents the donor or surro-
gate. See supra note 87. These additional amounts are paid to nonmedical personnel. The
intended parents may also have to pay an insurance carrier for supplemental medical in-
surance for the donor or surrogate and a psychologist for evaluating the donor or surro-
gate. These fees are paid to medical providers, so they are less problematic under § 213
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for a substitute for the taxpayer's diseased or impaired body part, so it
is deductible, just as the costs of seeing eye dogs, human guides, and
note takers are deductible. 20 8 In these cases, the payment to the non-
medical provider is for care that mitigates the taxpayer's disease or
condition. 209
These expenses are distinguishable from payments to nonmedi-
cal providers for services that are ancillary to care, rather than for
actual care. In the context of fertility treatment, the ancillary ex-
penses paid to nonmedical providers would include the fees paid to
the lawyer for the donor or surrogate and the fees paid to the broker
or agency that represents the donor or surrogate. In order to deter-
mine whether these fees are medical expenses, it is necessary to deter-
mine whether the fees are for services that are necessary to treat the
taxpayer's medical condition. 21 0 In Gerstacker v. Commissioner2 11 and
Levine v. Commissioner,21 2 the courts struggled to determine whether
the fees in question were necessary for the taxpayer's medical treat-
ment or were the sort of ordinary personal living expenses that are
undertaken without regard to medical problems. This standard would
usually be satisfied with respect to the payments to nonmedical provid-
ers in donor and surrogacy procedures because infertile patients do
not usually resort to such procedures unless they are the only way for
the patients to overcome their infertility. 213
One potential problem with the "substitute for normal function-
ing" argument is that it might go too far. The logical extension of this
argument might seem to permit adoptive parents to deduct adoption
expenses where the reason for adoption is the medical infertility of
the parents. Congress recently enacted I.R.C. § 23, which provides an
adoption credit for expenses incurred by parents adopting a child. 21 4
Intended parents who arrange for a surrogate to carry their child, and
then adopt the child, cannot claim the § 23 credit. 215 The enactment
than the fees paid to the nonmedical providers. The issue remains, however, whether
these fees paid to medical providers are medical expenses of the taxpayer. They are if they
are incurred to treat or ameliorate the taxpayer's medical infertility.
208 See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
209 In the kidney donor ruling, Revenue Ruling 68-452, 1968-2 C.B. 111, the taxpayer
who needed the kidney transplant did not pay the prospective kidney donor for the
kidney.
210 See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
211 414 F.2d 448 (6th Cir. 1969), rev'k49 T.C. 522 (1968). In Revenue Ruling 71-281,
1971-2 C.B. 165, the IRS ruled that it would follow the appellate court decision in Ger-
stacker, 414 F.2d 448.
212 695 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1982), affg 4 2 T.C.M. (CCH) 763 (1981).
213 Cf supra note 67 and accompanying text (noting that eighty-five to ninety percent
of fertility patients are treated with conventional drug and surgical treatments).
214 See I.R.C. § 23 (2000) (amended 2001).
215 See I.R.C. § 23(d) defines the term "qualified adoption expenses" as "reasonable
and necessary adoption fees, court costs, attorney fees, and other expenses ... which are
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of § 23 might at first seem inconsistent with the broadest definition of
medical expenses under § 213, but donor and surrogate procedures
can be distinguished from adoption procedures for purposes of § 213.
In both donor and surrogate procedures, the intended parents initi-
ate a medical procedure to bear their own child. In adoptions that do
not involve surrogacy, the adoptive parents do not initiate a medical
procedure to bear their own child; instead they initiate a nonmedical
process that enables them to adopt a child conceived by the child's
biological parents. Adoption expenses are not, therefore, medical ex-
penses under § 213, even if the adoption results from the medical in-
fertility of the adoptive parents.
The legislative history of § 23, which supports this interpretation,
indicates that members of Congress specifically excluded surrogacy
expenses from the scope of § 23 precisely because they assumed that
those surrogacy expenses would be deductible under § 213 as medical
expenses:
The question of fairness is raised when we compare the treatment
of adoption costs to those expenses related to the conception, deliv-
ery, and birth of a child-or high technology medical expenses for
in-vitro conception, etc. Parents could in most cases itemize and deduct
the latter costs as medical expenses. No similar relief is currently availa-
ble for adoptive families.216
In Sedgwick v. Commissioner, however, the IRS challenged a tax-
payer's medical expense deduction for fertility treatment expenses in-
volving a surrogate.217 Jeanne and Walter Sedgwick had gone
through six years of unsuccessful fertility treatment.218 After their doc-
tors concluded thatJeanne could not physically carry a child to term,
the Sedgwicks arranged for a surrogate to carry their genetic child.21 9
The IRS took the position that the costs of the surrogate procedure
were not deductible medical expenses. Counsel for the IRS argued:
[S] urrogacy is an elective procedure. Having a child through a sur-
rogate mother is not a diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or pre-
not incurred in violation of State or Federal law or in carrying out any surrogate parenting
arrangement."
216 140 CONG. Rc. S6,604 (daily ed. June 8, 1994) (statement of Senator Riegle) (sup-
porting the adoption credit bill).
217 Sedgwick v. Commissioner, No. 10133-94, 94 PTT 13-53 (T.C. filed June 7, 1994)
(LEXSTAT). Judge Jacobs noted that the case was one of first impression. He asked the
lawyer from the IRS Office of District Counsel if she had consulted the IRS National Office
about whether to proceed in the case. After she responded yes, Judge Jacobs said: "That's
okay. I was praying they would say no." Judge Jacobs' remark prompted laughter in the
courtroom. Case Transcript at 22-23, Sedgwick v. Commissioner, No. 10133-94, 94 PTT
13-53 (T.C. filed June 7, 1994).
218 Case Transcript at 9-10, Sedgwick v. Commissioner, No. 10133-94, 94 PTT 13-53
(T.C. filed June 7, 1994).
219 Id. at 12, 50.
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vention of disease, or for the purpose of [affecting] any structure or
function of the petitioner wife.
Although it may have improved the petitioner's general mental
health, that's not sufficient for allowing a deduction.
220
In other words, the IRS argued that the surrogacy expenses did
not qualify under the first prong of the medical expense definition,
because infertility is not a disease, and did not qualify under the sec-
ond prong of the definition, because the treatment affected the struc-
ture or function of the surrogate's body, not the taxpayer's body.
2 21
On the witness stand, Jeanne Sedgwick described the eight diffi-
cult years of medical treatment she and her husband experienced.
22 2
During her testimony, Mrs. Sedgwick cried as she recounted the
wrenching course of her medical treatment, 223 which included nu-
merous surgeries to diagnose and treat reproductive disease, two
ectopic pregnancies that resulted from tubal disease, two unsuccessful
IVF procedures, and counseling to treat the severe psychological dis-
tress Mrs. Sedgwick experienced. 224 Mrs. Sedgwick then explained
that her doctors had eventually given her the medical advice that she
should try a surrogate. 22 5 After her testimony and a conference in the
judge's chambers, the IRS settled the case in favor of the taxpayers. 22 6
The facts in the Sedgwick case illustrate the progression of the
medical treatment of infertility. 227 Infertile patients endure years of
medical treatment precisely because their bodies are unable biologi-
cally to do something that healthy bodies do naturally. The medical
treatment of infertility simply allows patients to achieve or approxi-
mate normal biological functioning. Fertility treatment costs are thus
§ 213 medial expenses under current law.
220 Id. at 25. The IRS also argued that the expenses of surrogacy cannot be character-
ized as medical expenses of the fetus, because cases have held that a fetus becomes a de-
pendent for tax purposes only after it is born. See id. at 26. The Sedgwick's first attempt to
have a child through a surrogate failed (the surrogate miscarried), but later, the Sedgwicks
had a child with the help of another surrogate. Id. at 5-6 (noting also that only the costs of
the first surrogate procedure were at issue in the case).
221 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
222 Case Transcript at 28-50, Sedgwick v. Commissioner, No. 10133-94, 94 PTT 13-53
(T.C. filed June 7, 1994).
223 See id. at 40-42 ("I cry all the time about this." (quoting Mrs. Sedwick)).
224 See id.
225 See id. at 39, 41-42, 48-49.
226 There was no reported decision in the case, but there is a stipulated decision,
which stated, "there is no deficiency due from ... the petitioners." Sedgwick v. Commis-
sioner, No.10133-94 (T.C. Nov. 20, 1995). Counsel for the IRS settled the Sedgwick case
instead of waiting for the judge to rule in the taxpayer's favor. There is no indication that
the IRS has changed its position on the deductibility of surrogacy costs in the years since
the case was settled.
227 See supra Part I.B.
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SHOULD FERTILITY TREATMENT COSTS BE TREATED AS
MEDICAL OR NONMEDICAL EXPENSES?
A. The Normative Starting Point
Our starting point in this normative discussion is a tax code with
a § 213 medical expense deduction. It is not a world in which we have
a credit for medical expenses; nor is it a world in which we have uni-
versal health coverage with explicit rationing of health care re-
sources. 228 Instead, the federal government provides a partial
patchwork of direct medical subsidies229 and the § 213 medical ex-
pense deduction.2 30 Given this normative starting point, should fertil-
ity treatment costs be characterized as medical expenses or
nonmedical expenses under § 213?
To resolve this issue, two questions must be considered. First,
should fertility treatment costs be deductible in order to take into
account taxpayers' ability to pay?23 1 Second, would a deduction
228 It is possible to defend either of these worlds on various normative grounds. See,
e.g., NoRMAN DANIELS, JusT HEALTH CARE 36-39 (1985) (making a Rawlsian argument for
universal health coverage); W. John Thomas, The Oregon Medicaid Proposal: Ethical Paralysis,
Tragic Democracy, and the Fate of a Utilitarian Health Care Program, 72 OR. L. REv. 47, 115-21
(1993) (applying a Utilitarian ethic to the Oregon Medicaid program after the state legisla-
ture decided to cover more poor Oregonians and to explicitly ration medical care).
If Congress repealed § 213 and adopted universal health care with explicit rationing
to provide a basic package of health care to the forty-two million Americans who are unin-
sured, the author would readily concede that fertility treatments would probably not be
covered, along with many other types of medical treatments, such as Viagra treatment for
erectile dysfunction. If Congress instead converted § 213 into a credit with a dollar cap,
the author would concede that fertility patients would not receive a tax benefit for part of
their treatment costs.
229 These direct expenditure health care programs include Medicaid and Medicare.
Medicaid is a federal program that provides grants to state health care plans for the poor.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000). For an overview of Medicaid, see Thomas, supra note 228, at
79-91. Medicare is a federal medical insurance program for the elderly and the disabled.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395-1395hhh (2000).
230 In addition to the § 213 deduction, § 105(b) of the tax code permits taxpayers to
exclude employer reimbursements from medical flexible spending accounts. See I.R.C.
§ 105(b). The § 105(b) exclusion turns on whether the medical expense is within the
§ 213 definition of medical expenses. Arguments that apply to § 213 also apply to the
§105(b) exclusion. Id. For simplicity, this Part refers only to the § 213 deduction, unless
otherwise indicated.
231 This normative question dominates the theoretical literature on the medical ex-
pense deduction. Considering the relationship between the expense and the ideal income
tax base is the traditional approach to tax policy questions. Under this internal coherence
approach to tax policy questions, "arguments are first and foremost arguments of tax law,
and their normative criteria-the criteria of coherency, consistency, and clarity-are, in a
sense, intrinsic to the law." Mark P. Gergen, The Common Knowledge of Tax Abuse, 54 SMU L.
REv. 131, 143-44 (2001).
This traditional normative approach to tax policy typically incorporates the "horizon-
tal equity" and "vertical equity" norms, both of which are controversial. Cf Paul R. McDan-
iel & James R. Repetti, Horizontal and Vertical Equity: The Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange, 1 FLA.
TAx REV. 607 (1993) (arguing against formulaic use of the horizontal and vertical equity
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for fertility treatment costs create improper incentives for taxpay-
ers?2
32
norms). The term "vertical equity" refers to the proposition that we should apply an ap-
propriate pattern of differentiating between those who are unequally situated. Id. at 607.
The term "horizontal equity" is used for the proposition that equals should be treated
alike. Id. Economic income is generally regarded as the measure of equality and inequal-
ity. See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 165 (1959).
The vertical equity norm is typically applied by considering whether persons pay tax
according to their ability to pay: Money is assumed to have declining marginal utility, so a
progressive income tax is thought to represent the most appropriate pattern for differenti-
ating between taxpayers with different amounts of income. See id. at 90-115; McDaniel &
Repetti, supra, at 611. However, some commentators have argued that the concept of verti-
cal equity has meaning only if it is infused with a specific theory of distributive justice. Id.
Many tax policymakers and economists consider the horizontal equity norm the most
widely applicable equity norm. See, e.g., MUSGRAVE, supra, at 160 ("Perhaps the most widely
accepted principle of equity in taxation is that people in equal positions should be treated
equally."); C. EUGENE STEUERLE &JON M. BAKIJA, RETOOLING SOCIAL SECURITY FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY. RIGHT & WRONG APPROACHES TO REFORM 20-21 (1994) ("One beauty of the hori-
zontal equity principle is its lack of conflict with other principles .... You and I may
disagree on how progressive we would like government to be, but we can still agree that,
whatever the level of progressivity, two persons in equal circumstances should be treated
equally under the law.").
There is disagreement, however, about whether the horizontal equity norm should be
considered an independent equity norm. Some commentators, including Professors
Kaplow, Griffith, McDaniel, and Repetti, have argued that the horizontal equity norm
should not be considered an independent norm because: (i) The horizontal equity norm
is subsumed within the vertical equity norm because any appropriate pattern of differenti-
ating between unequals must treat equals equally; (ii) it is difficult to determine whether
two persons are situated exactly equally; and (iii) the horizontal equity norm gives no gui-
dance if the situations of two persons vary at all. See, e.g., Thomas D. Griffith, Should "Tax
Norms" Be Abandoned? Rethinking Tax Policy Analysis and the Taxation of Personal Injury Recov-
eries, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 1115, 1155-59 (1993); Kaplow, supra, at 143, 147; Louis Kaplow, A
Note on Horizontal Equity, 1 FLA. TAx REV. 191 (1992); McDaniel & Repetti, supra, at 613.
232 This normative question takes into account the particular consequences of al-
lowing a medical expense deduction for fertility treatment costs. Although the traditional
normative approach to tax policy questions dominates, some influential commentators,
including Professors Bankman, Kaplow, Griffith, and Weisbach advocate a consequentialist
approach to normative questions in tax policy. See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, The Business
Purpose Doctrine and the Sociology of Tax, 54 SMU L. REv. 149, 154-56 (2001). Professor
Bankman explains this approach:
Those who adopt the welfarist/efficiency approach seek to determine the
effects of a particular tax provision or proposal on efficiency or welfare.
Those who adopt an internal coherency approach are skeptical of the claim
that we know enough about how the economy interacts with the tax law to
make that calculation. To that extent, they challenge a positive assumption
that underlies the welfarist/efficiency approach. Many are skeptical as well
about the normative assumption that underlies the welfarist/efficiency ap-
proach: that efficiency or welfare is all that matters. Consider, for example,
the belief that "likes should be treated alike" which serves as the basis for
the concept of "horizontal equity." This belief seems generally consistent
with values of internal coherency. My guess is that it and its instantiation in
a system of horizontal equity is one of the desiderata of a tax system that is
built on internal coherency. Thus, like treatment of likes is a value in itself.
Followers of the efficiency/welfare approach regard "likes should be
treated alike" as an empty tautology, and horizontal equity as of no inde-
pendent value in setting tax policy.
Id. at 156 (footnote omitted).
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B. Fertility Treatment Costs and Ability to Pay
Most of the influential writing on the medical expense deduction,
including the work of Professors Surrey, Andrews, and Kelman, con-
siders the relationship between the medical expense deduction and
the ideal income tax base. 233 This literature addresses the question of
whether medical expenses in general are part of the ideal income tax
base. 234 As such, it does not really address the specific question posed
here, which is whether fertility treatment expenses should be deducti-
ble. Considering ability to pay may, however, help us determine what
types of expenses should and should not be deductible, given the exis-
tence of the § 213 deduction.
Professor Surrey's influential tax expenditure model distin-
guishes between tax provisions that are part of the "normal tax struc-
ture" and those that are "special preferences." 235 The "normal tax
structure" is based on Haig-Simons income, 236 but takes into account
deviations from Haig-Simons that are thought to be part of the "gen-
erally accepted structure" of the tax code (such as the realization re-
quirement, which results in the deferral of income from the
appreciation of property).237 Special preferences, also known as tax
expenditures, are deviations from the normal tax structure that are
"designed to favor a particular industry, activity, or class of per-
sons."238 Surrey characterized the medical expense deduction as a tax
The influential articles on the medical expense deduction written by Professors
Kaplow and Griffith adopt a consequentialist approach. See Thomas D. Griffith, Theories of
Personal Deductions in the Income Tax, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 343 (1989) [hereinafter Griffith,
Theories of Personal Deductions]; Louis Kaplow, The Income Tax as Insurance: The Casualty Loss
and Medical Expense Deductions and the Exclusion of Medical Insurance Premiums, 79 CAL. L.
REV. 1485 (1991) [hereinafter Kaplow, Income Tax as Insurance].
233 See STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 79, 205-06 (1985)
(stating that the medical expense deduction "constitutes a national health insurance pro-
gram for well-to-do homeowners," id. at 79); William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an
Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REv. 309, 314 (1972); see also Kelman, supra note 124, at
858-79 (criticizing the medical expense deduction of personal-consumption elements as
an indefensible tax expenditure).
234 See supra note 233.
235 SURREY & McDANIEL, supra note 233, at 1-30 (defining the tax expenditure con-
cept). For a critique of Surrey's tax expenditure approach, see Griffith, Theories of Personal
Deductions, supra note 232, at 345-66.
236 Haig-Simons income is the sum of (1) the taxpayer's consumption during the taxa-
ble period, plus (or minus) (2) the taxpayer's change in wealth during the taxable period.
Robert Murray Haig, The Concept of Income-Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE FEDERAL
INCOME TAX (Robert M. Haig ed., 1921), reprinted in Am. EcoN. ASS'N, READINGS IN THE
ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 54, 55, 75N76 (Richard A. Musgrave & Carl S. Shoup eds., 1959);
HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM
OF FISCAL POLICY 50 (1938).
237 SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 233, at 4.
238 Id. at 3.
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expenditure. 2 39 In other words, he thought that medical expenses
were properly includable in the income tax base.
Professor Andrews, on the other hand, argued that medical ex-
penses should be excluded from the tax base, for reasons intrinsic to
the tax system. 240 Although Andrews acknowledged that amounts
spent on medical care could be construed as consumption, 24 1 he took
the position that the ideal income tax base should reflect "material
well-being," not just consumption.2 4 2 He argued that medical ex-
penses should be excluded from the income tax base because, "[a]s
between two people with otherwise similar patterns of personal con-
sumption and accumulation, a greater utilization of medical services
by one is not likely to reflect any greater material well-being or taxable
capacity, but rather only greater medical need."24 3 He also noted
that, "differences in health affect relative . . .well-being," but con-
cluded that it would be impractical to try to include good health in
the tax base.24 4
Professor Andrews also considered the distributional implications
of the medical expense deduction.2 45 He illustrated the equity issues
raised by the § 213 deduction with the following hypothetical: 246 Tax-
payer A has $120,000 of income before paying his medical bills and
$20,000 of medical expenses. Taxpayer B has $100,000 of income and
no current medical expenses. Taxpayer C has $10,000 of income and
the same medical condition that taxpayer A has, but C cannot afford
treatment. Andrews asked whether A's $20,000 of medical expenses
should be excluded from the income tax base.247
239 Id. at 79. Professor Surrey observed that tax expenditures are a form of govern-
ment spending. See id. at 99. He noted that tax expenditures represent "upside-down"
subsidies because the value of a tax deduction increases as the taxpayer's income and mar-
ginal tax rate increase. See id. at 103. He argued that Congress should eliminate many tax
expenditures or replace them with direct expenditure provisions. Id. at 116-17.
240 See Andrews, supra note 233, at 309-13.
241 See id. at 314. Andrews agreed with earlier ideal income tax theorists, such as
Simons, that the tax code should not have source-based distinctions. See id. at 316-17 n.12,
375-76.
242 See id. at 335.
243 Id. at 314. Andrews argued that medical expenses are different from other ex-
penses: "What distinguishes medical expenses from other personal expenses at bottom is a
sense that large differences in their magnitude between people in otherwise similar cir-
cumstances are apt to reflect differences in need rather than choices among gratifica-
tions." Id. at 336.
244 Id. at 335.
245 Id. at 338 ("[T]he ability to afford medical care if needed.., is roughly a function
of wealth or income and .. .it will be distributed among persons generally in relation to
their income.").
246 See id. The hypothetical is based on Andrews' hypothetical, but dollar amounts
have been added for clarity.
247 Cf id. (implicitly raising this question).
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Andrews considered both vertical equity and horizontal equity in
answering the question.2 48 He acknowledged that richer taxpayers
can buy more medical care and better medical care, so A is better off
than C.249 He defended the medical expense deduction, nonetheless,
on the ground that the "horizontal equity" comparison between A and
B is more important than the "vertical equity" comparison between A
and C:
[T] he exclusion of medical services from taxable income is justified
because it will tend to ameliorate the effect of differences in utiliza-
tion of medical services attributable to differences in health and
need for medical services. The amelioration of differences among
people attributable to differences in general income level, on the
other hand, is primarily a matter of rate structure rather than elabo-
ration of the tax base. 2 50
Andrews acknowledged that some medical expenditures include
"a considerable component of voluntary personal gratification," 251 but
thought it was "reasonable to act upon the proposition that disease or
injury is a burden, not a boon, and that large differences in utilization
of medical services go less than all the way toward offsetting differ-
ences in health need. ' 25 2 He acknowledged that the medical expense
deduction would, of course, present line-drawing difficulties, giving as
an example the treatment of cosmetic surgery, which he admitted is
similar to the nonmedical purchase of cosmetics, but he argued that
"such borderline difficulties are inevitable whatever general policies
[the tax system chooses] to pursue."25 3
Professor Mark Kelman challenged Andrews's conclusions and ar-
gued against the § 213 deduction. 254 In Kelman's view, there should
be no medical expense deduction because (1) taxpayers' use of their
income is irrelevant, and (2) personal deductions undermine progres-
sivity.255 Kelman criticized Andrews's approach to the medical ex-
248 Id. at 337-41.
249 See id. at 338.
250 Id. at 339. Even if large fertility treatment expenses are more often incurred by
taxpayers with relatively higher income, the income tax rate structure can be altered to
address such distributional issues.
251 Id. at 337.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 See generally Kelman, supra note 124, at 834 ("[W) hile some deductions for medical
care might be supportable, Professor Andrews' argument, which allows deduction for all
actual expenditures on what is conventionally deemed medical care[,] . . .is ultimately
unpersuasive."). Kelman took the position that the tax system has two goals: first, to allo-
cate tax burdens in a way that reflects individual earnings capacity; and second, to tax
individuals only on market transactions. See id. at 880, 882 (stating that "earnings capacity
best measures ability to pay" and that "net receipts best measure earnings capacity," id. at
882).
255 See id. at 835, 880-83.
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pense deduction on various grounds. First, Kelman argued that good
health is no different from other psychic pleasures, yet Andrews sin-
gled it out for special treatment.256 If taxpayers A and B engage in a
risky behavior, such as smoking, what happens if A quits smoking and
does not get sick, but B keeps smoking and gets sick?257 If the tax
code does not tax gains from risky behavior, but allows B a deduction
for medical care, B is better off than A.25 8 Second, Kelman chal-
lenged Andrews's assumption that all medical expenditures are price-
inelastic and income-inelastic. 2 59 He argued that spending on emer-
gency life-saving measures, like treatment of arterial bleeding, is con-
sistent with Andrews's assumption, 2 60 but points out that "such cases
are, to say the least, atypical."2 61 Most medical expenditures are both
price-elastic 2 62 and income-elastic. 263
Third, Kelman argued that medical expenditures often include
payments for nonmedical benefits, such as a private hospital room,
but § 213 does not require taxpayers to segregate the payments for
the nonmedical expenses. 264 He noted that the tax code could ad-
dress the problem of mixed-motive expenses by creating a system of
standard medical deductions for various disorders, like the system
used for worker's compensation claims.265 In Kelman's view, the tax
law should not permit full deductibility of mixed-motive medical ex-
penditures, even if the medical care: (1) is the "but-for" cause of the
expenditure; (2) provides a sufficient motive for incurring the medi-
cal expense; or (3) is the dominant motive for incurring the medical
expense. 2 66 He also argued that trying to apportion mixed-motive ex-
penses and permitting the taxpayer to deduct only the medical por-
tion of the expenditure is not administrable, and thus is an
unprincipled compromise between full deductibility and full inclusion
in the tax base. 2 67
256 See id. at 869.
257 See id.
258 Id.
259 Id. at 865-66.
260 See id.
261 Id. at 866.
262 Id. at 868.
263 Id. at 866. Kelman notes that richer taxpayers: buy more expensive, high-tech med-
ical care (assuming that it is "better" than less expensive care); consume more discretion-
ary medical care like psychotherapy; and buy more amenities, such as a private hospital
room. Id.
264 See id. at 864-65.
265 See id. at 876. Kelman considered other methods of dealing with mixed-motive
expenses, but found them all lacking. See id. at 872-79.
266 See id. at 877.
267 See id. at 878-79 ("As long as medical care expenditures include personal consump-
tion elements, the [§] 213 scheme will not be rationally defensible." Id. at 879).
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The scope of § 213 under current law is consistent with Professor
Andrews's normative position that a medical expenditure should be
excluded from the base unless it constitutes an extreme "borderline"
expenditure, such as cosmetic surgery.2 68 Why should medical ex-
penditures be subtracted from the base when other things that also
affect well being are not subtracted from the base? In part, because of
the elemental importance of health and the catastrophic nature of
medical expenses that exceed the 7.5 percent floor. As Professor Gos-
tin has observed:
Health is basic to all human endeavor.... First, health is nec-
essary for the pursuit of livelihood....
Second, a certain level of health is a necessary condition for the
exercise of fundamental rights and privileges....
Third, health is of overriding importance in achieving personal
satisfaction, happiness, and better personal relationships ...
[H]ealth is one of the more important aspects of personhood. A
person's self dignity, self-identification, and status in society are
often connected with that person's vitality and ability to
function....
When illness or disease are preventable, or when pain and disa-
bility can be alleviated, the government's failure to act is
conspicuous. 269
Assuming that the § 213 deduction continues to be part of the tax
code, the current definition of the term "medical care" could be al-
tered to address some of Kelman's concerns about the § 213 deduc-
tion. Medical care falls on a continuum, with emergency, life-saving
treatment on one end, and cosmetic surgery on the other end. The
tax system could draw the line between the two broad categories of
"voluntary" and "involuntary" medical care at various places on the
continuum of care.
Instead of considering the taxpayer's motives or trying to appor-
tion between the medical and nonmedical elements of the expense,
the tax system could distinguish between different types of medical
care based on whether or not the care is important enough to be re-
garded as involuntary. Under such a system, the cost of medical care
that is classified as involuntary would continue to be deductible, but
268 For example, Congress has specifically excluded cosmetic surgery from the defini-
tion of medical care, but has not excluded from the definition other forms of medical
treatment that include a nonmedical element, such as laser eye surgery that corrects vision
and eliminates the need for glasses. See supra note 127; see also Rev. Rul. 2003-57, 2003-22
I.R.B. 959 (ruling that the cost of laser vision correction surgery is a medical expense
under § 213). As noted earlier, in the area of reproductive medical care, the IRS has ruled
that vasectomies, tubal ligations, prescription contraceptives, and abortions are medical
care for purposes of § 213. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
269 Lawrence 0. Gostin, Securing Health or Just Health Care? The Effect of the Health Care
System on the Health of America, 39 ST. Louis U. L.J. 7, 13 (1994) (footnotes omitted).
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the cost of medical care that is classified as voluntary would not be
deductible. It might seem incongruous to treat medical care that fa-
cilitates reproductive choice as involuntary, but the tax system might
place such care on the involuntary side of the line if it is a type of care
that is very important to most taxpayers.
The § 213 test could be the tax analogue of the "major life activ-
ity" part of the ADA disability test.270 Recall that the broad interpreta-
tion of the term "major life activity" is an activity "of comparative
importance." 2 71 The narrow interpretation of the term "major life ac-
tivity" is an activity that satisfies the three requirements of microfre-
quency, macrofrequency, and universality. 272 If the tax system
defined medical care under § 213 by reference to this latter narrow
test, the term medical care would include only care that relates to an
activity that is engaged in all day, every day, by everyone.2 73
Under this narrow definition, § 213 would not cover medical care
for sexual dysfunction, including Viagra, or reproductive medical
care, including fertility treatment, abortion, vasectomy, or oral contra-
ceptives. The argument in support of this position is that a person
can lead a perfectly "normal" life without engaging in these activities.
The problem with defining medical care so narrowly is that sex-
ual and reproductive functioning, while not engaged in all day, every
day, by everyone, is extremely important to most people. The test
under § 213 should not be whether an activity is one in which all peo-
ple engage; rather, the test should be whether a person's reproductive
system can function normally, such that the person can exercise sex-
ual and reproductive choice. What a person decides to do with their
normally functioning body is irrelevant. A person who wants very
much to engage in sex or reproduction, but cannot because of a dis-
ease, condition, or abnormality, can hardly be said to be leading a
perfectly "normal" life just because some people decide not to engage
in sexual activity or reproduction.
This approach to drawing the § 213 line is consistent with the
broader definition of "major life activity" adopted by the Supreme
Court in Bragdon.274 The Court concluded that reproduction was a
major life activity because reproduction is "central to the life process
itself."275 Under this approach to § 213, medical care would continue
270 See supra notes 174-75 (discussing judicial interpretations of the ADA disability
test).
271 See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
272 See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
273 See supra note 179.
274 See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1997).
275 Id.
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to be broadly defined and would include reproductive medical
care.
2 7 6
In numerous health law cases, courts have had to define the
terms "illness," "disease," and "medical necessity," in order to deter-
mine the scope of medical insurance coverage. Some of these cases
relate to medical care for various types of sexual and reproductive dys-
function. These cases may be relevant for purposes of considering
whether, for tax purposes, such medical care should be treated as vol-
untary or involuntary.
These cases indicate that courts seem to appreciate the impor-
tance of sex and reproduction more than insurers. 277 In part, this is
due to the fact that insurers have narrowed the scope of insurance
coverage to contain growing health care costs. Traditionally, insurers
deferred to doctors' medical judgment and covered medical care that
was ordered by doctors.278 When expensive new high-tech treatments
began driving up the cost of health care dramatically, however, insur-
ance companies changed their practices.279 Beginning in the mid-
1970s, following the 1965 enactment of Medicare and Medicaid, our
national health policy objectives shifted from a policy of expanding
health care coverage to a policy of cost containment.2 0 Private insur-
ers attempted to control skyrocketing health care costs by stating in
their contracts that coverage is limited to treatment: (1) of a "disease"
or "illness,"2 l (2) that is a "medical necessity," 28 2 and (3) that is not
"experimental" or "investigat[ive]. '"283 Medicare and Medicaid also
276 Narrowing the § 213 definition of medical care is a form of rationing medical care.
Americans (and their representatives in Congress) do not favor explicit health care ration-
ing. In fact, they generally recoil at the notion of such rationing. Given the fact that
Congress has not enacted a directly subsidized universal health care plan, it is possible that
the broad scope of § 213 is a result of Congress's and the IRS's inability or unwillingness to
make the difficult calls about rationing medical care in the tax code. As a deduction with
broad scope, the § 213 deduction resembles an insurance policy with liberal coverage. The
only types of medical care specifically excluded are cosmetic surgery and similar
treatments.
277 See Hazel Glenn Beh, Sex, Sexual Pleasure, and Reproduction: Health Insurers Don't
Want You to Do Those Nasty Things, 13 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 119, 158-59 (1998).
278 See Mark A. Hall & Gerard F. Anderson, Health Insurers' Assessment of Medical Neces-
sity, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637, 1644-45 (1992).
279 See id. at 1644-51.
280 Id. at 1663.
281 For example, the insurance contract in Egert v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co.
specified that coverage was limited to the treatment of "illness." See 900 F.2d 1032, 1033
(7th Cir. 1990).
282 See Hall & Anderson, supra note 278, at 1645-46. In some cases, courts have de-
ferred to the insurer's definition of medical necessity. See, e.g., Dowden v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield of Tex., Inc., 126 F.3d 641, 644 (5th Cir. 1997) (concluding that the insurance
plan granted Blue Cross "the exclusive and conclusive authority to determine coverage and
benefits, and to interpret provisions of the plan, including whether treatment is medically
necessary" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
283 Hall & Anderson, supra note 278, at 1647.
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exclude from coverage services that are not medically necessary. 284
Insurers use these definitions to support their denials of coverage.
Courts have defined the terms "illness," "disease," and "medical
necessity," in cases involving sexual and reproductive dysfunction. In
Egert v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., the court held that infer-
tility was an "illness" and that IVF was "medically necessary" treatment
for infertility, so the patient was entitled to reimbursement for the
costs of IVF.28 5 Several courts have also held that sex reassignment
surgery for treatment of a transsexual with gender identity disorder is
a medical necessity.286 Shortly after the FDA approved Viagra, the
federal agency that administers the Medicaid program287 took the po-
sition that Viagra is a medically necessary treatment for erectile dys-
function and mandated that state Medicaid programs cover the
drug.2 88
284 The federal Medicare statute excludes from coverage medical services that are not
reasonable and necessary for the treatment or prevention of illness." 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395y(a) (1) (A), (B) (2000). Medicaid also limits coverage to medically necessary treat-
ment. See 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(d) (2003).
285 900 F.2d 1032, 1037-39. In a similar case, the Iowa Supreme Court held that infer-
tility was an illness, since "the natural function of the reproductive organs is to procreate."
See Witcraft v. Sundstrand Health & Disability Group Benefit Plan, 420 N.W.2d 785, 788
(Iowa 1988). The Oklahoma Court of Appeals, however, held that IVF "was not a medi-
cally necessary service because it was elective and was not required to cure or preserve [the
plaintiff's] health." Kinzie v. Physician's Liab. Ins. Co., 750 P.2d 1140,1141 (Okla. Ct. App.
1987). The result in Kinzie has been criticized on the ground that many types of covered
treatments ameliorate, but do not cure, illness or disease. See, e.g., Lisa M. Kerr, Note, Can
Money Buy Happiness? An Examination of the Coverage of Infertility Services Under HMO Con-
tracts, 49 CASE W. Rs. L. REv. 599, 609, 628 (1999).
286 See, e.g., Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d 546, 550 (8th Cir. 1980).
287 The administrative agency, formerly known as the Health Care Financing Adminis-
tration, is now called the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services. See http://www.hcfa.
gov/error.asp?404;http://www.hcfa.gov/newsitecms.asp (last visited Mar. 11, 2004).
288 See David F. Chavkin, Medicaid and Viagra: Restoring Potency to an Old Program?, 11
HEALTH MATRIX 189, 207-08 (2001) (describing the circumstances under which the
Health Care Financing Administration issued a letter to the states mandating coverage of
Viagra). The National Governors' Association, the American Public Welfare Association,
and the National Association of State Medicaid Directors all opposed the Viagra mandate
on the ground that it constituted an unfunded mandate that would cost the states $100
million per year. Id. at 208-11. These groups were concerned that covering Viagra would
divert badly needed funds away from maternal and childcare, HIV care, and care of the
disabled. See Carole L. Stewart, Comment, Mandated Medicaid Coverage of Viagra: Raising the
Issues of Questionable Priorities, the Need for a Definition of Medical Necessity, and the Politics of
Poverty, 44 Loy. L. REv. 611, 626 (1998) (noting that ninety percent of Medicaid benefi-
ciaries are women and children). Many states eventually covered Viagra, but others re-
fused to do so. See Chavkin, supra, at 231-38. According to Professor Chavkin, "[s]tate
claims of dire financial consequences and 'unfunded mandates' have proven to be grossly
exaggerated and [s]tates have been able to comply with federal law without threatening
their financial health." Id. at 231.
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Some insurance companies have taken the position that Viagra is
a "medical necessity," 28 9 but fertility treatment involves a "lifestyle
choice" and is not a "medical necessity." 290 Perhaps the difference in
insurance coverage of Viagra and fertility treatments is due in part to
gendered views of the importance of reproduction and sex. For years,
women have lived with the reality that contraceptives and fertility
treatment are not generally covered by insurance. 291 Conversely,
within two months after Viagra was introduced, a group of men filed a
class action suit against their insurer, which had limited the number
of Viagra pills it would cover each month. The men argued that they
had been denied treatment for a "vital human function." 29 2
If medical care is understood to fall on a continuum, with emer-
gency, life-saving treatment on one end and cosmetic surgery on the
other end, reasonable people could disagree about where on the con-
tinuum fertility treatment falls, but could probably reach consensus
about its relative importance. The vast majority of people probably
think that both sex and reproduction are vitally important, although
there may be gendered views about whether sex or reproduction is
more important.
Unfortunately, this ability-to-pay approach does not provide a
clear normative foundation for determining where to draw the line on
the medical care continuum. Professor Griffith has argued that the
normative underpinnings of both the Andrews and Kelman ap-
proaches to the medical expense deduction are incoherent.293 In ad-
dition, Professor Weisbach has argued that tax policy makers should
adopt a consequentialist approach to line drawing questions in the tax
law. 29 4  The following section considers this consequentialist
approach.
289 See Hayden, supra note 154, at 183 (noting that "insurance companies offer pre-
scriptive coverage of Viagra, classifying it as a 'medically necessary' drug to treat male im-
potence" (citation omitted)).
290 McCullough, supra note 154.
291 See Sylvia A. Law, Sex Discrimination and Insurance for Contraception, 73 WASH. L. REv.
363, 363 (1998). Only recently has coverage of both contraceptives and fertility treatment
been mandated in some states. See Chavkin, supra note 288, at 231-38; Hayden, supra note
154, at 189.
292 See Hayden, supra note 154, at 180.
293 See Griffith, Theories of Personal Deductions, supra note 232, at 370, 385. Professor
Griffith notes that sometimes Andrews seems to be adopting an egalitarian ethic and other
times he seems to be adopting a utilitarian ethic. See id. at 370.
294 David A. Weisbach, An Efficiency Analysis of Line Drawing in the Tax Law, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 71, 74 (2000); David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law,
84 CORNELL L. REv. 1627, 1649-51 (1999) [hereinafter Weisbach, Line Drawing].
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C. The Incentive Effects of Allowing a Deduction for Fertility
Treatment Costs
In order to determine whether these costs should be deductible
under a consequentialst normative approach,2 95 it is necessary to con-
sider the ex ante incentive effects of characterizing fertility treatment
costs as medical expenses or nonmedical expenses. 29 6 Allowing the
medical expense deduction for the costs of fertility treatment would
encourage fertility treatment by reducing the cost of such treatment
for the taxpayer; not allowing the deduction would discourage fertility
treatment by increasing the cost of such treatment. If the tax system
allowed the deduction for certain fertility treatments, but not others,
it would discourage use of the tax-disfavored treatments and en-
courage use of the tax-favored treatments.
The tax system should perhaps encourage all fertility treatments, or
certain types of fertility treatments, if (1) fertility treatments are un-
derutilized, given the extreme importance of reproduction, but gen-
eral lack of insurance coverage; (2) infertile patients choose to
undergo treatment that is covered by insurance, instead of pursuing
less expensive, less painful, or less invasive procedures that are not
covered by insurance; (3) the success rates for certain forms of fertility
treatment are dramatically higher than the success rates for other
forms of fertility treatment; and (4) the attendant risks of multifetal
pregnancies are lower for certain forms of fertility treatment than for
other forms of treatment.
The tax system should perhaps discourage all fertility treatments,
or certain types of fertility treatment, if. (1) ovarian stimulation poses
significant health risks to the woman whose ovaries are being stimu-
lated; (2) ovarian stimulation increases the rate of multifetal
pregnancies, which poses health risks both to the woman bearing the
children and to the children she bears; (3) the fertility treatment
295 Consequentialist theories of distributive justice may be either entitlement theories
or welfarist theories. See Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate
Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1905, 1915 (1987). Entitlement
theories focus on a person's right to keep what she owns. See, e.g., ROBERT NoZICK, ANAR-
CHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 150-53 (1974). Welfarist theories instead focus on the welfare of
some or all members of society. See Bankman & Griffith, supra, at 1915. The two most
prominent welfarist theories are utilitarianism and the Rawlsian leximin. See id. at
1915-16. Utilitarianism seeks to maximize the aggregate welfare of a society; the leximin
seeks to maximize the welfare of the least well off persons in society. See id. at 1916.
296 See Kaplow, Income Tax as Insurance, supra note 232, at 1489-90, 1506. Again, the
normative starting point assumes a tax system with a § 213 deduction and a patchwork of
direct medical subsidies. See supra notes 228-30. The question discussed in this Article is
how, given that assumption, the tax system should characterize fertility treatment costs.
Also, since § 213 is a deduction, not a credit, it is, in effect, like an insurance co-pay,
because the tax savings from the medical expense deduction equal the product of the
dollar amount of the deduction multiplied by the taxpayer's marginal tax rate.
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poses other health risks or psychological risks to the children con-
ceived; (4) infertile patients overestimate the success rates for fertility
treatment or underestimate the health risks of multifetal pregnancies;
or (5) adoption is a better alternative. This Article considers both the
negative and positive consequences of various fertility treatments
below.
1. The Positive Consequences of Fertility Treatment
a. The Benefits of Fertility Treatment to the Parents and Child
Fertility treatment dramatically improves the welfare of the in-
tended parents. Infertile patients suffer extreme emotional distress,
as this Article discussed in an earlier section. 297 That distress stands in
stark contrast to the happiness of those who want to have children and
are able to have them.
Ten thousand parks where dear run,
Ten thousand roses in the sun,
Ten thousand pearls beneath the sea,
My baby more precious is to me. 298
Infertile patients prefer to have a genetic, gestational, and nurtur-
ing connection to their child. If their physiology prevents them from
having all three, however, they are often quite happy to have the nur-
turing connection and whichever of the other two connections is phys-
iologically possible. In other words, they are often quite happy to
have a child with the assistance of a third-party sperm donor, egg do-
nor, or surrogate. 299
The financial sacrifices that infertile patients make to pay for fer-
tility treatment provide an indication of how important fertility treat-
ment is to these patients.3 0 0 As noted earlier, numerous studies have
demonstrated that infertile patients are prepared to pay dearly to in-
297 See supra Part I.A.
298 Mother's Song, in A BOOK OF NURSERY SONGS AND RHYMES 18-20 (S. Baring-Gould
ed., 1895), at http://www.poemfinder.com/poem-print.cfm?CFID-478086&CFTOKEN=42
873018&id=199570 (last visited May 22, 2001) (copy on file with author). Many other
poems also describe the joy of parenting.
I would not trade one day with you
To wear the purple robes of power,
Nor drop your hand from mine to do
Some great deed in a selfish hour.
For you have brought me joy serene
And made my soul supremely glad.
In life rewarded I have been;
'Twas all worth while to be your dad.
EDGAR A. GUEST, To The Boy, in THE PATH TO HOME 156-57 (1919).
299 See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
800 See supra Part I.C.
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crease their chances of conceiving and bearing a child.30 1 For exam-
ple, survey respondents in a United Kingdom study "were willing to
pay [twenty-nine] percent of their after-tax income for a [fifty] per-
cent chance of having a child, and willing to risk a [twenty] percent
chance of death in order to have a child."
30 2
Studies such as the United Kingdom study demonstrate the para-
mount importance of fertility treatment to infertile patients30 3 and
suggest that the demand for fertility treatment is relatively inelastic. 30 4
Professor Weisbach has argued that tax policy makers should draw
lines in the tax law in a manner that minimizes deadweight losses.3 0 5
If fertility treatment is uninsured and nondeductible, patients will be
encouraged to either: (1) opt for less effective medical treatment that
insurance does cover;30 6 or (2) opt for very aggressive fertility treat-
ment that increases the risk of a multifetal pregnancy. 30 7 Thus, disal-
lowing the deduction would likely increase deadweight losses and be
inefficient.
Fertility treatment also improves the welfare of the children who
would not have been born but for such treatment. The magnitude of
this effect on the consequentialist conclusion depends on the specific
consequentialist approach employed. 30 8  For example, Peter Neu-
mann, a public health expert, has computed the cost of IVF per life-
year-gained for a child conceived with IVF and compared that cost to
the cost per life-year-gained of other common medical treatments. 30 9
Neumann assumed that an IVF cycle costs $8,000 and has a twelve
percent chance of success, and that a child conceived with IVF would
301 See Neumann, supra note 90, at 1223-25 (summarizing results of studies exploring
how much couples were willing to pay for IVF).
302 Id. at 1223-24 (citation omitted).
303 Neumann, supra note 90, at 1225.
304 As Weisbach notes: "[T]he size of the deadweight loss from a tax on an item is
related to the elasticity of demand [for] the item. The greater the elasticity, the more the
demand changes for a change in price, and consequently the greater the economic distor-
tion." Weisbach, Line Drawing, supra note 294, at 1656.
305 Id. Weisbach argues that we should draw lines in the tax law to maximize effi-
ciency, and notes that "[a]n efficient tax is simply a tax with low deadweight loss." Id. The
deadweight loss of a tax is "the loss in value to consumers in excess of the revenue raised by
the government." Id. at 1651.
306 For example, patients with blocked fallopian tubes will likely opt for surgery to
repair the blocked tubes because the surgery is covered by insurance, rather than opt to
bypass the blocked tubes with an 1VF procedure, even if the surgery is the less effective
procedure. See Bonny Gilbert, Infertility and the ADA: Health Insurance Coverage for Infertility
Treatment, 63 DEF. COUNS. J. 42, 43-44 (1996).
307 See infra notes 471-73 and accompanying text.
308 For example, utilitarians sometimes look to total utility and sometimes look to aver-
age utility. SeeJ.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 27-28
(1973).
309 Neumann, supra note 90, at 1222-24.
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live seventy-five years.310 Given these assumptions the cost per life-
year-gained from IYF equals $3,259.511 The cost per life-year-gained
for many other common types of medical treatment is much higher:
(1) $23,000 for kidney dialysis; (2) $28,000 for a two-vessel coronary
artery bypass surgery (for the cost in excess of the cost of medical
management); (3) $100,000 for a heart transplant for a fifty-year-old
patient with terminal heart disease; (4) $300,000 for intensive care for
a "very ill" patient undergoing major vascular surgery; and (5) $2,700
for mammography every three years for a women age fifty to sixty-
five. 3 1
2
Neumann's cost per life-year estimate may have to be adjusted
upward because people may value life-years of unborn people less
than life-years of people who have already been born. His cost per
life-year estimate may also have to be adjusted downward because his
estimate does not take into account the benefits to the child's
parents.3 13
b. Adoption as an Alternative to Fertility Treatment
Adoption also enables infertile patients to experience the joy of
parenting, so infertile would-be parents often consider adoption as an
alternative to fertility treatment. 314 According to Elizabeth Bartholet,
infertile patients typically consider adoption only after they "have
reached the end of a long medical road designed to produce a biolog-
ical child. '3 15 Sociobiologists have long recognized the basic human
urge to reproduce,316 but Bartholet argues that societal forces are also
at work in making adoption less desirable than bearing a biological
child.317 Bartholet notes that those who are infertile naturally want to
310 Id. at 1222-23.
311 Id. at 1223.
312 Id. at 1224.
313 Id.
314 See William D. Mosher & Christine A. Bachrach, Understanding U.S. Fertility: Con-
tinuity and Change in the National Survey of Family Growth, 1988-1995, FAM. PLAN. PERSP.,
Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 4, 8. One study collecting data from 1988 to 1995 estimated that eleven
to twenty-four percent of infertile couples decide to adopt. Evan B. Donaldson Adoption
Inst., Overview of Adoption, at http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/FactOverview print.html
(last visited Mar. 11, 2004) (citing Mosher & Bachrach, supra, at 9).
315 See ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION, INFERTILITY, AND THE NEW
WORLD OF CHILD PRODUCTION 24 (1999).
316 See generally RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (2d ed. 1989).
317 See BARTHOLET, supra note 315, at 24. Bartholet explains:
Adoption is the choice of last resort for most infertile men and women who
want to parent. If asked why this is true, many would say, "Because it is
natural to want your own child." But it is hard to know what is natural,
given the fact that society weighs in to make adoption the last resort. And it
is not clear that we should characterize parenting decisions as the product
of choice. We are all conditioned from early childhood to equate per-
sonhood with procreation and procreation with parenting.
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seek medical attention to overcome the infertility.3 18 She argues, how-
ever, that infertile patients who begin medical treatment often have
difficulty deciding when to stop the medical treatment of their infertil-
ity, and that most of the information available to infertile patients is
biased in favor of medical treatment and against adoption. 3 19 In addi-
tion, adoption is highly regulated, but the medical treatment of infer-
tility is essentially unregulated. 320 Bartholet therefore argues that
society should promote adoption as an alternative to the medical
treatment of infertility.
321
On the other hand, Maura Ryan has argued that we should not
simply "assume that adoption is the obvious and unambiguous solu-
tion to the problem of infertility." 322 Typically, infertile adoptive par-
ents reach the decision to adopt only after experiencing the
devastating losses associated with their infertility.3 23 Ryan argues:
To make a blanket assumption that infertility should be solved by
adoption neglects the individual nature of the process of healing
and the fact that not all infertile people will come to the place
where they are able to positively embrace adoption. The many
adoptable children who have special needs of some kind are not
necessarily going to be well taken care of by someone for whom
Id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
318 See id. at 30.
319 Id. at 30-32. Infertile patients are most often advised by their fertility doctors. See
id. at 30. Their doctors often know little about adoption and rarely present it as an alterna-
tive to medical treatment. I& Adoption agencies are wary of infertile couples, who may
proceed with adoption before they have resolved their feelings of grief and loss about their
infertility. See id. at 31.
320 See id. at 33.
Those entering the world of adoption agencies and home studies quickly
realize that they have no right to become adoptive parents. Parental
screening is the essence of what traditional adoption is all about, with the
government determining through its agents who should be disqualified al-
together from the parenting opportunity and then how those who are qual-
ified should be rated for purposes of allocating the available children.
The parental screening requirement is a very real deterrent to many who
might otherwise consider adoption. People don't like to become helpless
supplicants, utterly dependent on the grace of social workers, with respect
to something as basic as their desire to become parents. Screening also
adds to the financial costs of adoption.
Regulation also sends a powerful message about the essential inferiority of
adoption as a form of parenting. By subjecting adoptive but not biologic
parents to regulation, society suggests that it trusts what goes on when peo-
ple give birth and raise a birth child but profoundly distrusts what goes on
when a child is transferred from a birth to an adoptive parent.
Id. at 33-34.
321 See id. at 37-38.
322 See MAuRA A. RvAN, ETHICS AND ECONOMICS OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTION: THE COST
OF LONGING 57 (2001).
323 Many infertile people "will find that after years of struggling to conquer infertility,
they are too old, or too tired, or too poor, or too broken in spirit, to begin another uphill
battle, and that of course is what adoption is." BARTHOLET, supra note 315, at 36.
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such an adoption is not really a positive and free choice .... [O]ne
could argue for a greater obligation to adopt on the part of the
fertile who would not, in principle, begin with the same
vulnerabilities. 3
24
In addition, pursuing adoption can be a difficult, expensive, and
uncertain process. 3 25 There is a shortage of healthy children available
for adoption in the United States, in part because adolescent birth
rates have declined significantly.3 26 In addition, only about one per-
cent of American women give up their babies for adoption. 32 7 As a
result of this baby shortage, adoptive parents typically have to wait
years to adopt a healthy American baby.3 28 Adoptive parents may be
able to adopt "special needs" children3 29 more quickly, but many
adoptive parents are hesitant to adopt such needy children. 33 0 The
wait is also frequently shorter for the adoption of foreign children.3 31
The cost of adoption from private agencies or the cost of an indepen-
dent adoption, including international adoption, ranges from $4,000
324 See RYAN, supra note 322, at 58.
325 See BARTHOLET, supra note 315, at 36-37.
326 See Paula Span, Parallel Lives, WASH. POST MAG., June 18, 2000, at 12, 15 (noting an
eighteen percent decline in the adolescent birth rate since 1991).
327 Id. at 16. During the 1950s and 1960s, forty to fifty percent of unmarried mothers
in the United States gave up their babies for adoption. Id. As of 1995, only one percent of
women gave up their babies for adoption. Id. There are various reasons for the dramatic
reduction in relinquishment rates: (1) single parenthood carries less of a social stigma
today; (2) sensational press accounts of the emotional difficulties of adopted children have
made adoption appear to be a poor choice for the biological mother and child; and (3)
few adolescent mothers seriously consider adoption or think about the potential benefits
of adoption. See id. at 1 6 , 1 7 .
328 Id. at 15-16 (stating that potential adoptive parents seeking a healthy, white, Amer-
ican-born baby face a wait of two to seven years); see also RYAN, supra note 322, at 59 (noting
that many infertile couples are "interested, for both good and bad reasons, in adopting
healthy, white infants").
329 A "special needs" child is a child with a "specific factor or condition (such as his
ethnic background, age, or membership in a minority or sibling group, or the presence of
factors such as medical conditions or physical, mental, or emotional handicaps) because of
which it is reasonable to conclude that such child cannot be placed with adoptive parents
without providing adoption assistance . . . or medical assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 673(c)
(2000).
330 In one study, only about twelve percent of the parents adopting special needs chil-
dren gave infertility as the reason for the adoption, but over eighty percent of parents
adopting a child independently or through a private adoption agency gave infertility as the
reason for the adoption. See Marianne Berry et al., Preparation, Support, and Satisfaction of
Adoptive Families in Agency and Independent Adoptions, 13 CHILD & ADOLESCENT Soc. WoRK J.
157, 165-66 (1996).
331 See Span, supra note 326, at 26 (noting that international adoption is a quicker
process).
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to $30,000.332 Adoption of non-special needs children is particularly
costly. 333
Adoptions also involve uncertainty because a biological mother
may decide, after the child is born, not to go through with the adop-
tion.334 Adoptive parents who have paid the birth expenses of the
biological mother are not reimbursed for those expenses. 335
In 1996, Congress enacted two tax provisions, § 23 and § 137, to
encourage adoption. 336 Section 23 provides that adoptive parents can
claim a tax credit of up to $10,000 for adoption expenses. 33 7 Section
137 allows employees to exclude up to $10,000 of adoption expenses
reimbursed from an employer-provided adoption assistance pro-
gram.3 38 Both provisions can apply to a single adoption, but cannot
apply to the same adoption expenses.3 39 The § 23 credit is phased out
if the parents have gross income between $150,000 and $190,000.340
Parents with income of $190,000 or more cannot qualify for the
credit. 341 If the § 23 credit exceeds the parents' tax liability for the
year in which the credit is taken, the parents may carry over the un-
used portion of the credit to the next year.342
Due to the shortage of non-special needs, American-born chil-
dren available for adoption, these tax benefits probably have not in-
creased the number of adoptions of such children. 343 It is not clear
whether these tax benefits have affected the number of special needs
332 See Nat'l Adoption Info. Clearinghouse, Cost of Adopting, at http://naic.acf.hhs.
gov./pubs./s-cost.cfm (last visited Mar. 11, 2004) [hereinafter NAIC, Cost of Adopting]. For
public agency adoptions, which typically involve special needs children, costs range from
zero to $2,500. See id. In addition, parents who adopt special needs children may qualify
for government reimbursement of their adoption expenses. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 670, 673(a).
The Social Security Act provides payments to states so that they can reimburse adoptive
parents for the costs of adopting special needs children. See id. Parents may receive addi-
tional federal assistance if the adopted child was eligible for other forms of federal assis-
tance prior to the adoption. See Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Inst., Costs of Adoption, at
http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/FactOverview/costs-print.html (last visited Mar. 11,
2004).
333 See infra notes 345-46 and accompanying text.
334 See, e.g., Lord et al., supra note 16, at 64 (describing one family's experience with a
"fall-through").
335 See NAIC, Cost of Adopting, supra note 332.
336 SeeSmall BusinessJob Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1807, 110 Stat.
1899.
337 See I.R.C. § 23(b) (1) (2002).
338 See I.R.C. § 137(b)(1).
339 See I.R.C. § 23(b) (3) (A); DEP'T OF TREASURY, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON TAx
BENEFITS FOR ADOPTION 1 (2000), available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/tax-policy/li-
brary/adoption.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2004) [hereinafter TREASURY REPORT ON TAx
BENEFITS].
340 See I.R.C. § 23(b) (2) (A) (i), (ii).
341 See id. §23(b)(2)(A).
342 See I.R.C. § 23(c) (2000) (amended 2001) (permitting taxpayers to carry forward
the unused portion of the credit up to five years).
343 See TREASURY REPORT ON TAx BENEFITS, supra note 339, at 3.
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adoptions.3 44 The cost of a special needs adoption is lower than the
cost of a non-special needs adoption 345 and in eighty-five percent of
special needs adoptions, direct government subsidies cover the adop-
tive parents' out-of-pocket expenses. 346 Thus, special needs adoptions
generate tax benefits in only fifteen percent of such cases. 347
The tax benefits of § 23 and § 137 may have increased the num-
ber of foreign adoptions, however. 348 The Treasury Department esti-
mates that, in 1998, the average cost of adopting a foreign child was
almost twice the cost of adopting a child from the United States.3 49
Sections 23 and 137 therefore provide greater tax benefits for foreign
adoptions than for special needs adoptions or domestic adoptions.35 0
Given the greater tax benefit for foreign adoptions, these provisions
may have augmented the number of such adoptions.
The tax law currently favors adoption over fertility treatment,
even if fertility treatment expenses are characterized as medical ex-
penses. This is, in part, because § 23 provides for a credit, while § 213
provides for a deduction. 351 The following example illustrates the
comparative tax benefits of the § 23 credit and the § 213 medical ex-
pense deduction:
Lee and Shannon are infertile. They are deciding whether to adopt
a foreign child or do a cycle of IVF. The cost of either option is
$10,000. Assume that their gross income for the year is $100,000
344 Id. The number of special needs adoptions has increased, but it is unclear how
much the number of special needs adoptions would have increased without the tax incen-
tives of I.R.C. §§ 23 and 137. See id. at 4.
345 Id. at 2, 17.
346 See id. at 17.
347 Id. at 2.
348 Id. at 3 (noting that the adoption tax benefits may increase the number of foreign
adoptions). The number of foreign adoptions has increased significantly in recent years.
See Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Inst., International Adoption Facts, at http://www.adoption-
institute.org/FactOverview/international.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2004). Although the
number of foreign adoptions began to increase before Congress enacted §§ 23 and 137 in
1996, the number of foreign adoptions has surged since enactment of these sections. See
id. (presenting data, which indicates that there were approximately 6,500 international
adoptions in 1992; 7,400 in 1993; 8,300 in 1994; 9,700 in 1995; 11,300 in 1996; 13,600 in
1997; 15,600 in 1998; 16,400 in 1999; 18,500 in 2000; and 19,200 in 2001).
349 See TREASURY REPORT ON TAx BENEFITS, supra note 339, at 3. The Treasury Depart-
ment estimated that the average cost of foreign adoption was approximately $10,000 in
1998. Id. The actual average cost may have been higher, however. The tax benefits of
§§ 23 and 137 are subject to gross income phase outs, so this cost estimate does not reflect
the cost of adoption by higher income families. See supra note 340 and accompanying text.
350 See TREASURY REPORT ON TAx BENEFITS, supra note 339, at 3-4.
351 A credit reduces the taxpayer's tax owed by the dollar amount of the credit. JOSEPH
BANKMAN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAx: EXAMPLES & ExPLANATIONS 6-7 (3d ed. 2002). "A
deduction ... reduces [a] taxpayer's taxable income[, on which tax due is computed]." Id.
The tax savings from a deduction depend on the taxpayer's marginal tax rate and equal
the product of the dollar amount of the deduction multiplied by the taxpayer's marginal
tax rate. Id. at 7.
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and their marginal tax rate is 30 percent. If they adopt, they can
claim a section 23 credit of $10,000. The credit saves them $10,000
in taxes and reduces their net adoption cost to zero. If they do the
IVF cycle and take a section 213 medical expense deduction, the
deduction will be $2,500 (their $10,000 medical expense less
$7,500, which is 7.5 percent of their gross income) .352 The $2,500
deduction will save them $750 ($2,500 deduction multiplied by the
30 percent tax rate) in taxes. Their net cost for the IVF procedure
is $9,250 ($10,000 less $750 tax savings) .35
Although both fertility treatment and adoption can have a signifi-
cant positive impact on welfare, the tax code currently provides
greater tax incentives for adoption than for fertility treatment gener-
ally, even if the costs of fertility treatment are characterized as medical
expenses. In other words, the current tax code favors adoption over
fertility treatment.
2. The Negative Consequences of Fertility Treatment
a. The Medical and Psychological Risks of Fertility Treatment
Even without fertility treatment, pregnancy, labor, and delivery
entail medical risks to both the mother and the child.354 In addition,
the various surgical procedures employed to diagnose, cure, or treat
infertile patients involve the normal medical risks associated with sur-
gery. 355 This section will address the risks that increase or may in-
crease as a result of ovulation induction and high-tech treatments
such as IVF and ICSI.356 The known and potential risks of these fertil-
ity treatments include risks to: (1) the woman whose ovaries are being
stimulated; (2) the woman gestating the child or children; and (3) the
child or children being gestated.
352 See I.R-C. § 213(a) (2000).
353 The relative advantage of the credit is reduced if the adoption costs exceed
$10,000, or if the taxpayer's gross income is more than $150,000. See I.R.C. § 23 (2001).
354 The risks of pregnancy and delivery increase as women get older. See KEARNEY,
supra note 39, at 160 ("The risks of pregnancy-related death and of hypertension, diabetes,
and complicated delivery all rise as women age. Many older women are willing to accept
these risks, but they need to be carefully monitored during their pregnancies.").
355 See, e.g., id. at 274-75 (describing risks associated with assisted reproduction proce-
dures that involve surgery, and noting that "[n]one of these risks are unique to assisted
reproduction").
356 Infertility, by itself, sometimes increases the medical risks of pregnancy and delivery
because certain underlying causes of infertility increase specific pregnancy and delivery
risks. Some of the increased pregnancy and delivery risks associated with fertility treatment
may thus be attributable to the underlying cause of infertility. See id. at 276-77. For exam-
ple, women with disorders of the fallopian tubes, women with sexually transmitted diseases,
and women who were exposed to DES in utero all have a higher risk of ectopic pregnancy.
See id. at 278. In such cases, the cause of the infertility, rather than its treatment, may
account for much of the increased medical risk of pregnancy and delivery. Fertile surro-
gates who gestate children are not subject to these increased risks. See id. at 276.
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i. The Medical Risks to the Woman Whose Ovaries are Being
Stimulated
(A) The Risk of Hyperstimulation
Ovarian Hyperstimulation Syndrome (OHS), a condition in
which fluid accumulates in the abdomen, is the primary risk to women
whose ovaries are stimulated by fertility drugs.357 The fluid accumu-
lated in the abdomen may put pressure on the surrounding organs,
including the heart and lungs. 358 Hyperstimulation can cause dehy-
dration, which may lead to kidney damage or dangerous blood
clots. 3 59 A patient suffering from hyperstimulation may have to rest in
bed or, in more extreme cases, may have to be hospitalized.3 60 Hyper-
stimulation is relatively rare, 36 t but certain groups of women are
known to be more susceptible to it than others.3 62 The fertility spe-
cialist can reduce the risk of hyperstimulation by monitoring blood
estrogen levels during the ovarian stimulation and altering the course
of treatment if blood estrogen levels are high. 363
(B) The Uncertainty Regarding the Increased Risk of
Ovarian Cancer
Some medical researchers have suggested that ovarian stimula-
tion may increase a woman's risk of developing ovarian cancer, but
the link between ovarian stimulation and increased cancer risk has
not been established. Several controversial studies have concluded
that ovarian stimulation increases ovarian cancer risk. The most
widely publicized of these studies is the 1992 Whittemore study.364
This study concluded that, compared to fertile women, infertile wo-
357 See KEARNEY, supra note 39, at 264; RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 114-15.
358 See KEARNEY, supra note 39, at 265.
359 Id.
360 Severe hyperstimulation can be fatal, especially if untreated, but such severe cases
are rare. See KER NEY, supra note 39, at 265.
361 Hyperstimulation occurs in one to five percent of stimulated cycles. RESOLVING
INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 114. Severe hyperstimulation occurs in 0.4% to 1.3% of cases.
KERNEY, supra note 39, at 265.
362 KEARNEY, supra note 39, at 265. Higher risk women include those who: (1) have
polycystic ovarian syndrome (PCOS); (2) are very thin; (3) are under age thirty-four; or (4)
have a history of producing over thirty follicles or high blood estrogen levels in previous
stimulation cycles. See id. at 265.
363 See RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 114-15. If a patient has very high blood
estrogen levels, the doctor may cancel the cycle, or continue the cycle but stop the stimula-
tion drugs. Id.
The risk of hyperstimulation increases if the patient becomes pregnant while hyper-
stimulated. See KErNEv, supra note 39, at 265. If a patient has high blood estrogen levels,
the doctor may decide to delay the transfer of embryos. Id. The doctor can retrieve the
eggs, fertilize them, freeze them, and then transfer them at a later date, after the ovarian
swelling has subsided. Id. at 266.
364 See Alice S. Whittemore et al., Characteristics Relating to Ovarian Cancer Risk: Collabora-
tive Analysis of 12 US Case-Control Studies, 136 Am. J. or EPIDEMIOLOGY 1184, 1184 (1992).
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men whose ovaries had been stimulated had almost three times the
lifetime risk of developing ovarian cancer.365 On the other hand, nu-
merous organizations, including the National Cancer Institute and
the Food and Drug Administration, have criticized the methodology
and conclusions in the Whittemore study.36 6 In addition, numerous
subsequent studies have failed to establish a connection between ova-
rian stimulation and ovarian cancer.36 7
In another well-known study, the 1994 Rossing study, researchers
concluded that prolonged use of clomiphene citrate 368 may increase
the risk of ovarian cancer. 369 The methodology of the Rossing study
had fewer drawbacks than did the Whittemore study, but still had limi-
tations.370 In addition, the Rossing study considered the risk associ-
ated with using clomiphene for twelve or more cycles, but the medical
consensus is that clomiphene should not be used nearly that many
times. 37 1
Other studies have posited that infertility itself, whether treated
or not, increases a woman's risk of ovarian cancer.37 2 Given that fact,
the relationship between ovulation drugs and ovarian cancer may only
be a correlation, not a cause-effect relationship. Researchers will con-
tinue to study the potential relationship between ovulation stimula-
tion and ovarian cancer. For now, however:
None of these studies, either alone or together, conclusively demon-
strates a link between ovulation drugs and ovarian cancer, but
365 Id. at 1188 (noting also that "infertile women without fertility drug use experienced
no increase in risk" of ovarian cancer).
366 See KEARNEv, supra note 39, at 269.
367 See, e.g., Baruch Modan et al., Cancer Incidence in a Cohort of Infertile Women, 147 Am.
J. OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 1038, 1042 (1998) (concluding that their data did not suggest that
stimulation drugs increase the risk of ovarian cancer); Gad Potashnik et al., Fertility Drugs
and the Risk of Breast and Ovarian Cancers: Results of a Long-term Follow-up Study, 71 FERTILITY
& STERILITY 853, 853 (1999) (concluding that "[a] n association between the use of fertility
drugs and an increased risk of breast and ovarian cancers has not been confirmed"). Kear-
ney notes that these studies involved relatively small samples and urges further study.
KEANEY, supra note 39, at 269-72.
368 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
369 See Mary Anne Rossing et al., Ovarian Tumors in a Cohort of Infertile Women, 331 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 771, 776 (1994).
370 See id. at 774; KEARNEY, supra note 39, at 270-71. Kearney discusses both the
strengths and weaknesses of the Rossing study. For example, he notes that the study did
not control for the use of oral contraceptives, which reduces the risk of ovarian cancer. Id.
at 271.
371 See KEARNEY, supra note 39, at 271-72 (stating that clomiphene "should never be
used" for twelve cycles and adding that "[flew women use clomiphene for more than six
cycles, and those who do should be looking for a new doctor").
372 See, e.g., Robe; t E. Bristow & Beth Y. Karlan, Ovulation Induction, Infertility, and Ova-
rian Cancer Risk, 66 FERTILITY & STERILITY 499, 499 (1996); Lynette Burmeister & David L.
Healy, Ovarian Cancer in Infertility Patients, 30 ANNALS OF MED. 525, 527-28 (1998); Carmen
Rodriguez et al., Infertility and Risk of Fatal Ovarian Cancer in a Prospective Cohort of US Women,
9 CANCER CAUSES & CONTROL 645, 645 (1998).
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neither can the risk be entirely discounted. Based on what we know
now, should a woman avoid using ovulation drugs and rely on natu-
ral cycles to produce eggs for fertilization? Most physicians would
say no .... Pregnancy and childbirth have always been risky, but
most women are willing to assume the risk in order to have
children.373
A 1997 study bears out this last statement. The study indicates
that about eighty percent of women requiring fertility treatment indi-
cated that they would take ovulation induction drugs even if the drugs
slightly increased their risk of ovarian cancer.3 7 4 In addition, there
are certain things a woman can do that may reduce her risk of ovarian
cancer, such as taking oral contraceptives or carrying a pregnancy to
term. Various studies indicate that the use of oral contraceptives over
a period of years reduces the risk of ovarian cancer.3 75 Other studies
considering the relationship between pregnancy and ovarian cancer
indicate that, the more recendy a woman has given birth, the lower
her risk of ovarian cancer.3 76 One theory for this phenomenon is that
pregnancy somehow reverses malignant transformations in the
ovaries. 37 7
Taking birth control pills may be unacceptable to an infertile
woman who continues to want to bear a child. For such women, bear-
ing a child may be the only acceptable way to attempt to reduce their
ovarian cancer risk. If the infertility is caused by an ovulation disor-
der, an infertile woman may have a much better chance of bearing a
child if she enlists the assistance of an egg donor. Egg donors are
usually stimulated fewer times than are fertility patients (often just
once) and can reduce their ovarian cancer risk by taking oral contra-
ceptives or bearing a child after donating eggs.
The data so far are inconclusive on the hypothesized link be-
tween fertility treatment and ovarian cancer. Unless and until such a
link is established, the potential risk to women should not be treated
as a significant negative in the welfare scorecard for fertility treatment.
373 See KEARNEY, supra note 39, at 272.
374 See Barry Rosen et al., The Feasibility of Assessing Women's Perceptions of the Risks and
Benefits of Fertility Drug Therapy in Relation to Ovarian Cancer Risk, 68 FERTILITY & STERILITY 90,
90 (1997) (noting, however, that only twenty-four percent of the participants "understood
that treatment for ovarian cancer usually was not curative").
375 See, e.g., Christine H. Holschneider & Jonathan S. Berek, Ovarian Cancer: Epidemiol-
ogy, Biology, and Prognostic Factors, 19 SEMINARS IN SURGICAL ONCOLOGY 3, 3 (2000) (finding
that using oral contraceptives for five years cuts a woman's risk of ovarian cancer approxi-
mately in half.
376 See, e.g., Francesca Chiaffarino et al., Time Since Last Birth and the Risk of Ovarian
Cancer, 81 GYNECOLOGIC ONCOLOGY 233, 233 (2001) (observing an increased risk of ovarian
cancer "with increasing time since last birth"). See also Glinda S. Cooper et al., Pregnancy
Recency and Risk of Ovarian Cancer, 10 CANCER CAUSES & CONTROL 397, 399 (1999) (sug-
gesting that ovarian cancer risk increased as time since last pregnancy increased).
377 See Cooper, supra note 376, at 397.
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In addition, studies linking later pregnancy and reduced risk of ova-
rian cancer 378 support favorable tax treatment for the costs of egg do-
nor procedures.
ii. The Medical Risks of Multifetal Pregnancies to the Children
Gestated and the Gestating Woman
(A) The Medical Risks of Multifetal Pregnancies
Fertility treatment, especially ovulation induction with
clomiphene citrate, greatly increases the risk of pregnancies involving
multiple fetuses. 379 The risks of twin pregnancies are significantly
higher than the risks of singleton pregnancies, and the risks of triplet
or other higher-order pregnancies are dramatically higher than the
risks of singleton pregnancies. 380 In recent years, however, fertility
specialists have begun to develop new protocols to reduce the risk of
multiples.
Multifetal pregnancies are riskier both for the gestating woman
and the gestated fetuses. For example, women gestating multiples are
more likely to suffer from severe gestational hypertension, which may
require hospitalization; fifteen percent of women gestating twins and
thirty percent of women gestating triplets have to be hospitalized for
this condition.3 8 1 Multiple fetuses also increase the risk of caesarean
delivery.3 82
The risks to the fetuses are even more distressing.3 83 Compared
to singletons, multiples have a significantly higher risk of stillbirth. 384
The risk of preterm delivery and low birth weight is also much higher
in multifetal pregnancies, especially in triplet and higher-order
pregnanciesY.3 5 Low birth weight babies in turn have a much higher
378 See supra note 376 and accompanying text.
379 See RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 115-16.
380 See KEARNEY, supra note 39, at 283-84.
381 Id. at 283.
382 Id.
383 See, e.g., William N. Spellacy et al., A Case-Control Study of 1253 Twin Pregnancies from
a 1982-1987 Perinatal Data Base, 75 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 168, 170-71 (1990) (dis-
cussing the problems associated with twin pregnancies).
384 See id. at 169-70.
385 See Michael 0. Gardner et al., The Origin and Outcome of Preterm Twin Pregnancies, 85
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 553, 553 (1995) ("Twins accounted for a disproportional
amount of preterm birth and associated morbidity and mortality."); Laura A. Schieve et al.,
Live-Birth Rates and Multiple-Birth Risk Using In Vitro Fertilization, 282 JAMA 1832, 1832
(1999) ("Multiple-birth infants are at significant risk for . . . preterm delivery, low birth
weight, congenital malformations, fetal and infant death, and long-term morbidity and
disability among survivors."). Thirty to fifty percent of twin deliveries are preterm and
seventy-five to one hundred percent of triplet deliveries are preterm. See KEARNEY, supra
note 39, at 283. Over fifty percent of IVF twins and seventy-five percent of IVF triplets are
low birth weight. Id.
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risk of cerebral palsy.3 8 6 Multiples also have a higher risk of congeni-
tal abnormalities and certain diseases. 387 Compared to singletons,
twins are five times more likely to die during the first year of life, and
triplets and other higher-order multiples are thirteen times more
likely to die during the first year of life.388
The medical costs of multifetal pregnancies are significantly
higher than the medical costs of delivering singletons, largely due to
the increased medical risks of multifetal pregnancies. The cost of a
triplet delivery is often over $100,000389 and, in some cases, can be
more than $1 million. 390
Fertility treatment involving ovarian stimulation increases the risk
of multiples. 391 Fertility doctors are better able to reduce the number
of multifetal pregnancies if the fertility procedure is an IVF proce-
dure, rather than a clomiphene cycle with artificial insemination or
intercourse. Ovulation induction with clomiphene and ovarian stimu-
lation by injectable gonadotropins both cause a woman's ovaries to
produce multiple egg follicles.3 92 In a typical clomiphene cycle, the
patient attempts to fertilize the eggs either by artificial insemination
or by intercourse.3 93 In this type of procedure, the fertility doctor
does not limit the number of eggs that are fertilized.394
Patients injecting gonadotropins typically try to fertilize the eggs
and implant the embryos in an IVF procedure. 395 In an IVF proce-
dure, the fertility doctor decides how many embryos to implant. Doc-
tors trying to decide how many embryos to implant consider two
competing concerns. First, infertile patients are often financially con-
strained by the high costs of IVF and are willing to risk a multifetal
pregnancy to increase their chances of having a child, so they en-
courage their fertility doctors to transfer as many embryos as possible
386 See P.O.D. Pharoah & T. Cooke, Cerebral Palsy and Multiple Births, 75 ARCHIVES OF
DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD 174, 174 (1996); see also KEARNEY, supra note 39, at 284 ("[T]he risk
of cerebral palsy is about eight times higher for twins and forty-seven times higher [for]
triplets than for singleton births.").
387 See KEARNEv, supra note 39, at 284 (noting that low birth weight babies have a
higher risk of "cardiovascular disease, diabetes, abnormal blood clotting, excessive fat, or
obstructive lung disease later in life"); Spellacy, supra note 383, at 170-71 (finding that
twins have a higher incidence of congenital abnormalities).
388 See Schieve et al., supra note 385, at 1832.
389 See McCullough, supra note 154.
390 SeeJamie Malernee, Blastocyst Transfer, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 27, 1999, at 7C.
391 See generally Allan Templeton & Joan K. Morris, Reducing the Risk of Multiple Births by
Transfer of Two Embryos After In Vitro Fertilization, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 573, 573 (1998)
(noting that "[t]he high rate of multiple births resulting from in vitro fertilization is a
major health issue").
392 See generally KEARNEY, supra note 39, at 204-08 (discussing fertility treatment using
clomiphene).
393 See McCullough, supra note 154.
394 See RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 115.
395 Id. at 176-82.
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in the hope of increasing their chances of getting pregnant.39 6 Sec-
ond, the doctor must consider the significant medical risks of a mul-
tifetal pregnancy.
3 9 7
(B) The Development of New Protocols to Reduce the
Risk of Multifetal Pregnancies
Over the past decade, multiple birth rates have been increasing as
a result of increasing utilization of fertility treatment.398 In 1997, forty
percent of multifetal pregnancies were attributable to ovulation in-
duction without IVF, and forty percent were attributable to ovarian
stimulation with IVF.399 In recent years, the medical community has
expressed serious concerns about rising multiple birth rates and has
called for the adoption of measures to decrease the risk of multi-
ples.40 0 Numerous researchers, including doctors from the Centers
for Disease Control, have studied the relationship between fertility
treatment and the risk of multiples in order to establish new protocols
to reduce the risk of multiples.
Recent research indicates that the risk of multiples can be signifi-
cantly reduced through a combination of IVF and new treatment pro-
tocols. Researchers have discovered that they now can better predict
the risk of multiples in IVF procedures based on: (1) the number of
embryos transferred; (2) the age of the eggs (i.e., the age of the
woman whose eggs are fertilized); and (3) the quality of the embryos
available for implantation. 40 1 Various studies have made recommen-
dations regarding the optimal number of embryos to transfer in order
to balance patients' interests in maximizing pregnancy rates with the
risks of multifetal pregnancies. 40 2
396 Jane E. Allen, Limiting Embiyos, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2004, at F3 (noting that patients
pressure doctors to transfer a greater number of embryos, especially where patients have
incurred substantial treatment costs). See also supra notes 85, 90 and accompanying text
(discussing the costs of IVF and financial strains caused by IVF).
397 See KEARNEv, supra note 39, at 281-85.
398 See McCullough, supra note 154 (observing that the rate of high-order multiples
increased from 37 per 100,000 births in 1980 to 173 per 100,000 births in 1997); RichardJ.
Paulson, ASRM NEWS, Spring 2001, at 7 (2001) ("[T]he incidence of triplet and high order
multiple births in the United States increased from 29 per 100,000 in 1971 to 174 per
100,000 in 1997.").
399 See Paulson, supra note 398, at 7.
400 See, e.g., id. ("The high incidence of multiple gestations following assisted reproduc-
tive technologies (ART) is perhaps the most vexing problem confronting the reproductive
endocrinologist today.... The most obvious strategy to [reduce the risk of multiples]
involves transferring fewer embryos .... However, since pregnancy rates are directly re-
lated to the number of embryos transferred, this approach also decreases the clinical preg-
nancy rates.").
401 See, e.g., Schieve et al., supra note 385, at 1836.
402 One study concluded that, where the ovarian stimulation resulted in at least four
embryos, transferring more than two good-quality embryos did not increase the overall
birth rate, but substantially increased the multiple birth rate. See Templeton & Morris,
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In November 1999, the American Society of Reproductive
Medicine (ASRM) issued new treatment guidelines regarding the
number of embryos to be transferred in IVF procedures. These guide-
lines provide, for example, that no more than two embryos are to be
transferred if the patient is thirty-four or younger and the quality and
quantity of the embryos are good.40 3 In recent years, fertility doctors
have transferred fewer embryos per cycle than in earlier years.40 4 The
average number of embryos transferred has dropped from four em-
bryos per cycle in 1995 to three embryos per cycle in 2001.405 Recent
data also indicate that multiple birth rates attributable to IVF have
declined significantly since the adoption of the new treatment
protocols.
40 6
Reducing the risk of multiples in ovulation induction with
clomiphene is less precise. IUI is less precise because the doctor has
less control over the fertilization process than in IVF. In all ovulation
induction procedures, a doctor must monitor the developing follicles
in order to determine how many will probably reach maturity during
the cycle. 40 7 If numerous follicles (i.e., six or more) will mature, vari-
ous protocols can be used to reduce the risk of multiples. One proto-
col is to cancel the cycle and try again with a lower dose in a future
cycle. 408 A recent study indicates that, if six or more follicles are de-
supra note 391, at 573. Another study concluded that: (1) for women age thirty-four or
younger, the optimal number of embryos to transfer is two; and (2) for women age forty or
older, the optimal number of embryos to transfer is up to five regardless of quality. See
Schieve et. al., supra note 385, at 1832. Another study concluded that the optimal number
of embryos to transfer was limited to three, even for older women, where there were at
least four embryos available to transfer. See Selim Sen6z et al., An IVF Fallacy: Multiple
Pregnancy Risk Is Lower for Older Women, 14J. ASSISTED REPROD. & GENETICS 192, 192 (1997).
Yet another study concluded that transferring two embyros instead of three does not re-
duce pregnancy rates significantly, provided that at least one good quality embryo is trans-
ferred. See Murat Ta~demir et al., Two Instead of Three Embryo Transfer in In-Vitro Fertilization,
10 HUM. REPROD. 2155, 2157 (1995).
403 See Am. Soc. of Reprod. Med., Committee Opinion, Guidelines on Number of Embryos
Transferred (1999).
404 Allen, supra note 396.
405 Id.
406 Id. Allen reports that the rate of triplet and other higher order multiple births
after IVF dropped from 11.4% in 1997 to 7.4% in 2001: "A key reason ... is that doctors
began voluntarily limiting the number of embryos they implant." Id. During 1997 to 2001,
the rate of twins after IVF "held steady, even as the nation's overall rate of twins rose." See
also Tarun Jain et al., Trends in Embryo-Transfer Practice and in Outcomes of the Use of Assisted
Reproductive Technology in the United States, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1639 (2004) (concluding
that the rate of IVF pregnancies with three or more fetuses declined significantly between
1997 and 2001, as doctors followed the new treatment protocols and transferred fewer
embryos).
407 See RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 115-16. Some highly publicized multi-
ple births resulted from the use of clomiphene without adequate medical monitoring. See
id. at 116.
408 See id. Even if the doctor cancels the cycle (meaning the doctor stops the ovulation
induction drugs and does not do an IUI), the patient may still get pregnant after inter-
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veloping well, canceling the cycle significantly reduces the risk of mul-
tiples.4 09 Another approach is to extract some of the developing
follicles by needle aspiration and proceed with the cycle.
4 10
A recent study concluded that the risk of multiples is more effec-
tively controlled in IVF than in ovulation induction with IUI. 41 1 The
ASRM is considering whether IVF should be used more widely, instead
of ovulation induction, to reduce the risk of multiples.
4 12
Reducing the patient's out of pocket cost for fertility treatment
also reduces the rate of multiple births. Significantly, the risk of multi-
ples, especially triplets and higher-order multiples, is lower in states that man-
date comprehensive insurance coverage of infertility.4 13 With insurance
coverage of infertility, there is less financial pressure associated with
each cycle, so patients are more willing to be treated conservatively.
iii. Other Risks to the Child or Children Gestated
(A) Other Medical Risks
For the child or children being gestated, almost all of the medical
risks associated with fertility treatment are caused by multifetal
pregnancies4 14 or by the underlying cause of the infertility (such as in
utero exposure to DES).415 There is no conclusive evidence that TVF
increases the risk that the child or children gestated will have birth
defects or chromosomal abnormalities. 4
16
ICSI, 4 17 a new type of fertility treatment developed about ten
years ago, has been found to increase the risk of certain types of chro-
mosomal abnormalities, however. 418 ICSI is used in conjunction with
IVF in cases involving severe male factor infertility.4 19 In an ICSI pro-
cedure, an embryologist or technician injects a single sperm into a
course. See id. The resulting pregnancy may be a multifetal pregnancy, but some couples
are willing to take this risk. See id.
409 See Richard P. Dickey et al., Relationship of Follicle Numbers and Estradiol Levels to Mul-
tiple Implantation in 3,608 Intrauterine Insemination Cycles, 75 FERTILITY & STERILITY 69, 69, 77
(2001).
410 See McCullough, supra note 154.
411 Id.
412 Id.
413 See RESOLVE Responds to New Report on Trends in Multiple Births Following Infertility
Treatment, PR NEwswIRE, June 22, 2000, available at LEXIS, Wire Service Stories.
414 See supra notes 383-88.
415 See RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 137-38.
416 See KEARNEY, supra note 39, at 286-87.
417 See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
418 See KEARNEY, supra note 39, at 121-26.
419 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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single egg.420 ICSI dramatically increases fertilization rates,42 1 and has
been used much more frequently in the last few years.422
At the time ICSI was developed, geneticists expressed concerns
that ICSI posed two types of potential risks: first, the physical process
of injecting a needle into the egg to deposit the sperm might cause
genetic damage; and second, ICSI may allow a father, who has a ge-
netic defect and would have been unable to have children without
ICSI, to pass that genetic defect on to his child.423 Thus far, the first
potential problem has not materialized. 424 There is no evidence that
ICSI increases the risk of birth defects. 425 The second concern, how-
ever, is a potential problem. Studies have concluded that ICSI in-
creases the risk of passing various chromosomal abnormalities, some
of which are serious, to children conceived through ICSI.426
The great benefit of ICSI is that it can permit men with severe
male factor infertility to conceive. 427 The problem is that many differ-
ent genetic defects can cause male factor infertility, and only some of
these defects have been identified.428 Given that fact, it is currently
impossible to screen for all of the types of genetic defects that the
father may pass on to the child. 429 Some sex-based chromosomal de-
fects will render the children infertile like their fathers.430 Others can
cause serious conditions such as cystic fibrosis43 1 and Turner's
Syndrome. 4
32
420 See KEARNEY, supra note 39, at 118.
421 See id. at 115-16.
422 During 1998, ICSI was used in about forty percent of ART cycles. CTRS. FOR Dis-
EASE CONTROL & PREVENTION ET AL., 1998 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS
RATES 29 (1998). In 2001, ICSI was used in 45.8% of ART cycles. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CON-
TROL & PREVENTION ET AL., 2000 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES 37
(2000). In 2001, about seventy-eight percent of couples suffering from male factor infertil-
ity used ICSI in their ART cycles. See 2001 CDC REPORT, supra note 48, at 40.
423 See KEARNEY, supra note 39, at 120-21.
424 See id. at 121.
425 Id.
426 Id. at 121-23.
427 See id. at 116; supra note 71 and accompanying text.
428 See id. at 125.
429 Id.
430 See id. at 122.
431 Some men do not have the tubes that connect the testes and the urethra. See id. at
126. This abnormality is called congenital absence of the vas deferens (CAVD). Id. Men
with CAVD may produce normal sperm in the testes, but the sperm cannot leave the testes
so they cannot fertilize an egg naturally. See id The sperm of men with CAVD can be
removed surgically and injected into an egg using ICSI, but men with CAVD carry the
genetic defect that causes cystic fibrosis. Id. If such sperm is inserted into an egg that
comes from a woman who is also a cystic fibrosis carrier, the child could have a very serious
case of cystic fibrosis. Id. Women can be screened now to determine if they are cystic
fibrosis carriers, but this genetic test was not available when ICSI was first used. Id.
432 See id. at 122. Turner's Syndrome causes a variety of physical abnormalities, heart
and kidney problems, and infertility. See id.
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Still, the vast majority of children born as a result of ICSI are
normal. 433 In addition, some risks associated with using ICSI can be
reduced. For example, genetic testing of the patient and his partner
can detect certain chromosomal abnormalities. 434 Also, the risk of
transmitting defects carried on the Y chromosome can be reduced,
but not eliminated, by transferring only female embryos in the IVF
procedure. 435
Children of older mothers have a higher risk of certain chromo-
somal abnormalities. 43 6 For example, the child of a forty-year-old
woman has a 1 in 100 probability of having Down syndrome. 4 37 The
age of the egg determines the age-related risks, so using eggs donated
from a younger woman reduces these risks.438
(B) Potential Psychological Risks
The first IVF child was born in 1978, 4 3 9 so researchers have had
time to study the emotional and psychological development of chil-
dren conceived through assisted reproductive technologies. Numer-
ous longitudinal studies have concluded that the social and emotional
development of IVF children is normal.4 40 Studies have also con-
cluded that parents who become parents after fertility treatment gen-
erally parent well. 4 41
Mental health professionals caution, however, that children cre-
ated through fertility treatment, especially third-party treatments like
sperm donation, egg donation, or surrogacy, may be harmed psycho-
logically if the parents keep the child's origins a secret.4 42 Secrecy in
connection with fertility treatment dates back 100 years to the early
days of sperm donation. 443 Medical doctors thought it would be best
for the family and for the children to keep the sperm donation a se-
cret, not realizing the negative impact that such a secret could have
on the entire family in the future.4 44
433 See id. at 121.
434 See id. at 126.
435 See id.
436 See RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 149.
437 Id.
438 SeeJARE-r & RAUSCH, supra note 28, at 143.
439 See RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 12.
440 See, e.g., Susan Golombok et al., The "Test-Tube" Generation: Parent-Child Relationships
and the Psychological Well-Being of In Vitro Fertilization Children at Adolescence, 72 CHILD DEV.
599, 605-08 (2001).
441 See, e.g., Susan Golombok et al., Families Created by the New Reproductive Technologies:
Quality of Parenting and Social and Emotional Development of the Children, 66 CHILD DEv. 285,
285 (1995) (concluding that "the quality of parenting in families with a child conceived by
assisted conception is superior to that shown by families with a naturally conceived child").
442 See COOPER & GLAZER, supra note 20, at 350-57.
443 See id. at 340.
444 See id. at 341.
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As late as ten years ago, several studies indicated that most of the
families that had resorted to sperm donation had decided not to tell
the children. 445 As mental health professionals have become much
more involved in fertility treatment, however, they have urged parents
to be open with their children about their origins because secrets can
have very negative effects on family dynamics and on the child who
later in life discovers the secret.446
b. The Judgments About Fertility Treatment that May Be Affected
by Heuristics and Biases
i. The Potential for Overestimating the Chances of Success
Fertility patients need accurate information about their various
treatment options in order to make informed decisions about their
treatment. In 1992, Congress enacted the Fertility Clinic Success Rate
and Certification Act to make it easier for infertile patients to obtain
such information. 447 This legislation requires the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) to compile and publish success rates
for assisted reproductive technology treatments performed at hun-
dreds of U.S. fertility clinics. 448
The December 2003 CDC report provides data for fertility treat-
ment during calendar year 200 1.449 This report, the 2001 Assisted Re-
productive Technology Success Rates (2001 CDC Report), is based on
national data, and includes the success rates for 384 specific fertility
clinics.450 The national data are based on information gathered from
107,587 ART cycles administered in 2001.451
The data indicate a twenty-seven percent live birth rate per ART
cycle.4 52 Broken down by age of the mother, the live birth rate per
cycle was:
(1) 35 percent for women ages 34 or younger;
(2) 28 percent for women ages 35 to 37;
445 See id. at 343.
446 See id. at 351-52.
447 See Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-493,
§ 2, 106 Stat. 3146 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 263a-l-a-7 (2004)). For a discussion of the
events leading up to the enactment of this law, see KEARNEY, supra note 39, at 32-34.
448 See Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992 § 2(a). The CDC
works with the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART), a professional organ-
ization of fertility doctors, and RESOLVE, the National Infertility Association, to compile
the data. See 2001 CDC REPORT, supra note 48, at iv.
449 See 2001 CDC REPORT, supra note 48, at 4-5. The statistics in the report include the
percentage of live births per treatment cycle for each clinic, which means that the most
recent data relate back to fertility treatment cycles from a year earlier. A live birth is de-
fined as "the delivery of one or more live-born infants." Id. at 15.
450 Id. at 5.
451 Id. at 11.
452 Id. at 17.
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(3) 20 percent for women ages 38 to 40; and
(4) 10 percent for women ages 41 to 42453
The report further breaks down the live birth rate per cycle for
women forty and older:
(1) 15.9 percent for 40-year-old women;
(2) 11.4 percent for 41-year-old women;
(3) 9 percent for 42-year-old women;
(4) 5.9 percent for 43-year-old women; and
(5) 2.9 percent for women ages 44 and older.454
Live birth rate per cycle is also broken down based on the infertil-
ity diagnosis:
(1) Male factor: 32 percent;
(2) Endometriosis: 30.8 percent;
(3) Ovulatory dysfunction: 30.6 percent;
(4) Tubal factor: 27.5 percent;
(5) Uterine factor: 25 percent;
(6) Other causes: 25.7 percent; and
(7) Unexplained cause: 28.5 percent.45 5
These rates can be considered in relation to the overall
probability of a couple getting pregnant in one natural cycle with no
fertility treatment, which is ten percent or less per cycle. 456 This com-
parison can be misleading, however, because couples trying to get
pregnant naturally can try every month, but couples do not usually go
through more than two or three ART cycles in a year because of the
high costs and difficulties involved. 45 7
Instead of focusing on per cycle success rates, infertile patients
might want to know the cumulative success rates for ART cycles, mean-
ing the end result success rates where the patient goes through multi-
ple, sequential ART cycles. 458 Geneticist Brian Kearney frames this
issue in the following way:
If high-tech conception were like rolling dice, cumulative success
rates could be calculated directly from the per-cycle success rates.
Every time you roll a die, the probability of coming up with any of
the numbers is 1 in 6 (17 percent). If you keep rolling, eventually
you will come up with your target number. For example, the
probability of rolling a six is 17 percent after a single throw. After
three rolls the probability of rolling a six at least once is 43 percent,
and after eight rolls it is 77 percent. The key here is that the die
never changes. No matter how many times you roll it, it still has six
453 Id. at 25.
454 Id. at 23.
455 Id. at 27.
456 See KEARNEY, supra note 39, at 25-26.
457 See id. at 26.
458 See id. at 40.
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sides, and the probability of rolling any of the numbers will always
be 1 in 6 for each throw. If high-tech conception worked the same way, a
couple would eventually give birth if they started enough cycles .... The
question is whether using high-tech conception is like rolling
dice.4 59
Various studies have tried to determine cumulative success rates
for IVF, but they have reached conflicting conclusions. 460 Some stud-
ies have concluded that success rates drop sharply after the first unsuc-
cessful IVF; others have concluded that success rates stay the same for
six or more cycles.46 1 Kearney believes these studies warrant some
skepticism, however, because they all suffer certain methodological
limitations. 462 In his view, the most reliable study is a United King-
dom study that included data from almost 37,000 cycles during the
years 1991 through 1994.463 That study concluded: "[T] he probability
of live births per cycle significantly declined with each successive at-
tempt at IVF, even when the results were adjusted for the age of the
mother. ' 464 Based on this study, Kearney argues that "IVF is not like
rolling dice. It's worse. If a couple doesn't give birth by the fourth
attempt, they are unlikely to be successful continuing the same treat-
ment and should consider alternatives. 46 5
Infertile patients may assume, contrary to the conclusion reached
in the U.K. study, that fertility treatment is like rolling dice and that
they will get pregnant and have a baby if they simply persist with fertil-
ity treatment.46 6 Thus, patients may overestimate the chances of their
treatment being successful.
Patients may also overestimate the odds of success in later individ-
ual cycles due to the "gambler's fallacy." 467 For example, patients may
459 Id. at 40-41.
460 See id. at 43.
461 Id.
462 See id.
463 See id. at 43-44.
464 Id. at 44 (emphasis omitted).
465 Id.
466 See supra note 461 and accompanying text.
467 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, inJUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 7 (Daniel Kahneman et
al. eds., 1982). Tversky and Kahneman explain the gambler's fallacy:
People expect that a sequence of events generated by a random process will
represent the essential characteristics of that process even when the se-
quence is short. In considering tosses of a coin for heads or tails, for exam-
ple, people regard the sequence H-T-H-T-T-H to be more likely than the
sequence H-H-H-T-T-T, which does not appear random, and also more
likely than the sequence H-H-H-H-T-H, which does not represent the fair-
ness of the coin. Thus, people expect that the essential characteristics of
the process will be represented, not only globally in the entire sequence,
but also locally in each of its parts. [A] consequence of the belief in local
representativeness is the well-known gambler's fallacy. After observing a
long run of red on the roulette wheel,. .. most people erroneously believe
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assume that, with a twenty percent per cycle success rate for IVF, the
odds of success after four unsuccessful cycles would be much higher
than twenty percent in their next IVF cycle. In fact, the chance of
success may remain the same for each IVF cycle regardless of how
many times the couple has tried IVF in the past.4 6 8 On the other
hand, many other types of medical treatment require patients to make
similar calculations of their odds of success. Some of these judgments
may be as flawed as some of the judgments fertility patients make.
The point is that the tax system should encourage fertility pa-
tients to consider alternative treatment where a specific type of fertil-
ity treatment has failed repeatedly. In particular, it should encourage
patients to consider egg donor or surrogate procedures where IVF has
failed repeatedly.
ii. The Potential for Underestimating the Risks of Multifetal
Pregnancies
Just as fertility patients may overestimate the odds of fertility treat-
ment success, they may also underestimate the medical risks of fertility
treatment, especially the risks associated with multifetal pregnancies.
Recall that multifetal pregnancies, which are more likely with fertility
treatment, pose significant risks for fetuses and the women gestating
them.4 69 Although the risk of a multifetal pregnancy increases as the
number of embryos implanted increases, 470 fertility patients often
press their doctors to implant many embryos in order to increase their
chances of getting pregnant. 47 1 The patients also often are willing to
risk a multifetal pregnancy "for a better chance of becoming preg-
nant."472 Fertility patients may not comprehend the magnitude of the
that black is now due [on the next individual spin], presumably because the
occurrence of black will result in a more representative sequence than the
occurrence of an additional red. Chance is commonly viewed as a self-cor-
recting process in which a deviation in one direction induces a deviation in
the opposite direction to restore the equilibrium. In fact, deviations are
not "corrected" as a chance process unfolds, they are merely diluted.
Id. (citation omitted).
468 See KEARNEY, supra note 39, at 42-45.
469 See supra Part III.C.2.a.ii.
470 See supra note 402 and accompanying text; cf Templeton & Morris, supra note 391,
at 577 (concluding that transfer of two embryos, rather than four, reduces the risk of multi-
ple births).
471 See Templeton & Morris, supra note 391, at 573; supra note 396 and accompanying
text.
472 See KEAPR NEY, supra note 39, at 282. See also Allen, supra note 396. Allen reports that
twenty percent of the infertile patients in a recent study indicated that they would prefer a
multifetal pregnancy. The authors of that study concluded that, among infertile patients,
"a sizable minority prefers the situation that the medical community is trying hard to
avoid." Id.
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medical risks of twin or triplet pregnancies, or the difficulty of raising
triplets.
473
Recall also that it is not clear whether repeated stimulation of a
woman's ovaries increases her risk of ovarian cancer.474 Although the
studies linking ovarian stimulation and ovarian cancer risk have been
discounted due to their methodological limitations, it does not neces-
sarily follow that there is no risk.475 A 1997 study indicates, however,
that women are willing to take ovulation induction drugs even if the
drugs increase their risk of ovarian cancer. 476 In addition, many other
medicines have side effects. Viagra, for example, has immediate life-
threatening side effects. 477
3. The Implications for the Tax Characterization of Fertility
Treatment Costs
a. Medical Care that Cures or Treats Infertility
Medical care that cures or treats infertility includes surgical cor-
rection of varicocele, 478 blocked fallopian tubes,479 and endometri-
osis.48° In some cases, the benefits of these procedures may not be as
great as the benefits of IVF, and these procedures have their own med-
ical risks.481 For example, a woman may be more likely to have an
473 See supra notes 383-88.
474 See supra Part III.C.2.a.i.(B).
475 See KEARNEY, supra note 39, at 269-70.
476 See Rosen, supra note 374, at 90. In the 1997 study, about eighty percent of women
requiring fertility treatment indicated that they would take ovulation induction drugs, even
if the drugs slightly increased their risk of ovarian cancer. Fertility patients may be suffer-
ing from the "it won't happen to me" bias, however. This is described in Paul Slovic et al.,
Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURIS-
TICS AND BIASES, supra note 467, at 463, 468-70. Slovic explains:
Accurate perception of misleading samples of information might also be
seen to underlie another apparent judgmental bias, people's predilection
to view themselves as personally immune to hazards. The great majority of
individuals believe themselves to be better than average drivers, more likely
than average to live past 80, less likely than average to be harmed by prod-
ucts they use, and so on. Although such perceptions are obviously unrealis-
tic, the risks look small from the perspective of each individual's
experience. Consider automobile driving: Despite driving too fast, tailgat-
ing, etc., poor drivers make trip after trip without mishap. This personal
experience demonstrates to them their exceptional skill and safety. Moreo-
ver, their indirect experience via the news media shows them that when
accidents happen, they happen to others.
Id. (citations omitted).
477 Lisa Thomlinson, Viagra Linked to 17 Deaths, THE EVENING STANDARD (LONDON),
May 17, 1999, at 5.
478 See RESOLVING FERTILITY, supra note 2, at 166-67.
479 See id. at 132-35.
480 See id. at 125-27.
481 See id. at 176 (noting that patients should think carefully about whether or not IVF
is the best treatment for their fertility difficulties); KEARNEY, supra note 39, at 24-29 (dis-
cussing the comparative benefits of LVF).
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ectopic pregnancy after tubal surgery.48 2 On the other hand, these
procedures do not involve the risks of ovarian stimulation, including
the risks of hyperstimulation and multifetal pregnancies. 48 3 This type
of medical care should be characterized as a medical expense under
§ 213.
b. Ovarian Stimulation with IUI or IVF
The benefits of ovarian stimulation with IUI or IVF often exceed
the benefits of surgical treatment. Patients express with their wallets
their strong preference for this type of treatment.48 4 The biggest
countervailing consideration is the large, negative effect on welfare
caused by multifetal pregnancies. 4 5 The fertility community and the
CDC are currently developing effective new protocols to reduce the
risk of multifetal pregnancies, so this risk will likely be significantly
reduced as treatment protocols evolve. 486
The risk of multifetal pregnancies will be reduced if IVF is subsi-
dized. The risk of multifetal pregnancies is much easier to control
with IVF than with IUI, but IVF is much more expensive per cycle.
4 8 7
In addition, where patients have less at stake financially, they are more
amenable to conservative treatment, which reduces the risk of mul-
tifetal pregnancies. 48 8 Ovarian hyperstimulation is another medical
risk, but serious cases are not common.48 9 Researchers have not estab-
lished that ovarian stimulation causes ovarian cancer, but additional
research will be done as patients age. 490
Another concern is that infertile patients may overestimate the
benefits of multiple cycles of high-tech treatment and underestimate
the risks of treatment, especially the medical risks associated with mul-
tifetal pregnancies. 49 ' If patients fail to understand that their chances
of success decline with each subsequent attempt,49 2 as is likely the
case, alternative treatments that are more effective, such as donor and
surrogacy procedures, should be encouraged. Fertility treatment
counseling should emphasize the risk of multifetal pregnancies, but
the tax system does not need to eliminate the § 213 deduction for the
costs of IUI and IVF to respond to this risk. In fact, empirical evidence
482 See KEARNEY, supra note 39, at 278-81.
483 See supra Part III.C.2.a.i-ii.
484 See supra notes 80, 85 and accompanying text.
485 See supra Part III.C.2.a.ii.
486 See supra Part III.C.2.a.ii.(B).
487 See supra notes 85-86, 411 and accompanying text.
488 See Templeton & Morris, supra note 391, at 577 (concluding that transferring two
embryos, rather than four, reduces the number of multiple births).
489 See supra note 360 and accompanying text.
490 See supra Part III.C.2.a.i.(B).
491 See supra Part III.C.2.b.i-ii.
492 See supra notes 464-65 and accompanying text.
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indicates that subsidizing fertility treatment reduces the rates of mul-
tifetal pregnancies. 49 3
The costs of IUI and IVF procedures should, on balance, be char-
acterized as medical expenses, given the profound desire of patients
to increase their chances of conceiving and bearing a child, and the
positive effect of subsidies on the risk of multifetal pregnancies.
c. Donor and Surrogate Procedures
Collaborative reproduction, involving a donor or surrogate, pro-
duces great benefits for the parents and child. 494 Although some pa-
tients choose to adopt if they cannot have a biological or gestational
connection to a child, many patients strongly prefer collaborative re-
production to adoption. 495 Also, many parents who would like to
adopt non-special needs babies in the United States cannot because
there is a shortage of such babies. 496 In addition, the tax subsidy for
adoption is typically more generous than the tax subsidy for fertility
treatment costs that are characterized as medical expenses under
§ 213. Thus, the tax law currently favors adoption over collaborative
reproduction, even if the costs of collaborative reproduction are de-
ductible as a medical expense.497
Egg donation involves medical risks to the donor and to the
woman who gestates the fetus or fetuses. 498 Ovarian stimulation of an
egg donor entails the serious but uncommon risk of hyperstimula-
tion.499 Also, an increased risk of ovarian cancer from repeated ova-
rian stimulations is possible, although this risk has not been
established.500 Even if a connection between stimulation and ovarian
cancer is established, egg donors are usually stimulated fewer times
than are fertility patients and they can reduce their ovarian cancer risk
by taking oral contraceptives or bearing a child after donating eggs.501
The infertile woman may also reduce her own risk of ovarian cancer
by proceeding with egg donation and bearing a child, which is an-
493 Cf McCullough, supra note 154 (reporting that the risk of a multifetal pregnancy is
lower in states that mandate comprehensive insurance coverage of infertility).
494 See generally RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 267-85 (providing an overview
of donor and surrogacy procedures).
495 See COOPER & GLAZER, supra note 20, at 246-47.
496 See supra notes 326-28.
497 See supra notes 336-42, 351-53 and accompanying text.
498 See COOPER & GLAZER, supra note 20, at 207-09.
499 See id. at 208; supra Part III.C.2.a.i. (A).
500 See supra Part III.C.2.a.i.(B).
501 See supra notes 375-77.
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other benefit of the procedure. 50 2 The woman who gestates runs the
risks associated with multifetal pregnancies. 50 3
The basic donor fee should be deductible, in part to permit infer-
tile women to conceive and bear a child and, in part, to encourage
infertile women to proceed with a more effective alternative to re-
peated IVF procedures. The deduction for the fee charged by the
donor should be capped by statute to prevent the deduction of exorbi-
tant costs incurred to create a "designer" baby. From the perspective
of the surrogate, the strongest negative is the medical risk associated
with multifetal pregnancies, but, as noted above, this risk can be re-
duced.50 4 The cost of a surrogate procedure should be deductible as
a medical expense, so that the tax treatment of surrogacy costs is less
disadvantaged relative to the tax treatment of adoption, and is compa-
rable to the tax treatment of IVF procedures.
CONCLUSION
The experience of infertility is devastating and produces multiple
losses. The treatment of infertility is intensely medical and has been
appropriately likened to the treatment of other chronic illnesses. In-
surance does not typically cover fertility treatment.
Under current law, fertility treatment costs are properly charac-
terized as deductible medical expenses. Internal Revenue Code § 213
provides that "medical expenses" include costs incurred for "the diag-
nosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the
purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body."50 5 The
term "medical expense" is defined by reference to a baseline of nor-
mal biological functioning, which includes reproductive and sexual
functioning. Most people conceive and bear children without having
to incur expenses for fertility treatment. Expenses incurred to try to
return to or approximate this baseline of normal reproductive health
are deductible, even if the taxpayer winds up "better off," with a child
after the fertility treatment. Infertility is a loss, just as a broken leg is a
loss.
Some have argued that fertility treatment costs should not be de-
ductible as medical expenses because people can lead a "normal" life
without having children. This argument is flawed, however, because
people who desperately want to bear a child, but cannot because of a
physiological condition, are not leading a "normal" life.
502 See supra notes 376-77. Taking oral contraceptives to reduce ovarian cancer risk
will be unacceptable to many fertility patients.
503 See RESOLVING INFERTILITY, supra note 2, at 274; supra Part III.C.2.a.ii. (A).
504 See supra Part III.C.2.a.ii.
505 I.R.C. § 213(d)(1)(A) (2000).
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The IRS has taken the position that certain types of fertility treat-
ment costs are not medical expenses. For example, the IRS has ar-
gued that surrogacy expenses do not satisfy the second "structure or
function" prong of the medical expense definition because the surro-
gate, not the taxpayer, bears the child. Surrogacy costs are medical
expenses, however, under the first "disease or condition" prong of the
definition.
The characterization of fertility treatment costs as medical ex-
penses is also controversial from a normative perspective. Given the
existence of the § 213 medical expense deduction, however, taxpayers
should be able to deduct the cost of IVF, donor, and surrogate proce-
dures. Similarly, they should be able to deduct the costs of medical
care for sexual dysfunction, such as Viagra, and other types of medical
care that facilitate reproductive choice.
Reproduction is extremely important to most people and the
elasticity of demand for fertility treatment is likely low. In addition,
allowing taxpayers to deduct the costs of various types of fertility treat-
ment will: (1) encourage infertile taxpayers to elect the most effective
medical treatment option for their particular fertility problem,
whether it is an IVF procedure, an egg donor procedure, or a surro-
gate procedure; and (2) reduce the rate of risky multifetal pregnancies.
Even if fertility treatment costs continue to be characterized as medi-
cal expenses, the tax code favors adoption over fertility treatment be-
cause the medical expense deduction saves taxpayers less money than
the tax credit for adoption expenses. Due to the vital importance of
reproduction to most people, fertility treatment costs should be de-
ductible under either an "ability-to-pay" or a consequentialist norma-
tive approach.
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